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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1. Rationale 
 
The two years of study at the University of Waikato have led me to a growing 
fascination with the field of human security, particularly globalization, environment 
and development politics along with the policies, ethnic conflicts and indigenous 
affairs in Southeast Asia.  In particular, Dr. Keith Barber, who specializes in 
contemporary ethnic conflicts and rural/urban settlements in Papua New Guinea and 
West Papua, has influenced my interest in the ongoing conflict occurring in West 
Papua which contains issues regarding globalization, environmental justice, 
development politics and policies, ethnic conflict and indigenous rights. 
Also, it is revealed in this thesis that West Papua was unwillingly incorporated 
into the Indonesian Republic.  As a result, West Papuans have lived under 
unacceptable oppression and human rights violations conducted by the Indonesian state, 
the Indonesian Military (Tentera Nasional Indonesia-TNI), the Indonesian enterprises 
and the multinational companies (MNCs) such as Freeport McMoRan.   
 
I have been long concerned about the human rights situation in Indonesia, 
especially in West Papua where human rights abuses by both multinational corporations 
and the TNI are concentrated.  These violations of human rights are the result of 
conflict over the rich natural resources contained there.  The revelation of recent 
human rights situations in West Papua by the Indonesian Human Right Committee 
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(IHRC) fuelled my concern and desire to contribute to moving the situation forward by 
investigating the issues and exploring possible solutions through academic research.  
In fact, the Western Highlands of West Papua, where Freeport McMoRan operates, has 
been one of the areas where the human rights violations have been concentrated.  Yet, 
only a limited amount of research has been done regarding the Freeport’s social policies 
and the prospect of settling the dispute within its mining area.  Thus, it was these 
factors that led me to further research on this area. 
 
2. Background (About West Papua, West Papuans, Freeport McMoRan and 
Amungme and Kamoro) 
This section first provides concise information about West Papua and West 
Papuans and then introduces the Freeport McMoRan mining company and the 
Amungme and Kamoro communities.  West Papua is the western half of the New 
Guinea island.  It is located in the bottom of Southeast Asian region, north of Australia 
and north-west of New Zealand.  It was first colonized between 1828-1962 by the 
Netherlands and then from 1963 by Indonesia.  A central West-East trending mountain 
range dominates the geography of New Guinea island.  The island measures a total 
length of over 1600 km and its western region is about 100 km across and 600 km 
long.1  Both the north and west parts of West Papua include mountains, measuring 
1000 to 2000 m above sea level, and is covered by a significant amount of rain forest 
with warm humid climate throughout the year. 2   There are several precipitous 
mountains which reach up to 5000 m high along the range (including the Puncak Jaya, 
                                                  
1 West Papua New Guinea National Congress. In West Papua Today You could be Murdered (Shot), Jailed, Tortured, Tried and 
  Convicted of Treason and Jailed for 20 Years for Carrying Out or Even Attending or Observing Such Activities. 2006.  
http://www.wpngnc.org/flagraising.htm 
2 Ibid. 
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the highest mountain on the New Guinea island) and this provides a stable supply of 
rain from the tropical atmosphere.3  West Papua has 40 islands, 12 lakes and 40 major 
rivers.4  The Mamberamo river occasionally referred to as the ‘Amazon of Papua’ is 
the largest river in West Papua and runs through the northern part of the area.5  The 
border with Papua New Guinea (PNG) follows the 141 meridian with one section 
defined by the Fly River.6  The border is usually undefended, and due to this, it has 
witnessed a significant number of illegal aliens and refugees crossing over to PNG to 
escape from the colonialists. 
In terms of demography, the total population of West Papua was approximately 
2,646,489 in 2005.7  The two biggest cities in West Papua are the provincial capital of 
Jayapura, in the northeast, and Sorong in the northwest of the Bird’s Head Peninsula.  
Both cities contain around 200,000 people.8  The indigenous people of West Papua are 
Melanesian, being genetically disposed to curly hair and black skin.  There are 
approximately 312 different tribes, including unknown tribes who inhabit the interior of 
the territory.9  They normally have a root crop subsistence agriculture based on taros 
and sweet potatoes.  At the same time, people in the swamps and lowlands, acquire 
their starches from sago palm which provides a substantially generous gain for an 
extraordinary little effort.  The introduction of domestic and feral pigs in West Papua 
from Southeast Asia was an event which had enormous cultural significance for West 
Papuans.  These pigs are generally regarded as family members.  In some places, they 
follow women to the gardens everyday when they are weaned. 
                                                  
3 Ibid 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Omnipelagos. Western New Guinea. 2006. http://www.omnipelagos.com/entry?n=western_New_Guinea  
8 Ibid. 
9 Survival International. Amungme. 2006. http://www.survival-international.org/tribes.php?tribe_id=15  
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Archaeologists estimate that the ancestors of the West Papuans arrived around 
6,500 years ago.10  While people in other parts of the world still lived through a 
foraging economy, West Papuans had already started gardening.  Until recent times, 
many of them lived within a simple Stone Age culture, decorating their bodies with 
animal skins, bird feathers, pig tusks, shells, and paintings with little clothing.11  Some 
of the more isolated tribes still have almost no communication with the outside world.  
Finally, as in some adjacent east Indonesian provinces as well as Papua New Guinea, 
the majority of West Papuans are Christian.  In the 2000 census, 54 percent of the 
population identified themselves as Protestant, 24 percent as Catholic, 24 percent as 
Muslim, and less than 1 percent as either Buddhist or Hindu.12   There is also 
considerable practice of animism, but this is not recorded by the census. 
The focus turns now to Freeport.  Freeport McMoRan is the mining company 
which originates in Louisiana, the United States (U.S.).  Freeport signed its Contract of 
Work (CoW) with the Indonesian state in 1967 and has operated since.  However, 
during the last four decades since the company started its mining operation, its 
operation has had enormous environmental and social impacts on the adjacent areas and 
Amungme and Kamoro communities who have inhabited in its operating area.  
Situated in the Western Highlands of West Papua, Freeport works together with the Rio 
Tinto company of the United Kingdom (UK), the biggest mining company in the world, 
manage Mt Grasberg, which is the third largest copper mine and the largest gold mine in 
the world.13  The mountain is abundant with gold and copper stocks worth at least U.S. 
                                                  
10 Peter van der Heijden. Papuans in Netherlands New Guinea. 2005. 
   http://www.vanderheijden.org/ng/papuas.html 
11 Ibid. 
12 Omnipelagos. Western New Guinea. 2006. http://www.omnipelagos.com/entry?n=western_New_Guinea  
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/West_New_Guinea 
13 Gedicks, A. Resource Rebels. South End Press: Cambridge, 2001, p. 92. 
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$40 billion.14  It is estimated that one billion tonnes of ore are contained in Mt 
Grasberg which are expected to last for a maximum twenty years.15  In 2005, Grasberg 
mine generated 3, 410,000 oz of silver, 273,900 tonnes of copper and 1,676,000 oz of 
gold and the company’s net income in that year was US $995.1 million.16  The 
company has also been the highest tax payer to the Indonesia.  According to the 
company, it has provided more than U.S. $33 billion in indirect and direct benefits, 
including fees, dividends, royalties and taxes, to Indonesia from 1992 to 2004 and $1.2 
billion in 2005.17  However, only 13 per cent of the Indonesian state revenue from 
Freeport currently goes to West Papuan provincial and local governments and very little 
benefit has gone to the West Papuans until today.18 
     The Amungme (highlanders) and Kamoro (lowlanders) are the native landowners 
of the Tembagapura and Timika areas of West Papua where Freeport has operated gold 
and copper mining and constructed the infrastructure.  Currently, approximately 
13,000 Amungme including around 4,300 in the Freeport operating area, live in the 
highlands of West Papua.19  They engage in a nomadic agriculture, sustaining their 
livelihood by gathering and hunting.  The Amungme have very strong ties to their 
ancestral land and regard the adjacent mountains as sacred.   
The Amungme’s first contact with Westerners was in 1912, when the Alexander 
Wollaston led Dutch climbing expedition was accompanied by an Amungme clan guide 
into the area, and arrived at the base of the Puncak Jaya glacier.  Believing that these 
                                                  
14 Australia West Papua Association.  West Papua Information Kit. 1995. http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/cline/papua/core.htm 
15 Ibid. 
16 Down to Earth. Freeport-Rio Tinto: New Reports Expose Impacts Investors. No 69, May 2006. http://dte.gn.apc.org/69fd4.htm   
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Survival International. Amungme. 2006. http://www.survival-international.org/tribes.php?tribe_id=15  
  Leith, D. The Politics of Power. Freeport in Suharto’s Indonesia. University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu, 2003, pp. 95-96. 
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strange new people would guide them to a mystical place with the promise of perpetual 
life, many Amungme accompanied the expedition down to the lowlands, only to result 
in whole families and communities dying from illness such as malaria.20  Contact with 
outsiders did not occur again for the next two decades until 1936, when a Jean-Jacques 
Dozy led Dutch expedition climbed the glacier.  These Westerners once again visited 
hundreds of Amungme villages, and the welcoming Amungme guided them to Puncak 
Jaya glacier.  Yet, large numbers of Amungme who accompanied the second expedition 
to the lowlands died again through illnesses.  The Amungme then from the early 1940s 
initiated contact themselves with missionaries in the lowlands, though these 
missionaries did not reach the remote Amungme villages until the 1950s.  Due to the 
small number of inhabitants and the inaccessibility of its territory, the Dutch colonial 
authorities (1828-1942) made only occasional medical visits to the Amungme’s territory 
accompanying the missionaries. 
In contrast, approximately 15,000 Kamoro, including around 8,000 in the 
Freeport operation area live in the lowlands of West Papua.21  Surrounded by the 
world’s richest mangrove area, Kamoro live a semi-nomadic life-style, shifting their few 
belongings between the excellent fishing areas near the coast and the sago palm forests 
(which begin at the furthest inland extension of the tidal zone).22  The Kamoro made 
first contact with foreigners much earlier than Amungme.  For several centuries 
Kamoro suffered with slave traders coming from adjacent islands and endured fierce 
attacks from the Asmat headhunters in the east.   
                                                  
20 Leith, D. The Politics of Power. Freeport in Suharto’s Indonesia. University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu, 2003, p. 85. 
21 Muller, K. The Kamoro People of the South Coast of Irian Jaya (Papua). 2000. From Papua Web. 
   http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/tema/kamoro/muller/the-kamoro.rtf  
22 Ibid. 
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First contact with Westerners for the western Kamoro was made in 1623 when 
Jan Carstensz, a Dutch explorer led an expedition to ‘discover’ the snowcapped 
mountains.23  Although initial contact with Westerners resulted in the death of many 
Westerners due to the violence by the Kamoro, relations between the two groups 
gradually became more favourable.  At the turning of the twentieth century, the Dutch 
started to map the territory and permitted Chinese traders contact with the Kamoro.  
The first government post in the territory was established in 1926.  In the early 1930s, 
missionaries (who arrived in the territory at the same time as the government) helped 
the government to establish schools and undertake programs to relocate the Kamoro 
into permanent villages.  The contact between the highland Amungme and lowland 
Kamoro also grew after the Jean-Jacques Dozy led the Dutch expedition in 1936.  
During World War II (1942-45), the Kamoro once again suffered from cruel occupation, 
this time by the Japanese.  Yet, for the Amungme and Kamoro, the most significant 
disruption to their lives came with the arrival of Freeport in 1967, which is discussed in 
the following chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
23 Leith, D. The Politics of Power. Freeport in Suharto’s Indonesia. University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu, 2003, p.86. 
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Map 1: West Papua24 
 
Map 2: West Papua in the Regional Context25 
 
                                                  
24 Huibers, R. Papua: People under the Threat. 2000. http://www.photo.nl/Papua/PapuaMap.html 
25 West Papua Information Kit. 2006. http://fandom.net/InfoKit/Src/map.html 
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Figure 1: Amungme people26  
Figure 2: Kamoro people27 
 
                                                  
26 Project Underground. Irian Jaya/West Papua. 1997. http://www.moles.org/ProjectUnderground/pix/amungme.jpg           
27 Netherlands Centre for Indigenous Peoples. Kamoro People. 2003. http://www.nciv.net/site3/img/pap.jpg 
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3. Research Statement, Research Questions and Methodology 
This study examines an ongoing conflict in West Papua between the Amungme 
and Kamoro communities and the Freeport company as well as the Indonesian state and 
the TNI.  It then explores the prospect of further development of the Amungme and 
Kamoro peoples.  The chapters to follow examine how the Freeport company has 
exploited the Amungme and Kamoro and how these two communities resisted the 
oppression by this company.  The following chapters investigate the contemporary 
issues surrounding the two communities.   
     Smith argues that one of the research agendas regarding indigenous 
self-determination is the achievement of social justice which is fought through a 
psychological terrain and ultimately involves a process of healing.28  In fact, as 
discussed in the following chapters, genuine reconciliation between Amungme and 
Kamoro and Freeport is a crucial step to achieve successful community development 
around the mine which will also contribute to the future development of these two 
indigenous communities.  For these reasons, a case study of the South African 
reconciliation processes via the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is 
employed to explore the prospect of achieving genuine reconciliation between 
Amungme and Kamoro communities and Freeport.  The TRC has succeeded, to a 
certain degree, in achieving reconciliation between White and Black South Africans 
after the collapse of the apartheid government.  Its reconciliation processes are 
examined and analyzed and relevant key principles and lessons are applied to the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Forum which is expected to play an important 
                                                  
28 Smith, L T. Decolonizing Methodologies.  Research and Indigenous Peoples. University of Otago Press: Dunedin, 1998. 
   SeeChapter 3, p. 31 of this thesis. 
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role in creating reconciliation between the Amungme and Kamoro communities and the 
Freeport company in West Papua. 
Finally, Harawira argues the importance of an acknowledgement by the 
international community of the ongoing colonization of indigenous people and the right 
of indigenous self-determination.29  As discussed in the following chapters, major 
countries, including the U.S., the UK, New Zealand and Australia, have until today, 
largely disregarded the ongoing colonization of West Papuans by the TNI and the rights 
of West Papuans to self-determination.  Instead, they have supported the Indonesian 
state and the TNI.  For these reasons, the attitude of other Pacific Island states towards 
the issue is examined. 
 
There are two research questions which are addressed through this study.  These 
questions are: 
 
1. What lessons can the MOU Forum learn from the South African TRC in promoting 
genuine reconciliation between the Amungme and Kamoro communities and the 
Freeport company which will lead to successful community development around the 
mine in West Papua? 
 
2. What is the role of the Pacific community, particularly Melanesian community, in 
preventing further TNI abuses against indigenous West Papuans including 
Amungme and Kamoro? 
      
 
                                                  
29 Harawira, S M. Economic Globalization, Indigenous Peoples, and the Role of Indigenous Women. Paper Presented at the Hague 
   Appeal for Peace Conference, May 1999. http://www.apc.org.nz/pma/Mak.htm See Chapter 3, p. 29 of this thesis. 
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     Field research is not employed by this study since the topic involves human rights 
issues and there is a danger of causing harm to people who might participate in the 
research.  Instead, the research presented in the following chapters is conducted 
through the examination, investigation and analysis of primary and secondary published 
sources.  Through such analysis, the thesis attempts to address the two research 
questions raised above, and hopefully provides some solutions to the issues of 
indigenous development and self-determination around the mine in West Papua.    
 
4. Research Limitations 
 
     Although the conflict continues to the present day, the research contained in this 
study outlines the situation in West Papua only up until November 2006.  Also, as 
discussed in the following chapters, there are three main contemporary issues 
surrounding the Amungme and Kamoro communities which are: community 
development, transmigration, and human rights violations by the TNI.  But, due to the 
scale of the thesis, the study is limited to the exploration of possible solutions and 
consequent successful development of Amungme and Kamoro regarding only two of 
these issues and not with the issue of transmigration.  
 
5. Overview of Chapters 
The thesis is set out in eight chapters.  The following chapter examines 
Dependency Theory, a Marxist oriented International Relations theory which examines 
globalization and capitalism, a theory which is relevant to this thesis.  Chapter 3 
provides a review of the literature concerning the definitions and issues relating to the 
indigenous people, indigenous development and indigenous self-determination in West 
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Papua.  The literature reviewed examines a wide range of perspectives from which 
these issues can be approached.  Chapter 4 provides concise information about the 
historical background of West Papua which is followed by a discussion of the 
contemporary social, economic and political situation.  This chapter allows readers to 
gain an overview of the historical and contemporary situation in West Papua.  This 
may promote an understanding of the dispute around the mining area which is further 
discussed in the following chapters.  Chapter 5 investigates the background of the 
conflict around the mine between Amungme and Kamoro, Freeport, the Indonesian state 
and the TNI.  Chapter 6 identifies the contemporary issues surrounding Amungme and 
Kamoro communities by examining and analyzing academic publications, journals, 
media articles, organizational documents and official publications.  Chapter 7 explores 
the prospects of achieving the successful development of the Amungme and Kamoro 
communities.  Here, a case study of the South African reconciliation processes via 
TRC is employed.  The attitudes of Pacific community, particularly Melanesian 
community, towards the issues of TNI abuses against indigenous West Papuans in West 
Papua are also examined.  Chapter 8 utilizes findings from the research to answer the 
two initial research questions stated above.  Then, the relevance of the theories 
employed by this thesis is discussed.  Finally, through its findings, it is hoped that this 
thesis will help provide some possible solutions to the conflict in West Papua which 
will lead to the future development and prosperity of the Amungme and Kamoro 
peoples. 
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Chapter 2 
Globalization and International Relations Theory 
 
This chapter provides a definition of globalization and capitalism and then briefly 
describes the structuralist view of international relations which culminates into a 
discussion of Dependency Theory.  Dependency Theory, a Marxist oriented 
international relations theory examines the impact of globalization and capitalism.  The 
theory is a predominant variant of Structuralism (neo-Marxist theory) and has been 
influential in developing a structuralist view within the contemporary discipline of 
international relations theory.  Dependency Theory is relevant to the thesis because it 
explains the economic development of a state in terms of external influences such as the 
political, economic, and cultural on domestic development policies.  In a nutshell, it 
explains the phenomenon of continuous poverty in developing states.   
 
1. Globalization and Capitalism 
 
     This section provides definitions of globalization and capitalism which are 
examined in the following discussion of Structuralism and Dependency Theory.  
Harawira, as well as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and Moore, define globalization as a 
process of integration and interaction among the governments, firms and people of 
various states.30  It is a process spurred by global investment and trade which is 
                                                  
30 Harawira, S M. The New Imperial Order.  Huia Publishers: Wellington, 2005, p. 6. 
 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). What is Globalization. 2006. 
http://www.globalization101.org/What_is_Globalization.html 
International Monetary Fund. Globalization: Threat or Opportunity? 2000. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm 
World Bank. Poverty in an Age of Globalization. 2000, p. 1. 
http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization/documents/povertyglobalization.pdf 
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assisted by the advent of information technology.  The evolution of information 
technology and the dissemination of the open market economy have accelerated the 
pace of globalization over the past few decades.31 
 
Saunders, Rogers and Norberg say that capitalism refers to an economic system 
based on market exchange, production for profit and the private ownership of 
property.32  It is a system in which groups of individuals or individuals themselves 
compete with each other to accumulate affluence by buying the right to use capital, land 
and labour to generate services or goods and selling them in an open market for profit.33  
It is also “a system where the individual is his own master and the master of his property, 
with the power to make contracts and start up a business, who has the ability to move 
about, travel and trade regardless of national boundaries.”34  Decision making, as much 
as possible, remains with individuals, rather than with the state. 
 
2. Structuralism 
 
Structural theory of international relations is largely influenced by Marxism and is 
sometimes referred to as neo-Marxism, scientific Marxism, or structural Marxism.  
Structuralism has been significant in the history of international relations theory, and 
continues to have great relevance today.  The theory addresses issues of justice and 
harmony in societies, especially in developing states.  Generally, structuralism is 
regarded as a ‘bottom up’ view of the world that prioritizes the predicament of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Moore, M. A World Without Walls. Freedom, Development, Free Trade and Global Governance. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2003, p. 16. 
31 See Endnote 1. 
32 Saunders, P. Capitalism. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1995, p. 9.   
Rogers, W M. Third Millennium Capitalism: Convergence of Economic, Energy and Environmental Forces. Westport, Conn: 
Quorum, 2000, p. 11. 
Norberg, J. Capitalism-Questions and Answers. 2006. http://www.johannorberg.net/?page=indefense_qa 
33 Saunders, P. Capitalism. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1995, p. 9. 
34 Norberg, J. Capitalism-Questions and Answers. 2006. http://www.johannorberg.net/?page=indefense_qa 
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oppressed, the alienated, and the poor.  In terms of core principles, structuralists 
perceive the initial units of analysis as not states, but the interconnected and conflictual 
global capitalist economy and its manufacturing and exchange systems and social 
classes.  The reason behind this view is that the state-system is determined by the 
global capitalist economic system, or they manifested together and are therefore 
mutually constitutive.35  It is also because global capitalist economic relationships are 
formed in order to benefit particular privileged classes.  Consequently, the resulting 
‘world-system’ is initially unfair, and it leads to inter-state disputes.  Hence, 
structuralists perceive these disputes as a core process in international relations.  
Structuralists also regard the disputes as due to the structure in which inter-state 
(economic) relationships occur.  Finally, structuralism focuses on the significance of 
non-state actors and systematic relationships of dependence and domination, rather than 
the disorder of the state structure, or complicated interdependence under the global 
capitalist economic system.36 
 
Another core principle of structuralism is its emphasis on the link between 
economies and politics.  It highlights the significance of the overall structure of 
relationships within which economic and political interactions occur, and the 
mechanism and processes that assist this very structure.  That is to say, actors of the 
world system, states, transnational elites, multinational companies, and so on, have to be 
understood according to their position in the overall system of global capitalism.37  Yet, 
structuralists also believe that although these actors play a vital role in sustaining the 
                                                  
35 Rahming, A. J. Introduction to World Politics. POLS 113 (Course Note)  
 Lecture 8: Marxism and Structuralism. Victoria University of Wellington: Wellington, 2004, p. 4. 
36 Steans, J and Pettiford, L. Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives & Themes. Second Edition. Pearson Education   
   Limited: England, 2005, p. 75. 
37 See Endnote 2. 
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global capitalist order, classes are the core factors of it.  Furthermore, inter-state 
relations, or international relations, are determined by the nature of global capitalist 
economic relationship.  Thus, structuralists argue that it makes more sense to examine 
international relations by reference to the larger picture than by analyzing each action, 
event and actor individually. 
 
3. Dependency Theory 
 
Dependency Theory is one of the two important variants of structuralism in the 
contemporary discipline of international relations theory.  The theory explains the 
economic development of a state in relation to external influences - cultural, economic, 
and political - on national development policies and ongoing poverty in the developing 
states.  In detail, there are several key views which most dependency theorists share.  
Firstly, they see the global system as composed of two kinds of states, positioned as 
dominant or dependant.  According to these theorists, the dominant states are the 
economically advanced states in the Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).  Dependant states include those of Asia, Latin America, and 
Africa, states which have low per capita Gross National Product (GNP)s and which 
depend heavily on the exportation of a single commodity for earning foreign 
exchange.38 
 
Secondly, dependency theorists argue that dominant states actively, but not 
necessary intentionally, create a state of dependency within dependant states via 
several policies and initiatives.  These policies and initiatives include 
communications, foreign assistance, global commodity markets, and MNCs, through 
                                                  
38 Ferraro, V. Dependency Theory: An Introduction. 1996. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/depend.htm 
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which the dominant states can promote their economic interests within the outside 
world.39  Moreover, dependency theorists argue that the state of dependency is the 
most important factor influencing the development of dependant states.  This involves 
the manipulation of politics, economics, banking and finance, education, media control, 
and all aspects of human resource development.40  As Theotoino Dos Santos states: 
 
[Dependency is]…an historical condition which shapes a certain 
structure of the world economy such that it favors some [states] to the 
detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the 
subordinate economies…a situation in which the economy of a 
certain group of [states] is conditioned by the development and 
expansion of another economy, to which their own is subjected.41 
 
     Most dependency theorists perceive the inequalities of power, particularly those 
generated by global capitalism, as the structuring force behind dependency relations.42  
Under the global capitalist economic system, dependant states provide ecological 
resources, cheap minerals, cheap labour, and agricultural products.  They also provide 
the storehouses of manufactured products and outdated technologies, and providing 
surplus capital to the dominant states, without which dominant states are unable to 
acquire the standard of living they enjoy.43  In addition, political and economic power 
is largely centralized and concentrated in the dominant states.  Any division between 
political and economic power is spurious: governments of dominant states take 
whatever steps are required to protect their economic interests, such as those held by 
multinational companies.44 
 
                                                  
39 Ibid. 
40 Lay, V. A Biography of Khieu Samphan (Phd). 2006. From Ezine Articles. 
 http://ezinearticles.com/?A-Biography-of-KHIEU-Samphan-(PhD)&id=233501  
41 Ferraro, V. Dependency Theory: An Introduction. 1996. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/depend.htm 
42 See Endnote 3. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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     Thirdly, dependency theorists argue that the relationships between these two sets 
of states are dynamic because not only do the interactions between them tend to 
strengthen, but also the unequal patterns of wealth distribution will grow.  In one way, 
this is attributed to the fact that particular classes have common interests regardless of 
their nationality.  For instance, the distribution of resources over time is sustained not 
only by the power of dominant states, but also via the power of the privileged in the 
dependant states.  Privileged people in dependant states sustain a dependant 
relationship because their own personal interests correspond with those of the dominant 
states.  These privileged populations are generally trained in the dominant states and 
share a similar culture and values to those in dominant states.  They play an 
intermediate or managerial role within their own states for global capital by using 
control of state power to defend the interests of multinational capital to the detriment of 
the majority of the poor.45  Dependency theorists point to the way in which the state 
institutions, the economic system, the law courts, the military and the police function to 
defend the interests of privileged.46  For these reasons, in a very actual sense, a 
dependency relation is a ‘voluntary’ relation. 
 
In another way, dependency theorists argue that increase of the unequal patterns 
of wealth distribution is attributed to the central distributive structure of the neoclassical 
model, which are commonly known as ‘trickle-down’ economies.47  They say that it 
worked to grow the interests of the already advanced, rich economy of the West (or 
North), and to increasingly impoverish already poor states (the South or Third World).48  
                                                  
45 Steans, J and Pettiford, L. Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives & Themes. Second Edition. Pearson Education 
   Limited: England, 2005, p. 93. 
46 See Endnote 4 
47 Ferraro, V. Dependency Theory: An Introduction. 1996. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/depend.htm 
48 Steans, J and Pettiford, L. Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives & Themes. Second Edition. Pearson Education 
   Limited: England, 2005, p. 83. 
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They say the reason for this is that the neoclassical model of economic development 
pays comparatively little attention to the question of wealth allocation.  Its initial 
concern is with efficient production and supposes that the market will distribute the 
rewards in an unbiased and rational way.  This supposition may be true in a well 
integrated, economically flexible economy where people are able to adapt quickly to 
economic shifts and where consumption habits are not twisted by non-economic forces 
such as gender, ethnic, and racial bias.49  Yet, these situations, they argue, are not 
disseminated in the economies of dependent states, and economic activity does not 
easily pervade in these states.  For these reasons, dependency theorists argue that the 
nature of the markets for primary products, existing trading regimes, and the 
fundamental structure of the global economy primary direct the development path of 
each state. 
 
Due to this, dependency theorists argue that dependent states are in a situation of 
underdevelopment where their resources are being largely utilized in a way which is 
beneficial to dominant states thus maintaining the dominant position of the privileged 
minority to the detriment of the majority poor population.50  They argue that the 
majority population in dependent states are poor not because they fell behind the 
Enlightenment values of the European states or scientific transformation, but because 
they were forcibly integrated into the capitalist economic system only as generators of 
raw materials, and were refused the opportunity to sell their resources in a way which 
competed with dominant states.51  Thus dependant states, they say, are in a completely 
negative situation, which provides no opportunity of sustained and self-governing 
                                                  
49 Ferraro, V. Dependency Theory: An Introduction. 1996. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/depend.htm 
50 Rahming, A. J. Introduction to World Politics. POLS 113 (Course Note)  
   Lecture 8: Marxism and Structuralism. Victoria University of Wellington: Wellington, 2004, p. 5. 
51 Ferraro, V. Dependency Theory: An Introduction. 1996. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/depend.htm 
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economic operations in their states which results in the persistence of poverty. 
 
Yet, dependency theorists believe that the national interest of the dependent states 
can only be fulfilled by addressing the needs of poor within their states, rather than via 
the fulfillment of the needs of privileged.  To this extent, although the privileged in 
dependant states are deliberately betraying the interests of their poor, the dependant 
theorists say that these privileged truly believe that the key to economic development 
remains in going along with the methods of liberal economic principle.52  In summary, 
Dependency Theory explains the current ‘underdeveloped’ situation of dependant states 
as the result of how they are integrated into the world-system.  They also say that 
disparity among states is an inherent part of interactions among and within those states. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The structuralism and Dependency Theory examined above articulate the view 
that the global economy can only be understood by analyzing its relationship within the 
global capitalist economic system as a whole.  Structuralism holds a view that the 
system was established to benefit certain social classes, and that the resulting 
‘world–system’ is inevitably unfair.  Dependency Theory complements this thesis and 
argues that the initial structure of the global economy, existing trading regimes and the 
nature of the markets for primary goods primary has directed the development path of 
each state.  Thus, the underdeveloped situation of developing states in the 
contemporary era is the result of how these states are integrated into the global capitalist 
economic system.  The disparity among states is an inherent part of interactions which 
occur among and between them.  This Marxist oriented international relations theory is 
                                                  
52 Ibid. 
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relevant to this thesis, an issue which is further discussed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
Indigenous Development and Self-determination 
 
There is a significant volume of literature relating to indigenous people, 
indigenous development and indigenous self-determination which is all applicable to 
this thesis.  This chapter provides a review of the literature examining a wide range of 
perspectives from which these issues can be approached.  This has involved 
investigating the definitions of indigenous people and their self-determination, as well 
as the issues regarding indigenous development and self-determination.  The chapter 
concludes by providing a summary of the reviewed literature. 
 
1. Indigenous People 
 
According to the United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council, 
Commission on Human Rights (1982): 
 
Indigenous [p]opulations are composed of the existing descendants 
of the peoples who inhabited the present territory of a country 
wholly or partially at the time when persons of a different culture or 
ethnic origin arrived there from other parts of the world, overcome 
them and, by conquest, settlement or other means, reduced them to a 
non-dominant or colonial situation: who today live more in 
conformity with their particular social, economic and cultural 
customs and traditions than the institutions of the country of which 
they now form part, under a state structure that incorporates mainly 
the national, social, and cultural characteristics of other segments of 
the population that are predominant.53 
 
      
 
                                                  
53 Indigenous Technology International. Who are the Indigenous? 1998. http://www.inditek.com/definition.html  
 See Endnote 1. 
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     Similarly, the International Labor Organization Convention (ILO) No. 169 (1989) 
states that “indigenous people” refers to:  
 
tribal peoples whose social, cultural and economic conditions 
distinguish them from other sections of the national community and 
whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or 
traditions or by special laws or regulations and to peoples who are 
regarded as indigenous on account of their descendants from the 
populations which inhabited the country at the time of conquest or 
colonization.54 
 
     By contrast, the World Bank Operational Directive 4.20 (1991) disregards the 
elements of the colonized and minority status of indigenous people.  According to 
them, “indigenous people” refers to the people who have 
 
a) close attachment to ancestral territories and to the natural 
resources in these areas;  
b) self-identification and identification by others as members of a 
distinct cultural group;  
c) an indigenous language, often different from the national 
language;  
d) presence of customary social and political institutions; and 
e) primarily subsistence-oriented production.55 
 
2. Indigenous Development 
 
Harawira says that in present times, the world is “witnessing the assertion of new 
forms of capitalism, of a new global capitalist order in which the resources, the wealth, 
the assets of the world are concentrated in the hands of a few, while the vast majority is 
increasingly dispossessed.”56   Indigenous people and other minority communities 
across the world are the most dispossessed, disempowered and disenfranchised 
                                                  
54 Netherlands Center for Indigenous Peoples. Indigenous Peoples - Some Working Definitions. 2006. 
 http://www.nciv.net/Millennium/Definitions/some_indigenous_peoples_english.htm 
55 Amazon Conservation Team (ACT). Act in the News. September 2005. 2005. 
 http://www.amazonteam.org/news/news_0905_article01.html 
56 Harawira, S M. Economic Globalization, Indigenous Peoples, and the Role of Indigenous Women. Paper Presented at the Hague 
   Appeal for Peace Conference, May 1999. http://www.apc.org.nz/pma/Mak.htm 
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communities within this world order.  The reason for this, as Wilmer says, is moral and 
legal justification for indigenous dispossession by the order that has excluded them 
from the enjoyment of universal human rights such as economic and political 
sovereignty and self-determination.57  As a consequence, ensuring political, economic 
and cultural rights have been the most important agendas sought by the indigenous 
movement.  Nevertheless, indigenous people generally in the world, including the 
Amungme and Kamoro, have been politically, economically and culturally marginalized 
by capitalist oriented economic development and resource exploitation.  Also, in many 
cases, the marginalization has been justified by the political and economic interests of 
the states as shown in the following chapters. 
 
Furthermore, Harawira argues that through the struggle to maintain the right to 
live in their lands which are not only crucial to their survival but have ancient, 
deeply-held genealogical and spiritual connections, thousands of indigenous people 
have died.58  Despite documented evidence, these facts are largely ignored by the 
governments, both international and domestic media due to the well-restricted flow of 
information by the state and by the majority of people who do not know, either because 
of a well-restricted media, or simply because they are completely consumed by their 
own daily efforts. 59   Nevertheless, indigenous people generally, including the 
Amungme and Kamoro, have been suppressed and murdered over the struggle to 
maintain their indigenous rights as discussed in the following chapters.   
 
 
                                                  
57 Wilmer, F. The Indigenous Voice in World Politics. Sage Publications, Inc: California, 1993, p. 7. See Endnote 2. 
58 Harawira, S M. Economic Globalization, Indigenous Peoples, and the Role of Indigenous Women. Paper Presented at the Hague 
   Appeal for Peace Conference, May 1999. http://www.apc.org.nz/pma/Mak.htm 
59 Ibid. 
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Although the situation of indigenous people to a certain degree has improved in 
recent years, it is still in crisis.  For example, Lutz discusses Fair Trade and says that 
the idea was designed in recent years to amend the harsh effects of global capitalism on 
the poorest world population.60  She claims however that it disaggregates other human 
values such as culture, ethnic identity, religion, extended family and politics which 
indigenous people require the most except through the premise that if each individual 
follows his/her own social and economic interest, society as a whole will in some way 
be better off.61  If creative expression is the way in which indigenous people honour 
their gods and ancestors, and transmit traditions to their children, there will be harsh 
consequences for them when they accept Western aesthetics or sell their inheritance to 
tourists. 62   If the integrity of indigenous society is based on face to face, 
interdependent, reciprocal relationships, harsh consequences will eventuate when a 
depersonalized paid worker becomes the only the way of survival.63   
 
For these reasons, Lutz argues that Fair Trade does not address such fundamental 
issues and even at its most capacity-expanding, transparent and inclusive, it rarely 
encourages indigenous peoples’ access to an imposed economic system which cannot 
initially accommodate different ideas about social relations, community or ownership.64  
In fact, her argument is that the capitalist economic system itself fundamentally 
contradicts indigenous values in many cases.  Since Fair Trade is based on the 
capitalist economic system, it seldom assists the indigenous peoples’ access to an 
imposed economic system as discussed in the following chapters.   
                                                  
60 Lutz, E L. Is Fair Trade Fair? Cultural Survival Quarterly Issue 29, No 3, 2005. See Endnote 3. 
   http://www.cs.org/publications/csq/csq-article.cfm?id=1843 
61 Ibid. See Endnote 4. 
62 Ibid 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
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In relation to the previously mentioned issues, Harawira, Wilmer and Lutz 
suggest several solutions.  At a domestic level, Lutz argues that it is important for the 
public to participate in a fair discussion on Fair Trade by being open to the things which 
do not correspond to their expectations, by adapting their actions to the knowledge they 
get, and by claiming that all the people along the production network do the same.65  
By doing so, the public not only can create trade which is fairer for indigenous people 
but can also participate in fundamental process of establishing the good life for all of 
humanity.66  Yet, her argument is not persuasive because in many states, the majority 
ethnic group, as a public social group, holds a largely racist view of indigenous people 
and regard them as inferior.  The majority ethnic group has also benefited from 
dispossessing and marginalizing indigenous people and it is unlikely that they can create 
a fairer situation for the indigenous people as shown in the following chapters.   
 
Wilmer discusses the importance of environmental organizations and social 
critiques, since the state and also the unethical process of unchecked industrialization 
have been vulnerable to them.67  As a consequence, the state now gradually applies 
regulations to the industrialization process for example by engaging in environmental 
impact reports, in the way it once encouraged industrialization.68  In addition, more 
social criticism of modernity and bureaucratization is needed involving bureaucracies 
from both the private and public sectors. 
 
      
                                                  
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Wilmer, F. The Indigenous Voice in World Politics. Sage Publications, Inc: California, 1993, p. 26.   
68 Ibid, p. 26. 
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     Wilmer also suggests there is a need for the state to modify the goal of national 
integration.  In most states, the possibility for majority ethnic groups to control the 
state and perpetrate genocide or discriminate politically against minority groups is 
problematic. 69   This is particularly significant when a minority group asks for 
autonomy or greater representation only to find that the state suppresses them in the 
name of national security.70  To achieve multi-ethnicity and multi-culturalism in the 
name of the state, majoritalian rules are inadequate.  For this reason, Wilmer says that 
adopting pluralistic national politics, and in some cases the disintegration and 
renegotiation of state for autonomy is crucial.71  What he argues here about adopting 
pluralistic national politics is important, however, he disregards the fact that although 
such pluralistic national politics is adopted in theory in several states, it has not 
contributed to multi-ethnicity and multi-culturalism in any sense since it implies a lack 
of capacity in seriously adopting such pluralistic politics as discussed in the following 
chapters. 
     Finally, Wilmer argues that the insistence of indigenous people to limit the 
meaning and capacity of state sovereignty is important.  Sovereignty in practice has 
never been absolute, and, through indigenous claims, the state may get into diverse 
relationships with ethnic groups, in which relationships concerning issues of external 
and internal sovereignty can be negotiated.72  His arguments are that indigenous people 
themselves are the ones who have suffered from the majoritarian rule and know the 
most about what they need and what they want for their prosperity.  Unless indigenous 
                                                  
69 Ibid, p. 27. 
70 Ibid, p. 27. 
71 Ibid, p. 27. 
72 Ibid, p. 27. 
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people themselves initiate action, multiethnicity and multiculturalism in states are 
unlikely to be achieved. 
With respect to the global level, Harawira argues that it is crucial for the global 
society to acknowledge the ongoing colonization of indigenous people and the right of 
indigenous self-determination.73  However, Harawira disregards the fact that there are 
states which tend to ignore the facts depending on their political and economic interests, 
a fact that is shown in the following chapters. 
 
4. Indigenous Self-Determination 
 
The Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People by the UN Commission 
on Human Rights (1994) says that self-determination is the right for all people to 
“freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.”74  The Australian Legal Information Institute also discusses the 
relationship between indigenous people and the state and says that self-determination is 
the inherent right for indigenous people due to “their status as self-governing peoples 
prior to their subjection to processes of colonization in their own territories.”75  Since 
the dispossession of indigenous people happened without their consent but by force, and 
since indigenous people have not been part of state-building, self-determination for 
indigenous people means a search for opportunities to renegotiate their social position 
and to claim that they give their authentic agreement regarding future relations with 
existing States.76  In addition, indigenous self-determination also refers to the core 
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   Appeal for Peace Conference, May 1999. http://www.apc.org.nz/pma/Mak.htm 
74 Australia West Papua Association. West Papua Information Kit. 1995. http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/cline/papua/ 
See Endnote 5. 
75 Australian Legal Information Institute. Human Rights Law Resources. 2001. 
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processes of constitutional change and repositioning of power, because these processes 
of belated Nation-building are the same as decolonization, based on the 
acknowledgement of distinctive indigenous status as the first people and not just as 
cultural or ethnic minorities in a mainstream society.77  The right of indigenous 
self-determination is the same as the right of non-indigenous self-determination.  But 
for indigenous people self-determination means the universal and indivisible application 
of the UN’s principles, standards and instruments which provide everyone, worldwide, 
with acknowledged rights, which they operate with no bias, and with no discrimination 
based on ethnicity, colour and religion.78 
 
In contrast, Friedman and Chase-Dunn discuss self-determination in relation to 
globalization and capitalism by exemplifying self-determination as an indigenous 
movement.  They argue that self-determination is the legal right of any indigenous 
group to build and live their lives in a way other than those allowed or favored by the 
practices enclosed under the capitalist order.79  Thus, indigenous self-determination is 
the search for transforming the force of global capitalism into a gentler system that can 
consider the life of everyone in the world. 80   It challenges commodification, 
privatization, prevalent family organizations, prevalent gender roles, and prevalent 
views and practices of the basic relationships between humankind and their 
environment.81  Finally, indigenous self-determination also seeks to restructure the 
globalization process by leaving lands in their original condition, or engaging in 
movements claiming a larger share of worker control of working conditions. 82  
                                                  
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Friedman, J and Chase-Dunn, C. Hegemonic Declines. Present and Past. Paradigm Publishers: Colorado, 2005, p. 206. 
80 Ibid, p. 208. 
81 Ibid, p. 206.  
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However, they also acknowledge that for most indigenous communities, the 
fundamental object of self-determination is to create spaces in the existing society 
where they are able to continue to exist.  The global capitalist system is not able to 
undertake the basic revolutions, evolution or reforms which are important for providing 
the continuous appearance of such social spaces or autonomy of indigenous 
communities.83 
 
In fact, their arguments are that indigenous people generally in the world, 
including the Amungme and Kamoro, have suffered from the global capitalist order and 
its social and economic development model.  Particularly, they have suffered from the 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which is the key element of global capitalism.  It 
entails exploitation of indigenous people and environmental resources, leaving little 
benefits to them.  Thus, indigenous self-determination for most indigenous people, 
including the Amungme and Kamoro, has been to create spaces in the existing society 
where they are able to continue to exist. 
 
Smith discusses indigenous self-determination from the perspective of a research 
agenda.  She argues that self-determination in research is the “goal of social justice 
which is expressed through and across a wide range of psychological, social, cultural 
and economic terrains.”84  She argues that it involves the processes of mobilization, of 
healing, of decolonization and of transformation of peoples.  In addition, there are 
states and conditions where indigenous people move toward self-determination and 
these are survival, recovery and development.  However, it does not happen in order 
and the survival of community as physical beings, of the arts, of social relations, of 
                                                  
83 Ibid, p. 207. 
84 Smith, L T. Decolonizing Methodologies. Research and Indigenous Peoples. University of Otago Press: Dunedin, 1998, p. 116. 
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social and spiritual practices and of languages are all dependent on fundamental 
prioritizing.85  Likewise, the recovery of histories, indigenous rights, and territories 
also depends on prioritizing and on acknowledgement that indigenous cultures have 
changed unavoidably.  Recovery is a discerning process, often answering to sudden 
crises rather than an arranged approach and this is related to the reality that indigenous 
people are not in control and are dependent on an external conditions.86  In reality, this 
means particular areas become a priority because “the bulldozers are due to start 
destruction any day now.” 87   Figure 3 outlines the indigenous research agenda 
promulgated by Smith. 
 
Finally, Freire discusses the relationship between the oppressors and the 
oppressed.  He argues that through colonization, both oppressor and oppressed become 
dehumanized.  Due to this, self-determination for the oppressed is the struggle against 
the oppressors.  However, to achieve real self-determination, he argues that the 
oppressed must search for not only regaining their humanity, but also to restore the 
humanity of the oppressor.  The oppressed’s efforts to weaken the oppressor’s force in 
deference of themselves mostly generates the oppressor’s false generosity.88   To 
continuously have the opportunity to show their generosity, the oppressors also have to 
perpetuate injustice.89  An unjust social order is the perpetual source of this false 
generosity which is fostered by poverty, despair and death.90   
 
 
                                                  
85 Ibid, p. 116. 
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87 Ibid, p. 116. 
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Figure 3: The Indigenous Research Agenda.91 
     Thus, Freire says that through engaging in the struggle for their 
self-determination, oppressed must create true generosity by recognizing the necessity 
to fight for it and consequent praxis of their quest for it.92  According to Freire, true 
generosity refers to the struggle to destroy the causes which contributes to the 
oppression.93  The oppressed, who struggle for the restoration of their humanity, are 
able to generate true generosity because the oppressed understand the terrible condition 
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of an oppressive society the most, suffer the effects of oppression the most, and 
understand the necessity of liberation the most.94  He argues that this struggle by the 
oppressed “will actually constitute an act of love opposing the lovelessness which lies at 
the heart of the oppressor’s violence, lovelessness even when clothed in false 
generosity.” 95   Freire’s argument is that through the struggle to achieve 
self-determination, indigenous people in many states, including the Amungme and 
Kamoro, have tried to weaken the force of oppressor in defence against them.  As a 
consequence, they have been further suppressed by the oppressor.  For these reasons, 
to achieve real self-determination, the oppressed must restore not only their humanity, 
but the humanity of the oppressor by generating true generosity as discussed in the 
following chapters. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
     Through the literature reviewed here, broader perspectives on the definitions of 
indigenous people and the issues of their self-determination, and development and 
self-determination have been considered.  Firstly, in terms of the definition of 
indigenous people, indigenous people are the ones who live more in conformity with 
their traditional social, economic and cultural practices within the present political and 
social institutions.  UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights 
and the ILO recognize the colonized and minority status of indigenous people, but the 
World Bank disregarded these elements. 
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     Indigenous people are the most dispossessed, disempowered and disenfranchised 
communities within the global capitalist order.  Also, through the struggle to maintain 
the right to live in their lands, thousands of indigenous people have died.  Although the 
situation of indigenous people to a certain degree has improved in recent years, it is still 
in crisis.  For example, Lutz discusses fair trade and says it does not address 
fundamental issues which are crucial to the development of indigenous people.  As a 
solution to the above issues, on a domestic level, it is important for the public to 
participate in a fair discussion and by doing so, the public can create a good life for all 
humanity.  Also, environmental organizations and social critics must play an important 
role in solving the above issues.  Finally, it is important to adopt pluralistic national 
politics to achieve multi-ethnicity and multi-culturalism and indigenous people must 
initiate such a movement.  With respect to the global level, it is important for the 
global society to acknowledge the ongoing colonization of indigenous people and the 
right of indigenous self-determination. 
 
     Finally, regarding indigenous self-determination, self-determination is the right of 
all people to freely pursue their cultural, social and economic development and the 
freedom to decide their own political status.  Moreover, it is the fundamental right for 
indigenous people, due to their status as self-governing peoples prior to their 
subjugation to processes of colonization in their own lands, to determine their own 
destiny.  In relation to global capitalism, self-determination is the legitimate right for 
any indigenous communities to establish and live their lives in a way other than those 
favoured or allowed by the practices enclosed under global capitalism.  However, for 
most indigenous communities, the essential aim of self-determination under the global 
capitalist order is to establish spaces within the existing society where they can continue 
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to exist and thrive.  In terms of self-determination as a research agenda, it is the goal of 
social justice that is expressed via a broad range of economic, cultural, social and 
psychological terrains.  Finally, regarding the relationship between the oppressors and 
the oppressed, self-determination for indigenous people is not only a matter of regaining 
their humanity but it is also about regaining the humanity of the oppressor.  Thus, in 
order for the oppressed to be able to engage in the struggle for their own 
self-determination, they have to realize the reality of oppression, not as a confined 
world from which there is no exit, but as a limiting situation in which they are able to 
shift.  These perspectives on the definition of indigenous people and their 
self-determination, as well as the issues regarding indigenous development and 
self-determination are relevant to this thesis, as discussed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
Historical Overview and the Contemporary Social, Political, 
and Economic Situation in West Papua 
 
Historically, West Papua has long suffered from foreign occupation.  It first 
became a formal colony of the Netherlands in 1828 and its occupation was taken over 
by Japan during World War II (1942-44).  After World War II, during the 1950s and 
early 1960s, West Papua was shifting towards independence with the worldwide 
decolonization movement.  However, it became unwillingly involved in the Cold War 
competition and as a consequence, was denied the right of self-determination.  Control 
over West Papua was passed on to Indonesia in 1963 and formally became the part of 
the Indonesian Republic after the fraudulent Act of Free Choice Referendum in 1969.  
Under Indonesian rule, West Papuans have until today endured cultural and 
environmental destruction, human rights abuse and mass killing.  This chapter will 
provide the historical background of West Papua followed by a discussion of the 
contemporary social, political, and economic situation.  Due to the availability of the 
statistics, data used in this chapter are from 1995 to the 2006. 
 
1. Colonization 
 
As early as the seventh century BC, West Papua was being visited by traders from 
the southern Sumatran empire known as Sriwijaya.  Chinese merchants and their 
agents followed, whose ceramics and metal objects have been discovered in some 
coastal areas.  Finally, Malay merchants had frequent contact with coastal tribes and 
even with those further inland, where Malay words have been traced in local languages 
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along the old trade routes.96  In 1527, New Guinea was discovered by Europeans, 
when the Portuguese navigator, Jorge de Meneses sighted land on one of his journeys.  
He was followed by Spanish and Portuguese adventurers, including Ortes de Retes in 
1545 who named the island ‘New Guinea’ due to the similarity he perceived between 
the Papuans and the Africans of Guinea.97 
 
The first Dutch contact with West Papuans occurred in 1597, and in 1605 Willem 
Janz landed on the mainland where local West Papuans attacked him and killed six of 
his men.98  Since then, Dutch merchants and explorers established their influence over 
the territory by using economic power or military pressure, as part of their efforts to 
maintain control of the profitable spice trade from the Straits of Maluku, Java and 
Maluku.  In 1714, the Dutch East Indies Company acquired New Guinea following an 
agreement with the Sultan of Tidore.99  In 1828, the Dutch proclaimed the territory in 
New Guinea west of 141°East longitude as theirs, and in 1895 the Eastern border was 
set at 141° 1’47’’ E.L.100  In 1884, Germany occupied the Northeast of New Guinea as 
Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the Southeast was claimed by Britain. 
 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Dutch have conducted oil and mineral 
exploration in West Papua.  In 1907 Royal Dutch Shell was established to oppose the 
monopolies of the U.S. oil industries such as Caltex which was creating growing 
inroads into Dutch territories.  In the same year, Shell exploration found a huge 
seepage near the Teer River and by 1935 fifteen more seepages had been found.101  
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Nevertheless, except for these explorations and the establishment of administrative 
posts, the presence of the Dutch in West Papua was mainly concerned with the creation 
of concentration camps and penal colonies for rebels from Java.102  The resistance of 
West Papuans to colonization started with the occupation of their territory by the Dutch.  
The key area of this resistance was on the northern coast of the mainland near Hollandia 
and in the islands of the north, especially Biak Island.103  Examples of this were the 
temporary insurgences on the north coast, in the Geelvink Bay area in 1906 against the 
use of West Papuans as enforced workers to construct roads, and the Aweho and 
Aduweri insurgencies in 1921 and 1926.104 
 
In the first few decades of the 20th century, Japanese economic and military 
expansion in south-east Asia increased.105  During the Second World War, Japan took 
over the Dutch administration of West Papua in 1942 and quickly occupied the whole 
Indonesian archipelago.  The presence of the Japanese in West Papua in June 1942 was 
considered by the West Papuans as the mere substitution of one set of foreign colonizers 
by another.  West Papua was emancipated from the Japanese in 1944. 
 
2. Toward Independence 
 
After World War II in 1945, Indonesia quickly proclaimed independence from the 
Netherlands and insisted on North Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak, East Timor and West 
Papua as part of its territory.  Indonesia was granted full independence in 1949 and 
continued to insist that West Papua was part of its nationhood.106  Indonesia’s claim for 
                                                  
102 See Endnote 1. 
103 See Endnote 2. 
104 Ibid, p. 19. 
105 See Endnote 3. 
106 See Endnote 4.    
  
40
 
West Papua was seen as an effort to unite diverse ethnic, cultural, political and 
economic interests.  Particularly, it was aimed at unifying the conflicting factions in 
the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia) and the TNI over an issue 
on which they could consent and to shift attention from other problems and conflicts.107  
Several attempts were made by the Netherlands, Indonesia and West Papuan 
representatives to reach an agreement on the future of West Papua in late 1940s.108  
West Papuan representatives insisted clearly that they did not want to join the 
Indonesian Republic.  Thus, the Dutch were determined to shift West Papua quickly 
towards independence by 1970 to resist the charge of anti-colonial protests, especially 
those coming from Jakarta, as an excuse for Indonesia’s own territorial and colonial 
aspirations.109 
 
For this reason, the Dutch started to generate an educated West Papuan elite, who 
could manage everyday administration.  Many public schools were built from 1949 
onwards and during the 1950s, specialist schools were founded, including an 
agricultural college initially situated at Kota-Raja outside Hollandia which later shifted 
to Manokwari, where a forestry academy was founded.110  Dutch initiatives also 
extended to the creation of representative assemblies and West Papuans became 
motivated to establish political parties.111  Following the creation of regional councils, 
elections took place in February 1961 and 22 of the 28 seats were won by West 
Papuans.112  As a result, anti-Indonesianists dominated the councils.  Finally in 1961, 
the West Papua National Committee adopted ‘West Papua’ as the name for the state, the 
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‘Morning Star’ as the national symbol and ‘My Land of Papua’ as the national anthem.  
In the light of these developments, the prospect of West Papua’s self-determination 
seemed bright. 
 
However, with the rapid political development of West Papua and move toward 
self-determination, Indonesian’s growing preparations for war started to cause 
international concern.  As a result, Dutch and Indonesian representatives met in New 
York in July 1962.  At this meeting, the U.S. intervened.  The Soviet Union had sold 
a billion American dollars worth of arms to Indonesia.113  The U.S. countered this with 
a similar deal, regarding Indonesia as too valuable a prize to give to the Communist 
Block.114  Threatened by the further possible expansion of communism in Southeast 
Asia and the emerging war in Vietnam, John F. Kennedy lobbied the Netherlands to stop 
its involvement in West Papua’s affairs and pass it to Indonesia.115  Under huge 
pressure from the U.S. and with increasing concern at home about the threat of war with 
Indonesia, the Dutch were forced to pull out and accept Indonesian demands.  Their 
only requirement being a face-saving formula, which was the enforcement of a 
referendum called the ‘Act of Free Choice’ by the West Papuans in five years time 
(1969) to decide whether West Papua should join the Indonesian Republic. 
Consequently, in May 1963, the official transfer of West Papua to Indonesia occurred. 
No West Papuans had been involved in the Agreement and their hopes and aspirations 
were not represented.   
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     The day after the transfer, Indonesia celebrated with a bonfire of West Papuan 
books, aircraft and flags.  The local police were imprisoned in barracks, all political 
groups were dissolved, public assemblies banned, and the West Papuan education 
system was destroyed.  Since then, there were a number of insurgencies by the West 
Papuans against Indonesian control.116  By the end of 1967, more than 3,700 West 
Papuans had been killed by the TNI operation by the end of 1967.117  The insurgencies 
continued until August 1969 and these rebellions demonstrated the obvious - that the 
West Papuans did not have any aspirations toward the continuation of Indonesian rule.  
For this reason, West Papuans regarded the Act of Free Choice referendum as another 
opportunity for gaining self-determination. 
 
However, the Act did not follow the New York Agreement.  It was arranged by 
the Indonesian leaders in 1969 and it did not include universal ballot.118  Indonesians 
selected assembly members themselves to get a quick agreement.  When the Act took 
place, voting was restricted to 1,025 representatives chosen by the Indonesians.119  At 
the same time, the TNI conducted an effective campaign of intimidation to kill any 
voters who might vote for independence.  As a result, the majority of voters chose to 
be a part of Indonesia.  Protests came quickly and neighboring PNG expressed 
disappointment.  Also, the report of the United Nations Secretary General was critical 
of the way in which the Act had taken place.120  Although the report was sent to the 
UN, the Netherlands, France, Australia and the U.S., who they did not want to become 
further involved with the issue strongly lobbied the UN to acknowledge the Act.  
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Therefore, a UN resolution allowing Indonesian control over West Papua was passed in 
1969 and West Papua formally became the part of the Indonesian Republic. 
 
In short, the West Papuans were betrayed.  They were condemned to a fate at the 
hands of a cruel regime, which promptly undertook cultural and environmental 
destruction, human rights abuse and mass killings.  The UN, the body responsible for 
ensuring basic human rights, the pride and value of individuals, the equal rights of 
women and men, to create conditions under which respect and justice can be sustained, 
to encourage development and a better quality of life with greater freedom, turned its 
eyes, washed its hands and quietly walked away. 
 
3. General Knowledge about Contemporary West Papua 
 
The focus now turns to contemporary West Papua.  Firstly, in terms of living 
standards, West Papua is today the second poorest province out of the 33 Indonesian 
provinces, next to Nusa Tenggara province; and a substantial number of people there, 
including around 40 per cent of indigenous West Papuans, live in poverty.121  It also 
has the lowest health standard in Indonesia with the highest maternal and infant 
morality rates.  The average annual budget of the health department in the provincial 
government is only AU$ 1.3 million (1995 figure) though it has increased after the 
passing of Special Autonomy Law (SAL) in 2001 mentioned below.122  The rate of 
infant mortality in West Papua varies between 70 to 200 out of 1000 and the maternal 
mortality is 4.5/1000 in rural areas where large numbers of West Papuans live (1995 
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figure).123  This can be compared with a rate of 1.3/1000 as the Indonesian national 
average (1995 figure).124  According to one non-governmental organization (NGO), 
this high mortality rate is mainly attributed to malnutrition with more than 20 percent of 
the population in the central highlands facing it.125  Also, less than half the children 
under five are regarded as well nourished.  There are only 40.8 percent of immunized 
children – much lower than the Indonesian national average (1995 figure) of 60.3 
percent.126  In addition, West Papua has the lowest life expectancy compared to other 
areas of Indonesia, especially for women, who have a 50.3 year life expectancy 
compared to 62.7 year which is the Indonesian national average (1995 figure).127  
Finally, illiteracy in West Papua is almost double that of the national average of 30.5 
percent with a rate of 81.5 percent in the highlands area (1995 figure).128 
 
In relation to economy, West Papua is home to a huge array of natural resources, 
including timber, marine resources, gas and oil, as well as rich copper deposits, silver 
and gold.  Yet, the local economy of the province had not until recently benefited much 
from its vast natural resources, as only about 20 percent of resource revenue had gone 
toward local government.129  However, it has increased to a certain degree after the 
passing of SAL in 2001.  Also, the population of the productive age (over 15 years old) 
in West Papua was 1,586,230 people and the population of unemployed people was 
72,599 (2004 figure).130  Total imports are more than $400 million and total exports are 
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around $1.5 million (1998 figure).131 
 
4. Transmigration 
 
Transmigration has been one of the most important factors to have an impact on 
contemporary West Papua society.  Transmigration was originally initiated under the 
Dutch colonial authority during the early twentieth century and passed on to Indonesia 
after it took over West Papua from the Netherlands.  There are generally three types of 
transmigration: general transmigration, supported spontaneous transmigration, and 
self-assisting spontaneous transmigration.132  Approximately 800,000 people (2005 
figure) in West Papua are migrants brought into the area from the other parts of 
Indonesia by Indonesia’s ‘transmigration' policy. 133   In addition, around 10,000 
families each year continue to arrive in West Papua as sponsored migrants, with an 
unknown number arriving on their own accord.134  The current rate of transmigration 
makes West Papua’s population growth rate higher than any other area in Indonesia.135  
It is estimated that the population of West Papua will have increased to between 2.6 and 
3.9 million by 2010 and this will be mainly due to transmigration, both general and 
supported spontaneous transmigration and spontaneous industrialization resulting from 
the Indonesian state’s 1990s Eastward Development Policy.136 
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Transmigration is targeted at mitigating population pressure on the islands of Bali, 
Java and Sulawesi.  It is also to mitigate poverty by supplying new opportunities and 
land to generate a better standard of living for poor landless inhabitants.  
Transmigration has been financed by the United Nations Development Program, the 
U.S., Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Economic Community (EEC), 
and the World Bank. 137   One geographer described it as “the world’s largest 
invasion.”138  It is obvious that the major impact of transmigration on West Papua is 
the huge displacement of West Papuans from their native lands and subsequent 
marginalization.  Firstly, in most cases, the transmigrants are of different ethnicity to 
the West Papuans and their land has been taken from them, and cleaned, in order to 
establish a residential area for transmigrants.  However, Indonesian law justifies it.  
Clause 17 of Indonesia’s Basic Forestry Act of 1967 says, “[t]he rights of traditional law 
communities may not be allowed to stand in the way of transmigration sites.”139  Also 
Article 2 of the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 says, “…it is not permissible…for a 
community based on its traditional rights, to refuse to allow forest land to be cleared on 
a large and organized scale for the implementation of large-scale projects undertaken in 
the framework of plans to increase the production of foodstuffs and to shift the 
inhabitants.”140 
 
Due to the above displacement, West Papuans have been marginalized, resulting 
in their becoming an ethnic minority within their own land.  Since personal 
development (in western terms) is normally based upon education and urban living, 
West Papuans who were displaced and have inhabited rural areas, stand little chance of 
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benefiting from the development.  Yet, those already in the urban areas had not, until 
recently, been placed in positions of authority because the Indonesian government did 
not trust them and it was also afraid that West Papuans would acquire too much voice in 
the administrative sector.  For example, the provincial capital of Jayapura had, until 
now, been mainly administered by transmigrants, particularly Indonesians and Asians, 
with West Papuans obtaining only inferior positions.  It was only in the late 1990s that 
genuine attempts were made to invite Papuans into the formal sector.  By 2005, 
approximately 35 percent of the labor force in the provincial government was West 
Papuan.141  Yet, it is still a poor reflection of the demographic reality where around 60 
percent of the population in West Papua is indigenous West Papuan.142  Even worse, 
Indonesian transmigrants hold a largely racist view of indigenous West Papuans, who 
are regarded as inferior to them - except, of course, those who swapped their own 
identity and culture for a more Indonesian one, including language, culture and ways of 
behavior.143  Finally, the Indonesian officials and the TNI enjoy substantial wealth in 
West Papua (compared with the local population), which is not shared with West 
Papuans. 
 
Transmigration is also one of the Indonesian State’s policies which assimilates 
West Papuans into Indonesian society with the aim of creating a single ethnic state.  
According to one of the successive Indonesian governmental officials, transmigration is 
“to integrate all the ethnic groups into one nation … the different ethnic groups will in 
the long run disappear because of integration…and there will be one kind of man…”144  
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Currently, there are no less than 250 main languages spoken by the indigenous West 
Papuans.145  The Indonesian state’s long-term policy is targeted at making everyone 
speak Bahasa Indonesia, the Indonesian national language.  It is expected that 
intermingling with transmigrants will encourage West Papuans to use Bahasa Indonesia 
to facilitate their communication and so keeps them away from their native language 
groups.  Yet, despite the long history of transmigration, large numbers of West Papuans 
have still not made any perceivable transition to date.  Even the most articulate tribal 
community who once initiated assimilation into Indonesia lost their eagerness for 
Indonesian rule once they started to realize the full cost of Indonesian control.146 
 
5. Logging and Mining 
 
Apart from transmigration, logging and mining are the other factors which have 
had a major impact on contemporary West Papua society.  The destruction of West 
Papua’s environment and the West Papuans’ culture has taken place with the economic 
interests of both Indonesia and the Western states defending the business interests of 
local companies and large MNCs active in West Papua.  In fact, the Indonesian law 
allows the state to act in a way that allows it to appear to be respecting West Papuans 
land and resource rights.  However, state-sponsored developments, including 
commercial mining and logging, are regarded as national interests and have priority 
over any land and resource claims by West Papuans.  In addition, the Indonesian law 
regards all land, not being actively utilized for industry, housing or farming, as state 
property.  Hence, when a concession is granted, local West Papuans are not normally 
consulted and little compensation is paid.  Also, the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry 
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has not acknowledged the West Papuan’s indigenous rights to forest lands.  To make 
the matter worse, once a concession is granted, local West Papuans who enter lands to 
gather firewood or hunt are accused of trespassing.  Finally, the Indonesian state has 
regarded opposition to economic development as a crime of disruption resulted in the 
cruelest retaliations by the TNI. 
 
For example, logging has been one of the main causes of environmental and 
cultural destruction in West Papua.  The island of New Guinea holds one of the largest 
tracts of tropical rainforest (next to the Amazon) remaining in the world and West 
Papua’s forested area is around 24 percent of Indonesia’s total forested area.147  Since 
Indonesia’s own forest resources have been decimated, attention has now been shifted to 
West Papua.  There were 43 logging companies in West Papua in 1996 with a total of 
10.7 million hectares of forest concession (about the size of Wales).148  However, 
logging companies’ forest activities have paid no or little attention to the impact of 
logging on the local inhabitants.  As a result, large numbers of West Papuans are 
intimidated as huge tracts of land have been granted as concessions to timber firms - 
activity which is having serious physical and social consequences.  Furthermore, the 
heavy machinery has destroyed trees used by West Papuans for traditional medicine and 
food.149 
 
Mining has been another major cause of environmental and cultural destruction in 
West Papua.  Several largest MNCs in the world have until today operated in West 
Papua to exploit the mineral and oil deposits.  These multinational firms include: CRA 
Cudgen RZ, BHP, Aneka Tambang and Dominion Mining (Australia); Kepala Burung 
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and Marathon Oil (UK); Ingold (Canada); Total (France); Oppenheimer (South Arica); 
Freeport, Sun Oil, Atlantic Richfield, Petromer Trend Exploration, Shell, Mobil, Texaco, 
Esso, Phillips, Conoco, Agip, Amoko, and Union Oil (U.S.).150  Areas where mining 
concessions are located, particularly in the PNG border area, the ‘Bird’s Head’ on the 
western tip, the Baliem Valley, Fak Fak, the Paniai and Wissel Lakes region, and 
Grasberg and Ertsberg mountains, are where displacement and oppression of West 
Papuans has taken place. 151   They have also experienced the most powerful 
insurgencies with the cruelest retaliations by the TNI.  Since Indonesia and TNI’s 
economic interests correspond with those of MNCs, they have protected the interests of 
MNCs in West Papua and have sought to keep the problems hidden from the outside 
world.  Geographical isolation and difficulties with access to the highlands, highly 
manipulated Indonesian media and constraints on protest movement within the area, 
have all contributed to West Papua undergoing the quietest yet most serious cultural and 
environmental genocide in this contemporary era. 
 
6. Human Rights and the Resistance Movement 
 
For more than four decades after West Papua was passed to Indonesia in 1963 the 
West Papuans have, right up until today, experienced one of the most unjust and 
oppressive colonial occupations ever.  West Papuans have been prohibited from 
exercising their basic freedoms, including their rights to develop in conformity with 
their own interests and needs.  The best example of this has been the denial of their 
land rights.  The appropriation of West Papuan land for development projects, from 
road construction, mining and forestry to transmigration settlements, has led to 
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substantial numbers of West Papuans being displaced from their traditional land.  It has 
also resulted in the several large-scale conflicts with the TNI as well as emotional and 
physical damage for the people affected.  For these reasons, there have been conflicts 
between a popularly assisted West Papuan movement whose members are against both 
Indonesia’s rule and the local population who support Indonesian development. 
 
The conflicts have also resulted in widespread human rights violations.  Large 
numbers of violations have taken place in the context of on-going conflicts between the 
TNI and the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka-OPM).  For example, 
since Indonesia’s takeover, there has been a popular West Papuans’ peaceful protest, 
supported throughout West Papua and one of the most common ways of conducting 
peaceful resistance has been to hold flag raising ceremonies.  After one such event, in 
December 1988, held after a meeting at the Mandala sports stadium in Jayapura, several 
West Papuans were arrested.  The ceremony started with a prayer reading, followed by 
the hoisting of the ‘Morning Star’ flag and the singing of ‘My Land of Papua’.  
However, before the ceremony ended, TNI vehicles arrived and armed forces detained 
all those participating in the ceremony.  Over the next month, 37 of those detained, 
including civil servants and university lecturers were found guilty of disruption and 
sentenced to terms of 2 to 20 years in jail - and the wife of the group’s leader was 
imprisoned for 9 years for making the flag.152  According to Amnesty International’s 
report, there were over 140 political prisoners from West Papua who were serving 
sentences of between two years and life imprisonment for subversion in 1994.153  
Many of these were prisoners of conscience, imprisoned for their non-violent political 
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beliefs or activities. 
 
     A number of violent insurgencies by the OPM have also taken place in the Baliem 
Valley, Enarotali, Manokwari and other regions.  The TNI exacted a heavy toll in 
response to these assaults, strafing and bombing villages, with thousands of West 
Papuan inhabitants being killed.  Also, since the TNI is incapable of operating in the 
jungle trying to find guerrilla camps, it has reinstated retaliations.  To stamp out violent 
insurgency, villages were assaulted and suspected subversives were immediately 
executed.  Other West Papuans were coercively resettled in lower land, where 
substantial number of infants died due to their lack of resistance to malaria.  The TNI 
has engaged in operations to weaken support for the OPM resistance by intimidating the 
families of West Papuans who are believed to be resisting in the bush.  The parents of 
guerrilla fights were arrested and their wives attacked.  Villages suspected of assisting 
the OPM were destroyed, property looted, livestock killed and West Papuan inhabitants 
chased from their homes.  By 1995, it is estimated that between 70,000 to 200,000 
West Papuans have been killed since Indonesia’s takeover in 1963.154 
 
7. Special Autonomy Law 
 
Due to the insecurity of the Indonesian government caused by financial crisis and 
conflicts in East Timor and Aceh, followed by the instability of West Papua and the 
continuous resistance by West Papuans, Indonesia passed the SAL in 2001.155  SAL 
was a political bargain reached between the Indonesian state and West Papuans to settle 
the comprehensive issues in West Papua with dignity.  It was offered as the final 
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solution to West Papuans and also assisted by the international community, which 
supported with proposals, ideas and funds.  In theory, Special Autonomy is defined as: 
 
self-government, allowing those concerned people [to] manage their 
own affairs except defense and foreign affairs.  It is a middle ground 
of any given conflict, that both conflict [parties must be] ready to 
come to a compromised solution.  In some cases, it is seen as a 
bridge to achieve independence.156 
 
     Yet, the Indonesian state in reality has failed to implement a full Special 
Autonomy that would correspond with above definition.157  The lack of capacity to 
implement SAL is said to be the reason for it.  For example, the SAL No: 1/2001 
permitted the West Papua provincial government to administrate West Papuan affairs 
except for religious, jurisdictional, financial, defense, and foreign relation affairs.  Yet, 
Indonesia defines Special Autonomy as decentralization of state authorities to the 
provincial government and this indicates that important areas of authorities are still in 
the hand of the Indonesian government.  Due to this, the domination of the Indonesian 
government in West Papua’s affairs has remained the same up to today. 
 
SAL No: 21/2001 guaranteed autonomy for West Papuan institutions and their 
communities, as well as a greater share of state revenues from resource exploitation 
activities in West Papua, including 80 percent from mining activities and 70 percent 
from the gas and oil industry.158  It also promised special funds for the improvement to 
infrastructure, education facilities and health services for rural West Papuans 
community for a 20 years period.159  Yet, the Indonesian state has failed to implement 
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these promises.  For example, Socratez Sofyan Yoman, chairman of the Alliance of 
Baptist Churches in West Papua says that SAL No: 21/2001 has not contributed to 
improving the health standard of West Papuans because the doctors have set up 
pharmacies everywhere in West Papua where they sell medicines at extraordinarily high 
prices - far beyond the purchasing power of the local West Papuans.160  He also says 
that SAL has provided the transmigrants with excellent opportunities to take control of 
their share of revenues from resources exploitation and from West Papua economy.161  
Yet, he argues that local West Papuans have not been supported in competing with the 
newcomers in economic activities.162 
 
Finally, SAL: 19 to 25 promise the right of West Papuans to organize one of the 
highest bodies which has consultative status to the provincial government and 
parliament.  Indonesia did in fact allow the establishment of the Papuan People’s 
Assembly (Majelis Rakyat Papua-MRP) in March 2005 which consists of women, 
members of churches and the traditional council, and has the authority under Indonesian 
state law to fight for the survival and the fundamental rights of the West Papuans.163  
Yet, Indonesia has never heeded the views of the MRP since it conception.164  For 
these reasons, despite the passing of SAL in 2001, West Papuans have become poorer 
than ever in their own land and this clearly indicates the failure of SAL.  In fact, at the 
third Papuan Traditional Council meeting in Manokwari in 2005, the meeting renounced 
the SAL and agreed to return it to the Indonesian state in August 2005 if the Indonesian 
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state continued with the same policy.165 
 
     Furthermore, instead of implementing full Special Autonomy, Indonesia 
introduced a new plan to create two new provinces (Central Irian Jaya and Western Irian 
Jaya), three new regencies (Puncak Jaya, Mimika and Paniai), and one municipality 
(Sorong). 166   Indonesia claims that this is important for faster improvement of 
infrastructure and economic development in West Papua.  Yet, John Otto Ondawame, 
an OPM spokesperson and a member of the Papua Presidium Council (PDP) argues that 
the most important motives behind this new plan have been to destabilize the national 
unity of West Papuans and to strengthen control over the OPM in the area.167  Another 
possible motive, Timmer argues, is to increase the number of troops in the area.  A 
potentially stronger presence of the TNI would generate suspicion, as it may not only 
increase oppression but also strengthen connections with local businesses with which 
the TNI is involved.168 
 
Part of the plan for two new provinces was adopted in 2003 by the Indonesian 
state and due to this Bird’s Head Peninsular of West Papua was made a separated 
province of West Irian Jaya.  In fact, while the division of West Papua was part of SAL, 
the procedure, it stated was that it could only be implemented after deliberation of the 
MRP and upon acceptance by the provincial parliament.169  Due to this, the legitimacy 
of new province has been controversial as it has been disapproved by the MRP.  In 
November 2004, an Indonesian court acknowledged that the division violated SAL 
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which was granted to West Papua.  Yet, the court ruled that since the Western Irian 
Jaya had already been established, it should remain separate from other part of West 
Papua.  Nevertheless, the court did ban the establishment of Central Irain Jaya, another 
new province planned by Indonesia since the separation had not yet been carried out. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
After West Papua was unwillingly incorporated into the Indonesian Republic, 
West Papuans have suffered from one of the most unjust and oppressive colonial 
occupations.  They have suffered from huge displacement from their native lands and 
the marginalization by transmigrants.  The destruction of West Papua’s environment 
and West Papuan’s culture has also taken place through the logging and mining 
activities which involve the economic interests of both Indonesia and Western states.  
West Papuans have fought against Indonesia’s rule and the local population who support 
the way of Indonesian development and this has resulted in widespread human rights 
violations by the TNI.  Because of the insecurity of the Indonesian government caused 
by financial crisis and conflicts in East Timor and Aceh, West Papuans finally received a 
positive answer from the Indonesian state regarding the settlement of comprehensive 
issues in West Papua with dignity and SAL was passed in 2001.  Yet, despite the SAL 
being presented as the final solution to West Papuans and supported by the global 
community, the Indonesian state has failed to implement a full Special Autonomy in 
reality and West Papuans have become poorer than ever in their own land. 
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Chapter 5 
Background to the Conflict 
 
There has been a conflict in West Papua over human rights, environmental justice, 
the right to control development, and the necessity for more fair distribution of 
affluence - primarily issues which Western corporations have long believed could go 
disregarded within the affable confines of Third World dictatorship.  For more than 
forty years Freeport McMoRan, the American mining company, with its strict home 
laws against corruption, has been able to operate with privilege by adjusting to, and 
indeed developing a business culture anchored in nepotism, collusion and corruption. 
This chapter illustrates the background to the conflict in West Papua between Amungme 
and Kamoro, Freeport and the Indonesian state. 
 
1. Freeport McMoRan 
 
With the backdrop of the Indonesian state’s invasion and suppression of West 
Papua in early 1960s, the Freeport McMoRan mining company of Louisiana signed its 
CoW with the Indonesian state in 1967.  This agreement provided the company with a 
wide range of authorities over the West Papuans and resources, including the right to 
exploit the land, water, timber, and other ecological resources, on a tax free basis and to 
relocate West Papuans while providing unreasonable compensation to them. 170  
Situated in the Western Highlands, Freeport together with the Rio Tinto of the UK, 
which is the biggest mining company in the world, manage Mt Grasberg, which is the 
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third largest copper mine and the largest gold mine in the world.171  The mountain 
holds gold and copper stocks worth at least U.S. $40 billion.172  It is estimated that one 
billion tonnes of ore are in Mt Grasberg which is estimated to last for twenty years.173  
In 2005, Grasberg mine generated 3,410,000 oz of silver, 273,900 tonnes of copper and 
1, 6076,000 oz of gold and the company’s net income in 2005 was U.S. $995.1 
million.174  The company has also been the highest tax payer to Indonesia.  According 
to the company, it has provided more than U.S. $33 billion in indirect and direct benefits, 
including fees, dividends, royalties and taxes, to Indonesia from 1992 to 2004 and $1.2 
billion in 2005.175  The passing of SAL in 2001 promised greater share (80 percent) of 
Indonesian state revenue from mining activities to West Papua.176  However, due to the 
Indonesian government’s lack of capacity to implement SAL, only 13 per cent of the 
Indonesian state revenue from Freeport currently goes to West Papuan provincial and 
local governments.177  As a result, very little benefit has gone to the West Papuans until 
today. 
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Figures 4, 5: Mt Grasberg178 
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     The Amungme (highlanders) and Kamoro (lowlanders) are the native landowners 
of the Tembagapura and Timika area of West Papua where Freeport has operated gold 
and copper mining and constructed the infrastructure.  When Freeport signed the 
contract in 1967,  around 800 Amungme resided in the Wa Valley - where 
Timbagapura is - and used the adjacent territory for cultivation of gardens and 
hunting.179  Another 1200 Amungme lived in two surrounding Aroanop and Tsinga 
valleys.180  Even though the mill and mine, which are above the tree line at 14,000 and 
10,000 feet, had no commercial use for the Amungme, trials show that the territory was 
used for hunting.181  Most important is that this land held deep cultural and spiritual 
importance for the Amungme.  In comparison, around 947 Kamoro resided in the two 
villages of Nawaripi/Koperapoka and Tipuka.182  Arriving after the long history of 
penetration, especially the most recent cruel Japanese occupation, the first Freeport 
personnel described the Kamoro as “exhibiting a seeming indifference to outside 
influence and disinterest in their own future.”183 
 
Since the presence of Freeport, Amungme and Kamoro people have suffered from 
the huge, permanent, and escalating disruption of their lives.  The confrontation 
between Western capitalist values and highly traditional West Papuan values has 
resulted in the company disregarding the local landowners’ rights and their concerns.  
Even though Freeport and the West Papuan community have shared the land for forty 
years, the benefits to the West Papuan landowners were insufficient, with the company 
pretending to know surprisingly little of indigenous spiritual beliefs and customs.  One 
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example of this is that Freeport’s mining operation has resulted in the construction of 
the Tembagapura town for its own employees.  However, this disrupted the Amungme 
inhabitants who were displaced from Tembagapura and were forced to resettle at Timika 
near the airport which serves the complex, and is one of eight transmigrants settlements 
areas in Timika.184 
 
The company also constructed a U.S. $500 million ‘new town’ with an Indonesian 
partner on the flatlands nearby Grasberg, which provides accommodation for a 
maximum of 20,000 of its workers and families.185  The Amungme and Kamoro have 
been further displaced and alienated culturally, politically, socially and economically by 
the outsiders who moved to the region of economic boom produced by the mine and its 
infrastructure.  These newcomers include thousands of Javanese by the state’s 
transmigration policy, thousands of West Papuans from other parts of the region, traders 
from Sulawesi, and Australian and North American workers of Freeport.  Until the 
1990s, the local population had risen to more than 60,000 people, making Timika the 
“fastest-growing economic zone in the entire Indonesian archipelago.”186 
 
     Also, Freeport’s mining activities have had a significant impact on environmental 
deterioration and public health.  By 1995, the company was mining 110, 000 tonnes of 
ore per day.187  Most of this had been dumped as mine waste and tailings into the 
adjacent rivers, making the water thick with slit and toxic, killing and smothering all 
plant life along the formerly rich river banks.188  The company estimated that their 
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operation has resulted in the disposal of more than 40 million tons of tailings into the 
adjacent Ajkwa River in 1996 and average tailings have doubled since then.189  
Environmental organizations have claimed that the huge amounts of mine disposal, 
which contained dissolved mercury, lead, arsenic and other possible harmful metals, 
have wiped out approximately 26 square miles of rainforest, destroying palm trees 
which are the source of sago.190  The Kamoro people in the Koperapoke area were told 
not to consume sago which is their major food and the company has also provided them 
drums to obtain drinking water from the rain since the river water had been polluted.  
Also, Amungme and Kamoro communities inhabiting the company’s operating area 
were often forced to shift to lower lands, where they tend to receive malaria and where 
traditional mountain foods like pandanus trees do not grow.  The Amungme have 
emphasized respect for their native lands.  One Amungme author writes: 
 
‘[The Amungme’s] respect toward nature restrains them from causing 
any destruction to their environment.  To destroy the environment is 
akin to their [own] destruction.’  He states, ‘To the Amungme, the 
most important thing is to maintain the harmony among the three 
elements of life: humankind, the natural environment, and the spirit 
of the ancestors.’  Another Amungme declares, ‘The land is 
ourselves.  The land is our mother.’  Amungme cosmology depicts 
the mountain that Freeport is mining as the sacred head of their 
mother and its rivers as her milk.  To the Amungme, Freeport’s 
mining activities are killing their mother and polluting the milk on 
which they depend for survival.191 
 
     In contrast, Freeport did not have to compensate the Amungme and Kamoro 
communities for the loss of forest products, drinking water, fishing grounds, hunting, 
their food gardens and other component of the natural environment that their livelihoods 
                                                  
189 Gedicks, A. Resource Rebels. South End Press: Cambridge, 2001, p. 101.   
190 Ibid, p. 101.  
191 Abrash, A. The Amungme, Kamoro & Freeport: How Indigenous Papuans have Resisted the World’s Largest Gold and   
   Copper Mine. Cultural Survival Quarterly 25:1, 2001. 
   http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/csq/csq-article.cfm?id=652 
                                                          
  
63
rely on due to the reason mentioned in the chapter 4.192  Instead, Freeport has claimed 
that they have received benefits from its presence in terms of employment, educational 
opportunities and medical services.  However, the Amungme and Kamoro have 
opposed it, insisting that they have received almost no benefits from the Freeport and it 
has been rather the prohibition of their existence bringing an undesired military 
presence into their lives, together with dispossession and oppression.  As one 
Amungme leader stated: 
 
[T]he smiling faces in Freeport’s PR videos mask the grim reality of 
residents living in clapboard shacks, children scrounging for food, 
and communities ravaged by malnutrition and preventable disease - 
this while Freeport’s privileged employees enjoy modern apartments, 
travel benefits, and more.193 
 
In fact, Indonesian law allows the state to act as if it was satisfying West Papuans 
by respecting their land and resource rights.  However, economic development, 
transmigration and other state-sponsored agendas are regarded as national interests and 
have priority over any land and resource claims by West Papuans.194  For this reason, 
under Indonesian governance, the Amungme and Kamoro have had no right of informed 
consent or rights of refusal, nor any right to appropriate compensation.  Although there 
is compensation it is usually simply in the form of ‘a certificate of recognition of right.’  
Recognition can be in a form of various things, even something with no commercial 
value like conducting a traditional ceremony, the presentation of a mosque, church, 
agricultural implements or other public facilities. 
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     The coercive displacement of Amungme and Kamoro from their traditional lands 
often leads them to reply with open resentment.  However, the Indonesian state has 
regarded opposition to economic development as a crime of disruption.195  To fight 
against the two communities’ opposition in obscurity, the Indonesian state has strongly 
blocked the international inspections of human rights situations in West Papua including 
Freeport’s operating areas.196  It has persistently shut down access by human rights 
observers, including the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (1998), a 
joint NGO Indonesian-International independent assessment team (1999), and the UN 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (1999).197 
 
The violence by the TNI has also been serious.  According to the official record, 
the first killing of West Papuans by the TNI in Freeport’s operating area happened in 
1972.  Researchers have recorded no less than 150 incidents of individual killings of 
Amungme and other West Papuans around mine since the 1970s.198  Also, there have 
been hundreds of deaths amongst West Papuans from injury and illness, especially by 
malaria, because of the coerced displacement and invasions by the TNI.  In 1995, the 
Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), the biggest NGO in Australia reported 
that there had been disappearances or murders of dozens of indigenous people in and 
around Freeport’s operating area by the TNI between June 1994 and February 1995.199  
In 1995 it was found that obvious human rights abuses had taken place in and around 
Freeport’s operating area and Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights 
(Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia-Komnas-HAM) stated that these abuses are 
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directly linked to the TNI performing its duty as protecting the Freeport mining 
business.200 
 
Finally, Freeport itself had served as the obvious government in their operating 
area by the 1990s.  Despite the establishment of official state governmental systems, 
Freeport’s influence has continuously affected the situation in the area.  For example, 
the company has provided large organizational and financial support to the TNI via the 
Indonesian state.  In fact, the Grasberg mine has been regarded by the Indonesian state 
as vital to national interest and due to this the TNI has played an important role in 
protecting the Freeport operation.  Simultaneously, the Indonesian state has looked to 
Freeport to supply infrastructure assistance and additional funding for necessary 
services since it has had limited capital.  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Freeport 
management instructed their helicopter pilots to carry armed forces on patrol missions.  
Also in the same period, the TNI used Freeport infrastructure as a base for severe 
assaults, including aerial bombings, against local populations in and around the mine.201  
Finally, Freeport financial records from the mid 1990s reportedly stated expenses of 
more than U.S. $9 million for police and the TNI, including offices for two army 
advisors, ammunition storage facilities, parade grounds, barracks, guard posts and 
houses, recreational facilities and military headquarters.202  Since the first documented 
human rights abuses in Freeport’s operating area, Freeport officials have insisted that 
the CoW says that the company has been required to give logistical support to the 
Indonesian police and the TNI.  However, a review of Freeport’s 1967 and 1991 CoWs 
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do not reveal these facts. 
 
4. Defending the Amungme and Kamoro’s Rights 
 
The Amungme and Kamoro reacted differently to Freeport’s ill-treatment of their 
communities.  The Kamoro, due to their simple lifestyle in the lowlands and their past 
experiences of cultural suppression, are a less cohesive community and suffered from a 
loss of self-esteem and weakened social structures.  Though resistances have 
occasionally occurred, they have been comparatively more accepting of the unavoidable 
dominance and presence of outsiders in general, entering into a state of inactive 
opposition, resigning themselves to enabling others to manipulate the type and pace of 
change within their society.203 
 
Conversely, the Amungme’s harsher life in the isolated highlands, together with 
their necessity across the centuries to establish coherent political adherence for survival, 
has resulted in a comparatively politically savvy community with a strong sense of unity, 
cultural self-esteem, and aspiration to determine their own future.204  As such they 
have resisted the company by using both nonviolent and violent tactics and strategies 
based on strong community organizing, to protect their lives, livelihoods and lands.  
Their protests against Freeport started in 1967 (the year when the company arrived) by 
positioning traditional taboo sticks around Freeport’s highlands base camp.205  Later it 
became the hoisting of the Morning Star flag, sit-ins and public demonstrations and it 
also occasionally included violent resistances with the open resentment. 
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     The Amungme community has also persistently searched for resolving the issues 
via open dialogue.  In 1974 an agreement was made in which Freeport guaranteed to 
create facilities, including a health clinic and school for West Papuan communities 
affected, instead of admission of native landowners to company’s operations.  
However, the lack of transparency in the land acquisition continued.  Amungme 
leaders claim that as late as 1995, West Papuan communities around the mine realized 
for the first time that according to the state records they had ceded all inherited lands in 
the Timika area (nearly one million hectares) to the state for Freeport’s company town, 
Kuala Kencana, the town of Timika and transmigration settlement.206 
 
Discontented by the privileged powers’ pledge to addressing native concerns, 
Amungme leaders in 1996 brought two legal actions against Freeport in the U.S., one in 
the state court of Louisiana, where the Freeport headquarters is located and the other in 
the U.S. federal court.  They sued the company on the grounds of their stealing of 
ancestral Amungme lands, human rights violations, “violations of international 
environmental law tantamount to acts of eco-terrorism and the planned demise of a 
culture of indigenous people whose rights were never considered during the course of 
the company’s mining operations.”207  Although the suits were unsuccessful, they have 
further asked the U.S. and the UK government for help.  However, these two 
governments have ignored the request by the Amungme leaders and have continuously 
provided military training and sold arms to Indonesia since they are the key supporters 
of the TNI.208  By doing so, the U.S. government has protected the interests of their 
mining company in Indonesia.  According to the Engineering and Mining Journal, 
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Freeport’s operation has generated the highest return and that “[Indonesia] has the 
potential to become a truly world-class mining center over the long term.”209 
 
The Amungme and later also Kamoro have continuously sought to defend their 
rights by communicating and chronicling their demands and concerns in several media 
interviews, public statements, resolutions and letters.  They have appealed to the TNI, 
the Indonesian state and its civil institutions, the U.S., UN policy-makers and courts as 
well as Freeport shareholders and management.  Yet, UN intervention everywhere in 
the world entails the questions of state sovereignty and the political and economic 
interests of those states that can exert the veto in the UN.210  Also, the responses by 
Freeport and the Indonesian state have been inappropriate.  For instance, the state’s 
failure to enforce prosecution of military personnel responsible for human right abuses 
and compensation to West Papuan communities affected and the state’s disregard of 
Freeport’s own involvement in the human rights abuses have continuously frustrated the 
West Papuan communities.211  In addition, the dialogues are always held on the 
privileged powers’ terms, leaving West Papuan communities with seriously limited 
options.  Furthermore, the TNI has also disturbed the efforts by the Amungme to be 
heard or to adopt legal action.212  Finally, successive Indonesian presidents appear 
interested only in bringing profitable mining and logging concessions to the TNI so as 
to guarantee its support.213  In short, Amungme’s movement has sought to ensure their 
indigenous rights including their cultural, political and economic rights by transforming 
the force of global capitalism into a gentler system which can consider their life as 
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Wilmer, Friedman and Chase-Dunn stated.214 
 
5. Conclusion 
By contributing the highest tax to the Indonesian state through mining activity, 
Freeport has created a condition of dependency and has influence in West Papua’s 
economy, politics and society.  Since the interests of the Indonesian state and the TNI 
corresponds with that of Freeport, they also voluntarily perpetuate a state of dependency 
to the detriment of Amungme and Kamoro.  While ignoring the two communities’ 
cultural reliance on the natural environment, Freeport, the Indonesian state and the TNI 
have established a capitalist paradigm in which natural resources including land are 
exploitable commodities.  However, by being assimilated into an earth-exploiting, 
consumer-oriented capitalist system, the two communities have found that the system 
provides neither freedom of choice or property rights to them.  For these reasons, 
Amungme and Kamoro have been in the situation of underdevelopment where their 
mineral resource is being largely utilized in a way which is beneficial for Freeport, the 
U.S., the Indonesian state and the TNI and not for them.  Their story tells us about 
people who are at the mercy of unrestricted global capital in the extractive businesses 
and asks us to rethink whether sustainable development is achievable through a global 
capitalist economic system imposed by states and MNCs.  It also shows the obvious 
harm to people’s lives and to the condition of politically alienated groups.  This occurs 
when those who control the means of force permit economically driven interests to 
dominate democratic public policy making, the protection of the environment and 
fundamental human rights.  Unless states and MNCs stop neo-colonial approaches 
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toward local inhabitants and ecological resources and respect the universal human right 
to development, disputes will continue between states, MNCs and the local inhabitants 
whose territories they exploit. 
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Chapter 6 
Contemporary Issues Surrounding Amungme and Kamoro 
Communities 
 
With the intensification of West Papuan resistances and increasing pressure from 
the NGOs, Freeport in recent years has finally started to deal seriously with the 
Amungme and Kamoro communities and has spent millions of American dollars and 
human resources on community development.  With the little presence of the 
Indonesian government, except for the TNI, Freeport admitted that it will carry on its 
responsibility and that it is in its best interest to promote social development within its 
concession area.  Despite this, the two communities have been continuously 
underprivileged, disadvantaged and disenchanted.  Difficulties in achieving successful 
community development are attributed to cultural differences, the absence of coherent 
Amungme and Kamoro foundations through which dialogue and development funds 
would be maintained and managed and the continuous influx of transmigrants which 
prevent the two communities from succeeding in business and education.  However, 
the fundamental distrust which arose due to the company’s condescending attitude 
toward the two communities, its close tie with the TNI and its ‘can do’ development 
policies, have been the main factors in embittering relations and spoiling community 
development today.  Finally, although it is also vital to stop TNI’s violence toward 
West Papuans, other parties have supported the Indonesian state and the TNI. 
 
1. Fundamental Cultural Differences 
 
Fundamental cultural differences between Western capitalist oriented culture and 
traditional West Papuan culture have prevented successful community development.  
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Cultural differences distort communication lines, causing misunderstanding, resentment 
and inadequate development programs.  The Amungme and Kamoro have found it 
hard to adapt quickly to the remarkable changes being demanded of them.  Also, 
Freeport, which focuses on profits, regards technology and Western development as 
superior to West Papuan culture.  Thus it has also been difficult for Freeport to accept 
another cultural value.  The two communities argue that they have strict codes of 
conduct and hierarchical systems which Freeport must understand and also say that 
traditional ways of living do not imply fundamental inferiority or backwardness.215  
For example, they evaluate the quality of life by ties to the land, cultural strength, 
comforting and familiar rituals and kinship relations, whereas Westerners evaluate it by 
educational levels, life expectancy and infant mortality.216  Once when asked ‘How 
many people does Freeport feel that it has adversely affected by its mining operations?’, 
Edward Pressman, who is the spokesperson for Freeport Indonesia’s head office in 
Jakarta, replied: 
 
Has our presence disrupted traditional life style?  Yes, but in many 
more positive aspects than negative.  We have provided the means 
with which the local people can avail themselves of a better standard 
of living.  We have seen life expectancy among the local [West 
Papuans] rise dramatically since we entered the area.  We have seen 
infant mortality drop drastically since we entered the area.  The 
[West Papuans] in the area have been afforded educational and job 
opportunities that they never would have been given if not for 
Freeport’s presence.  And for many people, Freeport has provided 
hope that the next generation will enjoy even more benefits than the 
present.217 
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     However, although what Freeport argues sounds persuasive, the negative aspects 
of development have also appeared.  For example, whereas Amungmes’ lifestyle was 
dangerous and difficult, it is also true that before the presence of the company, everyone 
had a home, job and most important, a coherent spiritual culture.  Today, 
unemployment, social disorder, drug abuse, AIDS and economic, social and spiritual 
disorder are apparent in Timika and Kwamiki Lama and are starting to be seen in the 
villages.  In short, Freeport’s capitalist oriented development model has not been able 
to accommodate different ideas about cultural, social and family relationships and as a 
result, it has merely encouraged the Amungme and Kamoro’s access to an imposed 
capitalist economic system as Lutz argues.218 
 
Regarding communication and negotiation, these have been disturbed by the 
disregarding by both Freeport and Amungme and Kamoro of different ways of 
communication and negotiation.  Misunderstandings are usual on both sides and while 
Freeport officials expect to hear coherent decisions presented in one voice, the two 
communities often revisit settled issues.219  In the end, difference in negotiation results 
in the two communities believing that they simply have get to a higher stage of 
negotiations while Freeport believes it has already settled an agreement.  While 
Freeport has coherent channels of communication and decision making which 
concentrate on immediate outcomes, the two communities focus primarily on the 
process and have a variety of voices among which clear channels of decision-making 
are absent. 220   Thus, reaching an agreement with the two communities’ needs 
understanding and patience.  They require time to understand what is being offered by 
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following their own negotiation and deliberation rhythm.  In contrast, Freeport argues 
that in the competitive world today, they do not have sufficient time to continue 
renegotiating agreements.221   
 
     On the other hand, Freeport’s corporate culture has also been far from normative 
for successful communication.  The company believed in its capacity to overcome 
hardship and to win out over adversity.222  In fact, this can-do philosophy had brought 
its success in mining, but had completely failed in managing the mine’s critics.  As 
LABAT - Anderson states: 
 
Standard corporate operating procedures and management philosophy 
- e.g., materialism, individual property rights, formal written law, 
hierarchical, non-consensual decision-making result in different 
perspectives, conflict of messages, misunderstandings, and lack of 
reciprocity with respect to the indigenous peoples.223 
 
Finally, constructive communication and satisfactory outcomes are difficult when 
the two groups derive from significantly different power levels.  Living under the TNI 
occupation, struggling with cultural genocide and feeling comparatively weak in 
challenging the MNC, Amungme and Kamoro in general have struggled with a loss of 
self-confidence.224  In addition, forced interaction between three significantly different 
cultures has caused the situation to deteriorate.  The Indonesian transmigrants regard 
the West Papuans as backward and inferior.  In particular, traditional Melanesian 
culture with dietary practices including the eating of pigs, their morals, nudity and their 
pagan belief is regarded by Muslim Indonesians as anathema. 225   Indonesian 
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transmigrants have long benefited from marginalizing West Papuans and it is unlikely 
that they as a public can establish a fairer situation for the Amungme and Kamoro which 
contradict with what Lutz says.226  To make the matter worse, while the population of 
the area today is around 100,000, the West Papuans, who number around 40,000 have 
became a minority in their own territory, and the Amungme (around 4,300) and Kamoro 
(around 8,000) have became minorities within the minority.227 
 
2. One Percent Fund, Land Rights Recognition Programs and Land Rights Trust 
Fund 
 
Since there had been a growing necessity to find prompt resolutions to the social 
problems around the operating area and to respond to West Papuan demands Freeport 
announced the Integrated Timika Development Plan or more commonly, ‘the One 
Percent Fund policy’ in April 1996, as its effort at socioeconomic development to 
address West Papuans’ concerns.  According to Freeport, this plan was based on a 
tripartite cooperation between the company, the West Papuans and the Indonesian 
government in which each party takes equal responsibility for development.  To 
commit to its agreement, Freeport has contributed 1 percent of its annual profit for the 
fund.  According to Freeport, it contributed U.S. $42 million for the fund through 
2005.228  Between 1996 and 2005, it had spent an estimated U.S. $194 million for the 
fund.229  The fund is administered via Pembangunan Wilayah Timika Terpadu (PTW2) 
under the control of the Project Coordination Unit (PCU). 
      
                                                  
226 Lutz, E L. Is fair Trade Fair? Cultural Survival Quarterly Issue 29, No 3, 2005. See Chapter 3, p. 27 of this thesis. 
    http://www.cs.org/publications/csq/csq-article.cfm?id=1843 
227 Leith, D.  The Politics of Power. Freeport in Suharto’s Indonesia. University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu, 2003, p. 95-96.    
228 Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. The Elements of Sustainable Development. 2005 Working toward Sustainable  
   Development Report. 2005, p. 12. http://www.fcx.com/envir/wtsd/pdf-wtsd/2005/WTSD-ver4.pdf  See Endnote 5. 
229 Ibid, p. 12. 
  
76
 
     However, a number of issues have appeared from the One Percent Fund policy 
and one of them is the communication.  There has been a breakdown in the channels of 
communication between West Papuans, Freeport and the Indonesian government.  
There were few West Papuan elites who could negotiate properly with the company.  
In fact, a continuum of representative leadership is not familiar to West Papuans’ culture, 
where leadership is often diffused, challenged, fluid, and in a state of constant 
change.230  Within this fragile institutional structure, where the recipients often lack 
local credence, a corrupted Indonesian officer from the government planning agency in 
Jayapura, with no previous experience in community development and no clear or 
accountable plan, mismanaged the allocation of funds.231  Under the scheme, the fund 
was allocated with equal amounts going to each West Papuan community irrespective of 
Amungme and Kamoro who have been the initial victims of the Freeport operation.  
Moreover, the disbursement of funds was project driven (initially house construction) 
rather than being based on needs.  This meant that Indonesian contractors started 
engaging in projects for communities or borrowing funds “on the understanding that 
when the funds became available these funds be channeled straight to them to make 
them a handsome profit.”232 
 
Furthermore, these compensation funds by Freeport worsened already existing 
tensions and jealousies within and between West Papuan communities.  Because of the 
misallocation of the funds, the Amungme and Kamoro had been little satisfied.  They 
complained that they had never been properly compensated while most of those who 
received the fund were not entitled to it.  Amungme Traditional Council (Lembaga 
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Masyarakat Adat Amungme-LEMASA) estimated that the two communities had 
received no more than .001 percent of the fund.233  Due to this, in April 1996, 
LEMASA renounced the company’s offer, announcing that the fund failed to satisfy the 
Amungme needs.234  However, the rejection of Freeport’s offer by the LEMASA 
divided the coherent Amungme.  With the support of Freeport which controlled who 
could or could not represent the Amungme, Breakaway Amungme yayasan 
(AMUNGKAL) a rival Amungme representative group was formed and they obtained 
development funds for the Amungme.235  Yet, no preference was given to Amungme 
communities under this arrangement.  The LABAT - Anderson report says: 
 
The [council]s that supposedly represent the peoples…were formed 
in response to the money, not from the grassroots of the people’s 
needs.  They are staffed by people who have various allegiances: 
some were leaders of the riots of March 1996, some [were] Freeport 
employees, government employees and businessmen, the very 
contractors who implemented infrastructure projects.  Many 
lack[ed] the skills needed to perform their management and 
representation function effectively.236 
 
     By accepting Freeport’s offers, AMUNGKAL was given Rp 500 million from the 
fund each time, and another small Amungme group in the Banti village which aligned 
with the military and refused LEMASA was also guaranteed special privileges.237  As 
well as the Amungme, the Kamoro had also been split as well by the offer of Freeport’s 
funds. They caused discontent to grow between the Kamoro Traditional Council 
(Lembaga Adat Masyarakat Suku Kamoro-LEMASKO) which were also formed with 
Freeport’s support and were the direct recipients of funds and those in the Kamoro 
villages who perceived they were comparatively ignored yet asserted a strong tie to the 
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mining area.  Nevertheless, Kamoro as a whole benefited from the company’s offers 
and education and health projects. 
 
Due to the above problems caused by the One Percent Fund Policy, from 1998 the 
company started to re-evaluate the projects and restructure the mechanism and the 
People’s Development Foundation Irian Jaya (LPM-Irja) was founded.  By including 
provincial government representatives, local church representatives, leaders from the 
local Kamoro and Amungme communities, other West Papuan regional leaders and 
Freeport, its initial purpose was to generate a number of responsible representative 
foundations capable of managing the One Percent Fund on an everyday basis.  By 
establishing it, the company encouraged a more decentralized and representative 
decision-making system and implementation mechanism.  Within this new system, the 
attempt at socioeconomic development was village oriented rather than project or 
foundation oriented.  Freeport personnel and those NGOs willing to support the 
company, were engaged within the villages to assist setting up and training 
representative foundations, whose task was to decide what was required in their village, 
after which they handed in a proposal to LPM-Irja for evaluation.  If their proposal 
was accepted, funds were provided for the project, but under this system the village was 
asked to accomplish the project itself.238  With the conclusion of a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with LEMASKO and LEMASA in 2000, LPM-Irja was 
reorganized and renamed as the Development Foundation of Amungme and Kamoro 
People (Lembaga Pembangunan Masyarakat Amungme dan Kamoro-LPMAK) in 
2001.239 
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However, a number of issues again appeared.  Although the new system would 
witness certain successes, its effectiveness continuously suffered from the apparently 
continuing problems of jealously among recipients and the absence of responsibility - 
which LPM-Irja were expected to bring to an end, coupled with communication 
breakdowns between involved parties.240  Several village leaders were witnessed in 
Timika having cash in hand and sporting sunglasses; one person even allegedly fled to 
Java with U.S. $200,000 to pursue a better life and a new woman.241  In addition, the 
large inflow of money created unforeseen consequences such as an increase in the 
HIV/AIDS rate in these areas and a rise in the economically and socially significant 
bride-price.242  These are source of the outcomes which may occur when traditional 
cultures are suddenly bombarded by a Western capitalist culture. 
 
Tom Beanal, a recognized Amungme leader who is now a member of the 
company’s consulting group, expressed his concerns and said, “people don’t know how 
to use money properly and suddenly they have huge amounts.  It’s like instant cash.  
But we can’t blame the people.”243  Instead, he criticizes Freeport, for not educating 
West Papuans before the disbursement of cash.    To deal with the above issues, in 
2001 the company established a new Community Liaison Program.  The program 
required that trained workers engage within the villages to better understand the local 
West Papuans’ needs and their disquiets about the company.  The company also 
attempted to rely on NGOs for development programs and Yayasan Sejati an Indonesian 
NGO which had negotiated with Kamoro about the company’s land rights agreement, 
has engaged in small development projects in the Kamoro villages.  In the highlands 
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the strongly religious Village Heartbeat Foundation, founded by former community 
relations workers and the missionary John Cutts, have carried out these tasks. 
 
Finally, the One Percent Fund Policy also created a culture of dependency among 
the two communities.  A growing number of Amungme and Kamoro seem to be 
worried if there was no payment of the funds.  Rumbrar stated that local West Papuans 
such as farmers had left their jobs and were waiting for funds.244  Kilangin similarly 
stated that “[i]nstead of doing their routine activities such as gardening and their other 
daily activities, they carried their proposals around looking for funding from office to 
office.”245  Within the present atmosphere in which the Fund is disbursed, a mentality 
of reliance will grow and may result in serious problems after the end of the policy in 
2006 as there seems to be no promise from the company regarding the continuation of 
the policy. 
 
In relation to land rights, there had been misunderstanding regarding land rights 
which Amungme and Kamoro argued that their greatest loss had been that of their 
spiritual lands.  Due to this, resentment and trouble around the mine had continued.  
For this reason, Freeport has engaged in the Land Rights Recognition Programs to carry 
over the years by supplying millions of American dollars value of social, economic and 
infrastructure development projects for Amunme and Kamoro.246  Also the Land 
Rights Trust Fund agreement was signed by Freeport, Amungme and Kamoro 
communities in 2001.  Nevertheless, it was not a voluntary agreement and the local 
government, after being invited by Freeport, coerced the Amungme to sign the 
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agreement and they also signed the Kamoro land settlement illegally.  Under the 
agreement, Freeport’s compensation of land rights, which was U.S. $1 million annually, 
has been provided to the two communities to buy shares in Freeport, thus becoming 
stakeholders in the mine.247  This system was invented to appease the two communities 
by fulfilling all their requests, which included compensation, a voice within Freeport 
and equality.  In a provision which was similar to existing traditional land ownership 
practices of the Amungme and Kamoro, it also diminished compensation to them for 
loss of land by giving a way for continued transgenerational resource stewardship via 
ownership.248  In turn, they were asked to switch their land rights to permanent shares 
in Freeport and according to the agreement, the shares could never be sold.  By 
providing both the Land Rights Recognition Programs and the Land Rights Trust Fund, 
Freeport argues it has done more than it is obliged under Indonesian law to fulfill 
requests for acknowledgment.249  LEMASA in recent years has gradually understood 
Freeport’s dilemma regarding land rights, with a member expressing that “while the 
group believed that there is some goodwill from Freeport, the company’s actions were 
limited by Indonesian laws.”250 
 
3. Broad-Based Development Programs 
 
While Freeport now attempts to bring development to the operating area, it is 
continuously funding the broad-based development programs.  The funds for these 
programs come separately from the One Percent Fund and Land Right Trust Fund, and 
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from 1990 to 2000 U.S. $155 million was spent on the programs.251  However, several 
issues have again emerged from the programs.  Regarding Freeport’s employment, 
Amungme and Kamoro have found it difficult to adjust to a Western working timetable, 
with Freeport making no accommodation for their work habits.  Also, transmigrants 
have become their greatest competitors for jobs.  Freeport, for many years, has 
benefited from importing skilled labor and employing cheap Indonesian transmigrants 
rather than spending the money, effort and time to train West Papuans.  Also, regarding 
the other business opportunities, most business in Timika today is run by the 
transmigrants from Sumatra, Java, Maluku and North and South Sulawesi - even in the 
senior positions in government and the stores which sell West Papuans’ traditional 
crafts.252  As Earl states, Timika’s taxis and markets hold “a growing sea of people 
from western Indonesia with absolutely no regard for who was there first.”253  The 
local Amungme and Kamoro women, who now inhabit Timika and Kwamki Lama are 
required to depend on selling their vegetables in the marketplace to support their 
families, complaining that the more aggressive transmigrants took their business 
opportunities away.254  For these reasons, tension between the two communities and 
transmigrants regarding job opportunities has become a significant social problem. 
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Figure 6: Domination of Transmigrants in West Papua255  
 
Figure 7: The West Papuans’ Traditional Properties being Sold by 
Transmigrants256 
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Figure 8: West Papuan Women Selling their Vegetables in the Market Place257 
 
      
     Freeport, at first, denied that it has favored transmigramts - arguing that West 
Papuans are naturally disadvantaged against the more aggressive transmigrants, 
regarding employment.  The company says that since the technology for the mine is so 
complex, most West Papuans who have lived in traditional hunter-gatherer societies, 
with a lack of education or the benefit of past recruitment, lack the fundamental abilities 
required in most areas of the company’s jobs.258  Yet, in 1995, the company adopted a 
positive discrimination policy on behalf of the West Papuans.  It stated that 
employment priority today is given first to Amungme and Kamoro, and then to other 
West Papuans. Freeport is also running a popular literacy course for West Papuan adults 
and vocational training centers for West Papuans where they can learn the skills which 
they need for employment.259  Followed by these initiatives, the company argues it has 
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committed to employing more West Papuans.  It stated that from 600 West Papuans in 
1996, West Papuan employment had increased to almost 2,400 by 2005, with staff 
numbers (professional and managerial) in the same period increased from 50 to 250, 
with more than half of these being Amungme and Kamoro heads of households.260  
However, to position a large number of West Papuans in highly skilled areas Freeport is 
realistically expecting the next generation who are in school now.  Thus it will take a 
certain period of time before the benefits can be seen, even though the company 
continues to commit to these promises.  Yet, it also should not be disregarded that the 
Kamoro Baseline Study warned that it found a large number of errors in Freeport’s 
employment records. 
 
However, the same as in the case of the One Percent Fund policy, there has been 
significant jealousies between West Papuan communities regarding the company’s 
positive discriminatory policy.  For example, Kamoro complained that the company 
favours the Amungme who are the original owners of the mine and are historically 
fiercer than Kamoro.  In fact, Amungme found more employment than Kamoro in the 
ratio of 3:1 so that more than 60 ppercent of the Amungmes’ cash income is derived 
from Freeport employment compared to 27 percent of the Kamoro’s.261  Also, the same 
as with other Freeport initiatives, company policy and the Amungme and Kamoro’s 
understanding of the policy are different.   
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Table 1: Freeport’s Estimation of West Papuan Employees at Freeport262 
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Table 2: Freeport’s Estimation of West Papuan Staffs at Freeport263 
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Most Amungme and Kamoro do not perceive Freeport’s initiative on their behalf, 
believing that it is intentionally excluding them from employment.  However, due to 
the nature of the mining operation and the area’s demographics, it is not possible for 
Freeport to provide work for all those who look for employment. 
 
     Regarding education, which is a crucial requirement for solving the existing 
problems and achieving right socioeconomic development, the company has directly 
engaged in the education of the Amungme and Kamoro via its community development 
education program.264  In fact, the two communities desire education the most because 
it is seen as a passport to a company job and as the magical door through which access 
can be obtained to a seductive world created by Freeport affluence.265  However, only 
10 percent of 1.3 million West Papuans until today have completed primary and senior 
school, and only one percent have completed university degrees.266  In fact, whereas 
the company argues that its educational programs support the two communities, 
discrimination in favour of Indonesian transmigrants has been obvious and few 
scholarships for higher education have been awarded to the two communities.  Yet, any 
present or past discrimination in the education program might be the outcome of a 
flow-on from issues other than apparent discrimination by the Freeport itself.  The 
local priest points out that transmigrants are naturally better in school and as a result 
deserve more scholarships, since their history and language give them an original 
advantage.   
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He said: 
 
Reading primers are written in Bahasa Indonesia, which 70 percent 
of the province does not speak.  They tell about rice paddies and 
trains.  Who knows anything about paddies and trains here?  It’s 
too big a jump.  My people drop out, remain illiterate, and Jakarta 
says, ‘See? West Papuans don’t want to learn.’267   
 
Yet, in Amungme and Kamoro’s perspective, they believe that the discrimination in the 
education is an intentional policy of Freeport’s in coalition with the Indonesian state, to 
keep them stupid, split and remaining in a stone age culture to respect the more 
competitive transmigrants.268 
 
On the other hand, the company’s support for education is a two-edged sword for 
the two communities as well.  As Theys Eluay, who was the leader of the PDP, stated, 
“[e]ducation is the solution, but it’s also where the problem starts.”269  Whereas the 
company’s support of the education system provides chances to many Amungme and 
Kamoro, it also contributes to their cultural destruction.  In fact, Jakarta’s policy 
enforces every Indonesian citizen to receive a state-sponsored education using Bahasa 
Indonesian to assimilate every minority group into the dominant culture.270  The two 
communities complain about the Indonesian education system which is a form of 
brainwashing that undermines their culture.  Therefore, whereas lack of access to 
education is condemned by the two communities, so too is the system itself. 
 
Finally, disappointment with the education system is not only limited to access 
and content, but also to results.  While education may fundamentally increase 
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expectations, failure to achieve these expectations can be relatively detrimental to the 
individual and the community as a whole.  One community which received empty 
promises of education was the Kamoro.  Muller states that due to the Kamoro’s fairly 
simple lifestyle and their negative experiences of education in the 1930s - which 
witnessed the Kamoro receiving an education that was not useful in the village situation 
and failed to guarantee Western employment - makes it difficult to persuade them of the 
benefits of education, especially post high school level education.271  The Kamoros’ 
perception of education is obviously reflected in the statistics and while the access to 
education is easier for the lowland Kamoro and they generally receive a higher level of 
education compared to Amungme, more Amungme generate a higher level of attainment.  
Simultaneously the Kamoro Baseline Study proved that high drop-out rate of the 
Kamoro was also linked to the significance of sustaining resource and social bases in 
various parts of their territory.  That means “they often left their village for extended 
periods and returned to their seminomadic lifestyle, making continuity in education 
difficult.”272  Nevertheless, whereas education entails no guarantees, it is regarded as a 
passport to future development by most West Papuans.  As McBeth states: 
 
[I]nevitably, when you sit down with [West] Papuan leaders and ask 
them what they want, they say a school or a clinic.  They say they 
want their children to have more than they had and to relate to a 
world that is changing.273 
 
The TNI also realize this and has subsequently blocked West Papuan students from 
studying overseas, believing that education for West Papuans will threaten its control on 
the area. 
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4. Continuous support by other parties to Indonesia and the TNI 
 
While achieving successful community development is an important next step, it 
is also crucial to stop ongoing human rights abuses which have been conducted by the 
TNI over many years to promote further prosperity of Amungme, Kamoro.  TNI abuse 
has been widespread throughout the whole of West Papua since the turn of the 21st 
century, especially in the Freeport operating area in Timika which has become the most 
militarized zone.274  Despite the passing of SAL in 2001, it has done little to prevent 
the TNI oppression and human rights abuses until today.  Conversely, although the 
current Indonesian President Yudhoyono promised to decrease the amount of TNI 
presence in West Papua, it is in fact, growing significantly.  Today, no less than 50,000 
troops are in West Papua with 15,000 stationed in the Mimika regency.275  In fact, the 
TNI has spent not only the 30 percent of the state budget distributed to them but also 
has spent money from international donors which is provided for humanitarian aims.276  
Furthermore, despite the historical record of human rights violations, Indonesia and the 
TNI up to the present have continuously been supported and provided with aid and 
training from the other parties including Freeport, the U.S., UK, New Zealand and 
Australia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
274 See Endnote 23.  
275 Ondawame, O. West Papua: New Prospects for Change. A Briefing Paper No1. Representatives of West Papuan Representative   
    Office: Republic of Vanuatu, 2005, p. 12.   
276 Ibid, p. 12. See Endnote 24. 
  
91
Figure 9: Theys Eluay, a Leader of the PDP Murdered by the TNI in 2001.277 
 
Figure 10: Yustinus Morip, a local West Papuan ill-treated by the TNI in 
November 5, 2003.278 
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Figure 11: Paul Morkaneak Kossay, a local West Papuan murdered by the TNI in 
May 14, 2006.279 
 
 
 
     Firstly, the Grasberg mine has been regarded by the Indonesian state as vital to 
national interest and due to this the TNI has played an important role in protecting the 
Freeport operation.  Also, the Indonesian state has looked to Freeport to supply 
infrastructure assistance and additional funding for necessary services since it has had 
limited capital.  Thus, Freeport has until today assisted the TNI and in 2005, it spent a 
total of U.S. $7.3 million (U.S. $ 6.2 million net to PT Freeport Indonesia).280   The 
support has included the cost of infrastructure, dining hall and carted costs, vehicle 
repairs, fuel, housing, travel as well as allowances to cover administrative and incidental 
costs.281 
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     With regards to the U.S., the U.S. Congress once stopped providing International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) to the TNI in 1992 when it murdered East 
Timorese protestors in November of that year.  Although the regulation was moderated 
in 1995, it was again restricted in August 1999 when the TNI engaged in sabotage and 
violence in East Timor following the referendum supporting the independence from 
Indonesia, and also in August 2002 when two U.S. teachers were killed in the Freeport 
operating area.  However, in 2005, the Secretary of State confirmed that the U.S. could 
restore the full IMET since Indonesian collaboration regarding the murders had met the 
requirements set by Congress.  In November of the same year, the U.S. enforced a 
National Security Waiver given in the 2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and 
this waiver removed congressional regulations on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
and lethal defence articles, and represented recreation of normalized military 
cooperation.282  The U.S. expects this restoration of support to the TNI to provide 
significant assistance for Indonesia’s attempts to improve its ability to deal with national 
and regional disasters, and encourage regional stability particularly in relation to 
terrorists.283 
 
As well as the U.S., the UK has enjoyed unregulated military cooperation with 
Indonesia for many years.  It has also been one of Indonesia’s biggest suppliers of 
arms and in March 2005, Prime Minister, Tony Blair, declared a renewed military tie 
with Indonesia by licensing an ￡11 million arms exportation to Indonesia, ranging 
from combat aircraft parts to gun silencers which were mainly for the purpose of 
‘mopping up the terrorists’.284  In fact, UK-made Tactica armoured vehicles were 
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deployed against demonstrators in West Papua in the same year, which resulted in the 
use of excessive force, thereby committing further human rights violations. 285  
Although East Timor’s Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation warned 
that military assistance for Indonesia should be completely on the condition of progress 
towards strict adherence to universal human rights and full subordination to the civilian 
government and law, the British government has appeared to ignore it.286 
 
With regards to New Zealand, it terminated its bilateral defense cooperation 
program with Indonesia in September 1999 when the TNI engaged in human rights 
violations in East Timor.  Yet, its policy on West Papua since the Labour party took 
over the government in 1999 has been focused on avoiding any interruption to its 
relations with Indonesia.  New Zealand officials engaged in a form of words created to 
keep everyone happy: a formulation which would give no resentment to Indonesia, 
while still answering to public opinion in New Zealand.287  The written advice from its 
Embassy in Jakarta in July 2000 suggested that “expressions of concern about human 
rights abuses should be framed as far as possible to avoid giving offence to 
Indonesia.”288  In the same year, as part of the response to the questions from the 
human rights groups and the media, the New Zealand government responded that it 
wished to see a democratic, stable, united and prosperous Indonesia and supported 
Indonesia’s attempts to settle issues peacefully via consultation and dialogue.289  For 
these reasons, New Zealand’s role in lobbying Indonesia has been ineffective since it 
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has consistently given the higher importance to maintaining a good relationship with 
Indonesia rather than the rights of West Papuans. 
 
Finally Australia has also enjoyed military cooperation with Indonesia up until 
today.  As well as other states, Australia once shut down relations with Indonesia in 
1999 when it was preparing to use TNI backed violence against pro-independence 
advocators in East Timor as the justification for military intervention.  However, 
although having participated in the East Timor intervention, Australia had been eager to 
restore formal relations with Indonesia since Canberra has long regarded Indonesia as 
crucial to ensure its national interests especially regarding the fight against terrorism.  
Due to this, it restored its formal relationship with Indonesia in February 2002 by 
signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which enabled the joint investigation 
of the Bali attacks which happened in the same year.  Also, in 2004, Australia provided 
a 10 million AUS$ support package to Indonesia to underpin law enforcement 
capabilities for counterterrorism capacity-construction.290  In the same year, the Jakarta 
Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) was established, which Australia 
supplies 38.3 million AUS$ over the five year period ending in 2009.291  The Centre is 
expected to enhance counter-terrorism capabilities as well as to make available a place 
for military and police exchanges between Australia and Indonesia. 
 
In short, although Harawira argues the importance of acknowledgement by 
international society about the on-going colonization of indigenous people and the right 
of indigenous self-determination, major parties have until today ignored these issues in 
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West Papua.292  Though the motivation is different for each party, Freeport, the U.S, 
UK, New Zealand and Australia have, up until today, supported Indonesia and the TNI 
and it is very unlikely that their attitudes toward human rights issues in West Papua will 
be positive in the near future.  As mentioned in chapter 5, international humanitarian 
organizations, especially the UN, have also taken a negative attitude towards the West 
Papua issue since its intervention entails the question of Indonesian sovereignty and the 
political and economic interests of major states, including the above four states that can 
exert the veto in the UN.293  For these reasons, there is a growing concern that another 
Rwanda and East Timor could happen in West Papua. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
It is only recently that Freeport has begun to deal seriously with the social 
problems around the mine and Amungme and Kamoro have been invited to be partners 
in the development process.  With the absence of an accountable government, Freeport 
will unwillingly continue its roles as developer and administrator of its operation area.  
However, without establishing acknowledged representation and clear and agreed goals, 
significant progress cannot be made in accommodating the mine and the aspirations and 
rights of Amungme and Kamoro.  There are a number of problems which must be 
solved if there is to be reconciliation and further effective development.  First, what the 
two communities desire from Freeport is respect and equality, but unless the problems 
of fear, sense of betrayal and mistrust which they feel toward Freeport are solved, 
constructive dialogues and positive cooperation are impossible.  Also, Freeport must 
accept that community development is a long term task where outcomes are slow and 
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due to this, continuity in both projects and staffing is crucial in increasing the 
company’s understanding and effectiveness, and in gaining the credence and support of 
the two communities.  In addition, Amungme and Kamoro are required to present an 
appropriately united front, accept accountability for the administration of their own 
growth and give up the notion of having the company satisfy their desires if they wish 
to be equal participants in the development process.  Enhancing education and 
producing more educated Amungme and Kamnoro are crucial next steps.  Finally, the 
ongoing human rights violations by the TNI which West Papuans around the mine have 
many years suffered must be solved.  Since major parties have supported the 
Indonesian state and the TNI, the roles of minor states, especially the Pacific Island 
states and their subordinate organizations, are crucial in taking a positive step toward 
resolving the issue. 
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Chapter 7 
Prospects of Achieving Successful Development 
 
Smith argues that one of the research agendas regarding indigenous 
self-determination is the goal of social justice which is expressed through the 
psychological terrain and involves the process of healing.294  As discussed in chapter 6, 
genuine reconciliation between Freeport and Amungme and Kamoro is a crucial next 
step in achieving successful community development.   
 
In fact, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) mentioned in the chapter 6 
was agreed between Freeport and LEMASA and LEMASKO and it consequently 
resulted in the establishment of MOU Forum.  The Forum is expected to play an 
important role in promoting genuine reconciliation between Freeport and the two 
communities.  For these reasons, this chapter investigates the South African 
reconciliation process via Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to explore a 
possible way for the MOU Forum to achieve genuine reconciliation between the two 
parties and contribute to the further prosperity of Amungme and Kamoro.  The South 
African TRC has succeeded, to a certain degree, in achieving reconciliation between 
White and Black South Africans after the collapse of the apartheid government.   
 
With regards to the issue of ongoing TNI abuses, since major parties have 
supported the Indonesian state and the TNI, the attitude of the Pacific community 
toward the issue is investigated in order to explore its possible role in solving the issue.  
Finally, although the transmigramts have been another major issue surrounding the 
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Amungme and Kamoro communities, the possible solution to it is not explored in this 
study due to the scale of the thesis.295 
 
1. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Forum 
 
The MOU signed in 2000 between Freeport and LEMASA and LEMASKO 
focused on human rights, land rights, environmental issues and socioeconomic 
resources.  As a part of the agreement, the MOU Forum was established which 
consists of representatives of provincial government, Freeport, YAHAMAK (a 
non-profit advocacy group for West Papuan children and women), LEMASA and 
LEMASKO.  The Forum regularly meets to discuss issues in relation to the 
implementation of the MOU.  According to Freeport, “[t]his continual dialogue has led 
to further agreements and mutually beneficial projects and has instilled a sense of 
partnership and community between [Freeport] and [their West] Papuan neighbours 
aligning [Freeport’s] shared interests in a sustainable and more promising future.”296  
The company also states that the Forum promotes continuous dialogue for better respect 
and mutual understanding, in order to allow the West Papuans to accomplish their 
desires and to keep harmonious relations.297  For these reasons, it seems that the Forum 
is an appropriate arena for promoting genuine reconciliation between Freeport and 
Amungme and Kamoro.  Yet, to achieve its purpose, the Forum can learn from the 
experience of the South African TRC. 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
295 See Chapter 6, p. 82 of this thesis. 
296 Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. The Elements of Sustainable Development. 2005 Working toward Sustaianble   
   Development Report. 2005, p. 8. http://www.fcx.com/envir/wtsd/pdf-wtsd/2005/WTSD-ver4.pdf 
 See Endnote 1. 
297 Ibid, p. 8. 
  
100
 
Figure 12: Chairman of Freeport, James R. Moffett Meets with the MOU Forum 
Members in November, 2005 as part of Dialogue with the Initial Stakeholders in its 
Operating Areas.298 
 
 
 
2. Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa 
 
In South Africa, there had long been a racial segregation system called apartheid.  
Started in 1948, it was created to frame a legal system for continued political and 
economic supremacy by people of European descent.  Under apartheid, the South 
African people were officially divided into ethnic groups - Black, White, Coloured and 
Indian.  They were geographically and coercively segregated from each other on the 
basis of the official ethnic classification.299  Because of apartheid, there had been 
significant confrontation in South Africa, particularly between the White minority and 
the Black majority.  During the 1980s, confrontation between the Black forces of 
liberation and that of the apartheid state was serious.  The African National Congress 
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(ANC) which was at the forefront of the liberation movement had set up a campaign to 
make the state ungovernable and it succeeded to a significant degree.  Due to this, the 
apartheid government was forced to announce a state of emergency and violence in the 
city became the norm.300 
 
As a result of the confrontation, the racial attitudes of both groups were largely 
polarized.  The perception of Whites toward Blacks was heavily influenced by the 
historical discrimination dominating most of their lives under apartheid.  In addition, 
Whites viewed the liberation movement as the threat of Communists, believing the 
ANC to be a puppet of global communism.  The liberation movement was relentless as 
well.  Violence in the city intimidated Whites.  Some Whites feared that their Black 
South African housekeepers would stand up in revolution, “perhaps even poisoning 
their families while serving one of the daily meals.”301  Forced ethnic separation made 
anything but pro forma inter-ethnic contact unlikely, and what interaction occurred was 
unavoidably established on inequality.  Most Whites, even those who did not strongly 
advocate apartheid, perceived the liberation movement as a movement dominated by 
evil.  For this reason, the war against the liberation forces was seen as a ‘just war’ and 
under such circumstance, reconciliation would be unlikely. 
 
As with the Whites’ attitudes towards the Blacks, the Blacks’ attitude toward the 
Whites was also negative.  Whites were perceived by Blacks as irreversible racists, 
irrecoverably committed to apartheid and willing to deal with Blacks only when forced 
to.  They believed that “[a]partheid was a ‘crime against humanity’, making those who 
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benefited from apartheid criminals themselves.” 302   Blacks’ contact with Whites 
seldom occurred and even when it did, it often happened within the context of 
dehumanizing circumstances.  Many Blacks were coercively displaced from where 
they resided with some being exiled to the so-called Bantustans.303  For these reasons, 
for many Blacks, war against the apartheid regime was a ‘just war’. 
 
With these background landscapes, TRC was established in 1995, a year after the 
apartheid government finally collapsed.  The TRC was founded as a legal commission 
by the newly established ANC government.  Its primary aim was to create a more 
unified South Africa and external force was needed to open the door for changing both 
parties’ attitudes.  It was set up with a number of high profile members including 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu (chairman), Dr Alex Boraine (Deputy Chairman) and most 
members were South Africans themselves.  Its initial tasks were creating as 
unexaggerated a picture as possible of the causes, nature and scale of gross human 
rights abuses; awarding amnesty to perpetrators who fully revealed their crimes; 
reinstating the dignity of victims by providing them a chance to tell their stories and by 
suggesting restitution; and giving suggestions for the prevention of future violations.304  
The task of the TRC was achieved via three committees below: 
 
z Human Right Violations (HRV) Committee investigated human 
rights abuses that took place between 1960 and 1994. 
 
z Reparation and Rehabilitation (R& R) Committee was charged 
with restoring victims’ dignity and formulating proposals to 
assist with rehabilitation. 
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z Amnesty Committee (AC) considered applications for amnesty 
that were requested in accordance with the provisions of the 
Act.305 
 
     The fundamental principle behind the TRC reconciliation process was the 
promotion of both Black and White South Africans’ attitude change via the creation of 
cognitive dissonance.  To make both sides change their attitudes toward each other, the 
cognitive basis of ethnic beliefs needed to be shaken up.  In fact, this principle is hard 
to attain because exogenous forces capable of creating widespread dissonance seldom 
happen naturally, and most people can repulse a trickle of unwanted information as it 
filters into their awareness.306  Yet, one of the most important lessons from the South 
African conflict was that both sides did horrible things during the struggle over 
apartheid.  The TRC documented the abuses on both sides making many on both sides 
less certain about the legality of their side in the struggle, and forcing people to realize 
that the other side was also unfairly victimized.307  If one became involved in the TRC 
initiative, then they might have come to perceive the struggle over apartheid as one of 
good versus evil rather absolute good against infinite evil.308  It is difficult to reconcile 
with infinite evil but it is perhaps easier to reconcile with bad which is not completely 
evil (particularly if there is some degree of remorse).  Gobodo-Madikizela (2003) 
asserts that “to demonize one's enemies as monsters is too easy—it lets them off too 
easily; further, ... to dismiss perpetrators simply as evildoers and monsters shuts the 
door to the kind of dialogue that leads to an enduring peace.”309   
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She further argues: 
 
Daring, on the other hand, to look the enemy in the eye and allow 
oneself to read signs of pain and cues of contrition or regret where 
one might almost have preferred to continue seeing only hatred is the 
one possibility we have for steering individuals and societies toward 
replacing long standing stalemates out of a nation's past with genuine 
engagement.  Hope is where transformation begins; without it, a 
society cannot take its first steps toward reconstructing its 
self-identity as a society of tolerance and coexistence.310 
 
Yet, generally strong obstacles exist for new information to create attitude change.  
However, the information given by the TRC had several attributes making it likely to be 
effective.  First, information was extensively accessible.  The South African media 
was enormously focused on the human-interest aspect of the TRC’s activities, in 
contrast to the wider intellectual and logical goals in which the TRC was also 
interested.311  South Africans learned the extensive suffering of Blacks through the 
TRC initiative.  What they learned was often extensively graphic - as in Policeman 
Benzein’s demonstration of his notorious ‘wet bag’ way of torture, telecasted widely 
throughout South Africa.312  Few people in South Africa could have ignored these 
exposures of evidence revealed by the TRC.  Also, the TRC information, in general, 
included no visible ideological content; no apparent message was being sold.  As a 
result, TRC information did not actually raise the kind of defensive warnings which 
frequently make new information impotent in terms of bringing about attitude 
change.313  In addition, TRC information was not generally rebutted either, partly 
because miscreants appeared before the TRC to acknowledge their crimes and to be 
awarded amnesty.314  Surely, dispute periodically occurred (e.g. some victims were 
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against the motivations of the perpetrators, arguing, for example, that they were not 
political but economic (and thus not judged by the amnesty legislation).315  Yet, in 
general the extreme rebuttals which often cloud political disputes were limited in the 
case of the TRC 
 
Another significant feature of the TRC initiative was its emphasis on non- 
retributive forms of justice.316  For example, even despite granting amnesty to gross 
human rights abusers, the process also produced justice that emerged in which the 
justice deficit was overcome.317  This allowed Blacks to come forward and tell their 
stories.  It also allowed others to hear these stories, in all their violent and human detail, 
which created an enormous impact on how South African people reacted to the 
reconciliation process.  The TRC also held public hearings on the apartheid role of 
political parties, prisons, media, the health sector, the legal community, faith 
communities, businesses and labour in order to better understand how ordinary people 
could ignore the suffering and impoverishment of their fellow citizens.318  The moral 
awareness of passive eyewitnesses was also reawakened during the witnessing of 
perpetrator and victim testimony.  Therefore, some perpetrators showed heart-felt 
contrition, apologizing for their actions in terms that were broadly understood to be 
sincere.  In fact, it is true that the victims of political killings cannot be brought back to 
life, nor can the damage and trauma of abuse and torture be negated.319  Yet, the TRC 
brought back the human and civic dignity of these victims by making public the truth of 
what had been done to them.  In addition, since the reconciliation process was 
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procedurally fair, humanized and transparent, the TRC could penetrate the awareness of 
all South African ethnic groups with its message.  Finally, the absence of legalistic 
proceedings made the hearings easier to Black South Africans.  Although sometimes 
forced to take action by litigation, it would be hard to understand reconciliation 
processes and conclude that perpetrators, victims and witnesses were treated unequally 
(even if there were some grievances about the comparative amount of attention given to 
abuses by the each side in the struggle).320 
 
     As a result of the above processes, the TRC succeeded in creating cognitive 
dissonance, to a certain degree, for both White and Black South Africans.  For example, 
Whites learned from the processes that the protection of the apartheid regime involved 
many unjustifiable actions.  Much of the documented evidence revealed by the TRC 
included excessive suppression by the apartheid state of the liberation movement.  
Whether they should have known or not, many Whites were said to have been shocked 
by these revealed documents claiming that they never expected the state would go as far 
as it did to confront opposition to apartheid.321  There are those still who cannot accept 
that apartheid was a crime against humanity.  These people have in recent years, 
gradually come to perceive apartheid, and its continuation, as a crime.  Therefore, the 
‘just war’ to protect apartheid has become less ‘just’ to the Whites after the reveling of 
the documents by the TRC.  They also understood that the liberation movement was 
not communist.  The TRC did not have to teach them about this, but the historical 
evidence was enough.  With the collapse of the global communist movement, few 
Whites today would associate the ANC governance with the rule of cruel 
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communists.322  Finally, Whites may have come to acknowledge some of the blame 
and guilt for the advantages they enjoyed under apartheid and for the sacrifices the 
system inflicted on the vast majority of Black South Africans.  Although some Whites 
may have been unconscious of the crimes carried out by their state against the liberation 
movements, no Whites could claim to be unconscious of the huge subsidy apartheid 
supplied to their higher standard of living.  In short, Whites involved in the TRC 
reconciliation process learned that their position was less than honorable in establishing 
and protecting apartheid, and that the opposition was less evil in its attempts to establish 
a new system in South Africa. 
 
The TRC initiative also contributed to changing the Blacks’ attitude.  In fact, 
prior to the collapse of the apartheid government, Blacks were completely aware of the 
cruelty of apartheid, and the TRC did not drive away this perception of the Blacks.  Yet, 
TRC also taught Blacks that terrible things had taken place against both Whites and 
Blacks in the name of liberation.  In many ways, the campaign of ungovernability in 
the 1980s turned Blacks against Blacks, with substantial pressures toward conformity 
(strengthened by the dreadful crime of ‘necklacing’) and with a certain degree of 
‘gangsterism’ being executed under the guise of the struggle.323  Furthermore, the TRC 
initiative was significant for Blacks because it often proved what many had considered 
as ‘disinformation’ generated by the apartheid state.  In the 1980s, many Blacks never 
knew what to believe.  Due to this, some Blacks were swept up by revelations of 
violence directed against innocent White citizens.  Many Blacks who came away from 
the TRC initiative were persuaded by the TRC that the struggle against apartheid was 
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nevertheless a ‘just war’ but many unjustifiable actions were conducted in the name of 
liberation.  Finally, Blacks have learned that apartheid is not the single source of the 
myriad of issues confronting Blacks.  Crime, poverty, HIV/AIDS and widening social 
and interethnic gaps have been the most important agendas.324  The end of apartheid 
did not provide relief to the millions of Blacks living in wretched poverty. 
 
The success in the creation of cognitive dissonance consequently led to a certain 
level of reconciliation between them.  In the early 1990s, many South Africans were 
afraid of civil war engulfing the state and political violence was widespread.  Even the 
comparatively more optimistic South Africans were afraid of enormous White flight and 
destabilization.  Also, with the ANC having almost enough power to change the 
constitution unilaterally, some prophets feared that South Africa would go the same way 
as many other failed African states.  However, none of these things occurred after the 
collapse of the apartheid government, and it shows that reconciliation must have 
replaced the course of the South African transition.  On the contrary, there has been an 
increase in inter-racial interactions within South Africa.  Of course, it is important not 
to overstate the point, but Whites encountering Blacks in an atmosphere of social equity 
are gradually becoming common after the end of coerced separation by the collapse of 
the apartheid government.  Since the transition, not only has the number of interethnic 
interactions increased but also the quality of these interactions, particularly regarding 
legal equality, has improved.  The chances for both Whites and Blacks to understand 
each other have blossomed since the transition (even if benefit from the change has been 
unevenly allocated) and this is expected to lead to further reconciliation.  In summary, 
the TRC was a crucial element in the transition to free and full democracy in South 
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Africa and, its reconciliation processes despite some flaws, has been accepted by the 
South African people as successful. 
 
3. Attitude of Pacific Community toward the Issue of TNI Abuses 
 
Historically, geographically and culturally, West Papua has always been part of 
Melanesia and the broader Pacific community.  Referred to as West New Guinea in the 
1947 Canberra Declaration, it was primarily a member of the Pacific Conference of 
Churches and South Pacific Commission.  Its leaders such as Willem Zonggonau, 
Jufuai and Franz Kaisiepo participated in the opening ceremony of the South Pacific 
Commission in Noumea in 1949.325  However, since 1969, when West Papua was 
coercively incorporated into the Indonesian Republic after the Act of Free Choice 
referendum, it has been marginalized from the rest of the Pacific community.  The 
Pacific community had until recently regarded West Papua as part of Asia and due to 
this, West Papuans became a forgotten people in the region. 
 
One reason behind this is that there has been a large security concern in the 
Pacific community as a whole, particularly PNG which shares its border with Indonesia.  
Since the TNI constructed its capacity in West Papua, its systematic infiltration into the 
Pacific community has influenced their foreign policy.  There is a strong suspicion that 
the TNI plans to occupy PNG and other Pacific Island states.  Despite this, there has 
been little done to prevent this systematic invasion mainly because they have feared the 
occurrence of new regional conflict.  Due to this, the Pacific community, until recently, 
had ignored the issue of TNI abuses in West Papua and had denied the West Papuans’ 
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rights.  Particularly in recent years, security issues have been the most important 
agenda for the Pacific community due to the border problem between PNG and 
Indonesia, ethnic and tribal conflicts in the Fiji, Solomon Islands, PNG and East Timor 
and the issue of nations’ and states’ relationship with Hawaii, Tahiti, Kanaky, 
Bougainville and West Papua.326  Also, another and the most important reason has 
been the fundamental misperception about the political status of West Papua by the 
Pacific community who believes that West Papua is an already dead issue since the 
territory has been acknowledged by the UN as a part of the Indonesian Republic.  The 
Pacific community has regarded the issue of TNI abuses in West Papua as an internal 
affair of Indonesia and has advocated that any solution to the issue must be found within 
the Indonesian context. 
 
However, since the turn of the 21st century, the Pacific community is attempting 
to redefine the boundaries of the community and have also taken responsibility for the 
regional stability and world peace and sustainable development as a part of the global 
community in this globalization era.  To achieve their goal, the Pacific community 
acknowledges that the collaboration between neighbours is very important and 
solidarity with people who have not yet seized self-determination is crucial.  Therefore, 
the Pacific community has gradually acknowledged that the issue of TNI abuses in West 
Papua are a regional issue and not an Indonesian internal matter.  For this reason, the 
support from the Pacific community is now significantly increasing. 
 
Especially, West Papua has enjoyed huge support from Vanuatu, PNG, the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and other 
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regional organizations.327  One example of this, at the UN Millennium Conference in 
2000, the Pacific community, including Vanuatu, blamed the UN for its failure to protect 
the rights of West Papuans in 1969 and demanded the UN review the Act of Free 
choice. 328   Also, Vanuatu Associations for Free West Papua was established in 
Luganville in 2003 and Port Vila in 2004 to promote public support in Vanuatu and they 
have actively engaged in advocacy, networking, lobby works and campaigns to raise 
public awareness.329 
 
In relation to the MSG, it was organized to assist liberation movements in Kanaky 
and West Papua to end the existing colonization in Melanesia.330  As a member of the 
PIF, the MSG has jointly expressed their concerns over the political situation including 
the human rights issue in West Papua since 2000.  It has also indicated that it may 
focus on the issue of West Papua as a prioritised agenda since the Kanaky issue has 
already been put on the table of the UN Decolonization Commission.  Consequently, in 
2006, the West Papua issue was listed by the Melanesian states who participated in the 
third Melanesian arts and cultural festival in Suva as one of recommendations for the 
MSG.331  Also, West Papuans were invited to the festival and it was great progress for 
them in their struggle to be acknowledged by the member states of the MSG.  In this 
context, although West Papua has not yet been invited to become a member of MSG, it 
is part of Melanesia and it should be granted full rights as a member.  This will be a 
crucial next step.  In fact, at the 2005 MSG Summit in PNG, the Solomon Islands was 
told to draw up a concept paper to set the procedures for the granting of Observer status 
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to those that demand it.332  As soon as the procedures are set in place, granting 
observer status to West Papua is crucial.   
 
Finally, PIF, the largest regional organization also broke the long silence and the 
issue of West Papua has been on the agenda of its meetings since 2000.  For example, 
in October 2000, West Papua for the first time was invited to the PIF meeting.  At the 
meeting, the member states expressed their concerns about issue of TNI abuses in West 
Papua and asked the West Papuans and Jakarta to settle the issue via peaceful dialogue 
and defend the human rights of all inhabitants in West Papua.333  Similar statements 
were also expressed at its meeting in Nauru in 2001 and Suva in 2002.  Yet, the most 
significant support was seen in the PIF meeting at Auckland in 2003.  At this meeting, 
the West Papuan struggle received a higher profile than at any former Forum and all the 
member states became aware of West Papuans’ demands, and they were impressed by 
the significant attention given to their struggle by the member states, the Pacific and the 
Auckland public.334 
 
Yet, although the PIF has lobbied the Indonesian state to bring to justice the 
perpetrators of human rights abuses in West Papua, the failure of the first test case in the 
new Human Rights Court in Makassar to bring those in charge to justice would suggest 
a more primal approach to Indonesia is required.335  Therefore, it is important for the 
PIF to seek support from the Indonesian state for a PIF fact finding mission to West 
Papua to investigate the human rights situation in West Papua.  Also, it is the right time 
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for the PIF as well as MSG to grant observer status to West Papua since the West 
Papuans require the regional support now more than ever.  In fact, at the 2005 summit, 
PIF decided to enforce a policy that establishes a new classification of related 
membership, and administers the admission standard and permissions for observer 
status and associate membership.336  For this reason, granting observer status to West 
Papua by the PIF is the important next step so that the Forum could be organized as an 
adequate arena to assist dialogues between the Indonesian representatives and West 
Papuan leaders to work toward peaceful settlements of the many issues in the territory. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
There are several principles behind the TRC reconciliation processes which 
contributed to creating the reconciliation between Whites and Blacks in South Africa. 
These include promotion of attitude change on both sides via creating cognitive 
dissonance, emphasis on non-retributive forms of justice through granting amnesty to 
human rights violators who totally expressed their misconducts, and restoration of 
Blacks’ human and civic dignity by allowing them to come and tell their stories and 
allowing other South Africans to hear these stories in all their violent and human detail. 
These processes were procedurally fair, humanized and transparent and due to this, TRC 
at certain level successfully created reconciliation between Whites and Blacks.  Since 
the confrontation between Freeport and West Papuans in West Papua contains several 
common elements with that of South Africa, the MOU Forum can learn from the above 
principles of TRC reconciliation processes in promoting genuine reconciliation between 
the two parties which is discussed in the next chapter.  In relation to the attitude of the 
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Pacific community regarding TNI abuses, West Papua in recent years has gained huge 
support from Vanuatu, PNG, the MSG, the PIF and other regional organizations.  Yet, 
the MSG and PIF, which are two key organizations in the region, must continuously 
play an important role in facilitating the West Papuans self-determination.  Particularly, 
it is crucial for these organizations to become facilitators of dialogues between 
Indonesia and West Papua to make the two parties work toward peaceful settlement of 
the many issues in the territory which is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
Findings from the Research and Conclusion 
 
In many aspects, the confrontation between Freeport and Amungme and Kamoro 
in West Papua resembles that of Blacks and Whites in South Africa.  Due to this, there 
are several elements from the South African TRC reconciliation processes which can be 
applied to West Papua in encouraging genuine reconciliation between the two parties.  
Also, by looking at the TNI issue in West Papua from both the international law and 
historical points of view, it is one of the ongoing colonized territories in Melanesia that 
needs resolutions through legal and political channels.  An independent West Papua is 
the only possible way of settling the issue which also prevents further inflow of 
transmigrants into the area and contributes to regional stability, security, and world 
peace.  Therefore, the Pacific community must continuously commit themselves to 
assist one of the longest self-determination struggles in the world.  This chapter 
utilizes findings from the research to answer the two initial research questions which are 
stated in chapter 1.  Also, the relevance of the theories, which are examined in chapter 
2 and 3 to the thesis, is discussed.  Finally, the author presents the conclusion of the 
thesis by discussing the prospects of further prosperity of Amungme and Kamoro.   
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1. What Lessons can the MOU Forum learn from the South African TRC in 
Promoting Genuine Reconciliation between the Amungme and Kamoro 
Communities and the Freeport Company which will lead to Successful Community 
Development around the mine in West Papua? 
 
In many ways, the confrontation between Freeport and West Papuans in West 
Papua is similar to that of Whites and Blacks in South Africa.  Due to this, there are a 
number of principles from the South African reconciliation processes which can be 
applied to West Papua in promoting genuine reconciliation between the two parties.  
Firstly, as well as the South African case, not only Freeport but also the Amungme, 
Kamoro and other West Papuans around the mine including the member of OPM have 
engaged in unjustifiable actions over the struggle with Freeport.  The resistance has 
occasionally entailed violence with open resentment and it has to a certain degree 
caused damage to Freeport property.  A major example of this is the riots by the West 
Papuans around the mine in March 1996 which continued for three days.  This resulted 
in the deaths of three people, destruction of Freeport property and U.S. $3 million worth 
of damage which led to the temporary closing of the mine.337  However, the West 
Papuans’ efforts to weaken the Freeport’s force in defence against them have resulted in 
the company recruiting its own security force and cooperating with the TNI, which has 
suppressed West Papuans and conducted a large numbers of human rights abuses against 
them, to protect Freeport’s mining operations.  In this regard, so called false generosity 
by the Freeport was created as Freire argues.338  For these reasons, the humanity of 
both Freeport and Amungme and Kamoro must be restored, as Freire states. 
 
 
                                                  
337 Leith, D. The Politics of Power. Freeport in Suharto’s Indonesia. University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu, 2003, p. 102. 
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For the reasons above, the MOU Forum can restore the humanity of both sides 
and promote reconciliation by promoting attitude change on both sides via the creation 
of cognitive dissonance.  There are several tasks which the Forum can do to achieve 
this.  Firstly, the Forum should include external people such as church leaders who can 
fairly lead the reconciliation process without having any biases toward either side.  
Also, a human rights committee similar to the South African HRV Committee should be 
established within the Forum.  This committee would be expected to investigate the 
human rights violations in the past committed by both parties including Freeport’s own 
involvement in the TNI abuses and create as complete a picture as possible of the 
reasons, nature and the degree of human rights violations committed.  Certainly, the 
truth which can be generated through this process is regulated to some degree by reality: 
no collective memory can be generated out of any given set of historical facts.  
However, the Forum can seek to act impartially, distributing blame wherever it may 
exist, or it can “engage in a form of ‘victor’s justice’ in which the victors are held to 
lower human rights standards than the vanquished.”339 
 
Yet, obstacles to creating attitude change may appear with the information 
revealed by the Forum.  However, the Forum can generate attitude change by making 
information accessible to relevant people including Freeport, its stakeholders and local 
West Papuans.  As for Freeport and its stakeholders, the media must play an important 
role in broadcasting the human-interest side of the Forum activities so that they can 
learn about the disastrous consequences which West Papuans have suffered due to the 
company’s mining operation to extract vast amounts of wealth - and not escape from the 
exposure of evidence revealed by the Forum.  As for Amungme and Kamoro, 
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improvement in communication through LEMASA, LEMASKO and other West Papuan 
leaders is crucial so that the two communities can learn from the revealed truth that the 
struggle against Freeport was nevertheless justifiable, but many unjustifiable actions 
were also conducted.  Through these processes, it is important to make the two 
communities shift their perception of the company from infinite evil to bad which is not 
complete evil, and to open the door for further reconciliation. 
 
The creation of cognitive dissonance is crucial for both Freeport and Amungme 
and Kamoro due to several reasons.  As for Freeport, in fact, several funds and 
programs which the company has provided in recent years were not based on a 
‘genuine’ voluntary idea.  They rather appeared as a consequence of pressure from 
several parties, particularly the NGOs and local West Papuans and they grew out of a 
wider view on corporate responsibility.  One reason behind this is that some people 
within the company resent Freeport continuously providing funds to community 
development via the company’s Community Affairs Department.  The joint 
Cenderawasih University (UNCEN)-Australian National University (ANU) Baseline 
Studies Project report, concluded in December 1998, stated that the department was 
under-resourced and was alienated within the company and that its efficacy was spoiled 
by the heavy hand of administration in Louisiana and Jakarta.340  Although community 
development in general is a long-term task, with outcomes being slow, many within the 
higher ranks of the company still believe that any issue can and must be solved quickly.  
For these reasons, creating Freeport’s cognitive dissonance through the above processes 
is crucial in getting the company to behave more openly to understand Amungme and 
Kamoro and thereby commit seriously to long-term community development by 
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establishing genuine policies which address the two communities’ concerns.  This will 
also be crucial in gaining genuine trust and support from the two communities. 
 
As for Amungme and Kamoro, creating their cognitive dissonance through the 
above processes is crucial as well so that they can restore the humanity of Freeport and 
they themselves can also open the door for further reconciliation.  Also, the creation of 
cognitive dissonance is not only important for mitigating the two communities’ view of 
hatred towards the company, but also to make them realize that the company is not the 
single source of the myriad of issues confronting them and will hopefully make them 
turn their attention to the other social problems.  Today, corruption at the local 
community level, prostitution, unemployment, social disorder, drug abuse, AIDS and 
economic, social and spiritual disorder are apparent in the mining area.  Although 
some of these issues are directly attributed to the company’s presence, issues such as 
corruption, prostitution and AIDS are the results of Amungme and Kamoro’s own 
mismanagement of the funds provided by the company and they themselves must take 
responsibility in solving these issues.  For these reasons, it is important for the two 
communities to realize the importance of the funds and programs which the company 
offers to them, and to make the best use of them, particularly the education and health 
care programs. 
 
Finally, an amnesty commission and a reparation and rehabilitation commission 
should also be established, similar to the South African AC and R & R committees, to 
provide amnesty to human rights violators who have fully confessed their misconduct 
and to restore the Amungme and Kamoro’s human and civic dignity and organize 
proposals to support them with their rehabilitation.  As in the South African case, the 
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Forum can achieve these by emphasizing non-retributive forms of justice.  For instance, 
while granting amnesty to human rights violators, the Forum can also restore the 
Amungme and Kamoro’s human and civic dignity and produce justice which can satisfy 
them that the justice deficit was overcome.  It can do these by allowing the two 
communities to come forward and tell their stories and concerns - and making others 
including Freeport and its stakeholders hear these stories, in all their violent and human 
detail and ask them to accept the truth of what had been done to them.  Nevertheless, 
these reconciliation processes must be procedurally fair, humanized and transparent so 
that the Forum can penetrate the awareness of all relevant parties with its message. 
 
However, in the case of the South African TRC, there were criticisms as well of 
its reconciliation process.  One of criticisms is of its extensive focus on remarkable 
abuse together with narratives of forgiveness and healing.  As Archbishop Tutu stated 
in his opening speech at the victim hearings: 
 
We are charged to unearth the truth about our dark past, to lay the 
ghosts of that past so that they will not return to haunt us and that will 
thereby contribute to the healing of the traumatized and wounded 
people for all of us in South Africa are wounded people – and in this 
manner to promote national unity and reconciliation.341 
 
In this regard however, the TRC ignored the fact that, even despite all South Africans 
may have been victimized by apartheid, the White minority obviously benefited from it, 
in socio-economic aspects, and they, in no small way, continued to benefit from it.  
Nagy criticizes that depiction of a wounded nation which resulted in conflating 
individual abuses and sufferings with the suffering of the nation as a whole and 
consequently weakened the TRC’s position that the fight against the apartheid state was 
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not morally equivalent to apartheid’s defence. 342   The TRC initiative was also 
criticized for its emphasis on forgiveness, where some victims felt pressure to forgive.  
Nagy argues, “[t]alk of forgiveness simplified the costs of reconciliation by suggesting 
that victims’ generosity of spirit meant nothing further needed to be done.”343  Also, 
the forgiveness of individual violators does not necessary exonerate beneficiaries of 
their responsibility, especially when the beneficiaries opposed victim exaggeration and 
whining, and asserted disregard of killings and torture perpetrated in their name, and 
where only a few in fact believed that they were responsible for the Black 
suppression.344  In summary, the TRC’s call for the collective moral criticism of 
violations was criticized in not addressing continuing structural inequality by 
disregarding the issue of responsibility.  Also, the pressure to forgive misplaced the 
responsibility of reconciliation not on those who were responsible for apartheid but on 
victims and to this extent, the TRC weakened its own assertion that beneficiary 
recognition is part of national reconciliation. 
 
However, the principle of the above criticisms is not applied to the MOU Forum.  
In fact, it is true that both Amungme and Kamoro and Freeport have been victimized 
through the struggle over the mine in West Papua.  However, it is Freeport which has 
initially benefited by extracting wealth from the mine and by violating the two 
communities’ rights.  Therefore, the company to a certain degree, though not based on 
genuine voluntary idea, has already started to address the continual systematic injustice 
through several funds and programs.  Also, while the Forum emphasizes forgiveness, it 
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can also encourage the company to further address the ongoing systematic injustices.  
The Forum can do so by creating the cognitive dissonance of its staff and stakeholders 
through exposing the truth and making them lobby the company to take further 
responsibility and commit seriously to long-term community development.  For these 
reasons, the Forum’s call for the collective moral criticism of violations can also address 
ongoing structural inequality while placing the burden of reconciliation on Freeport 
which is responsible for it. 
 
2. What is the Role of the Pacific Community, particularly Melanesian Community, 
in Preventing further TNI Abuses against Indigenous West Papuans including the 
Amungme and Kamoro? 
 
By viewing the West Papua issue from the perspective of international laws and 
history, West Papua is one of the remaining colonized territories in Melanesia for which 
any solutions have yet to be found in legal and political contexts.  Independent West 
Papua is the only possible solution to the ongoing abuses by the TNI, which also 
prevents further inflow of transmigrants into West Papua and contributes to the regional 
security, stability, and world peace.  As far as West Papua remains colonized by 
Indonesia, its issues will remain as a cancer for the Pacific community, especially for 
the Melanesian community.  Particularly for Papua New Guinea that shares the 
boundary with West Papua, this indicates a continuation of security issues well into the 
next decades.  For this reason, the Pacific community must continuously commit 
themselves to assist one of the longest liberation struggles in the world to prevent these 
security threats. 
 
     There are several tasks which the Pacific community must do to contribute to 
achieving West Papuans’ self-determination.  For example, it must constructively 
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support the provisions of the UN resolution on the granting of independence to colonial 
countries and peoples together with the principles of the UN Charter.  It also has to 
guide the global community towards a better world where the basic freedom and human 
rights of all nations and states regardless of large or small are fairly respected.  In 
detail, the Pacific community must engage in the following tasks. 
 
Firstly, each UN member of the respective Pacific Islands states must exercise 
their rights to vote or support an upcoming UN General Assembly resolution regarding 
the re-inscription of West Papua on the Non-Self-Governing Territories lists.  In 1961, 
a Special Committee on decolonization was established by the UN General Assembly 
and it has become the centre for dealing with decolonization.  The committee is today 
also known as the ‘Committee of Twenty Four’ which investigates the social, economic 
and political situations in those states listed on the UN lists as Non-Governing 
Territories.  Now, PNG and Fiji are the only two Pacific Island members of the 
committee.  In fact, this case is the same as those of French Polynesia and New 
Caledonia.  Despite West Papua being on the UN list of non-Self-Governing Territories 
in the 1960s, it was removed from the list when the Dutch colonial authority reviewed 
the lists in 1963.345  Yet, this does not prevent the re-inscription onto the list as long as 
the UN General Assembly accepts this by its resolution.  This was the case of Oman 
and Djibouti in 1965, the Comoro Islands in 1972, and New Caledonia in 1986.346  For 
these reasons, UN member Pacific island states must play an important role in 
supporting the UN to re-inscribe West Papua onto its Non-Self-Governing Territories 
list. 
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     Secondly, the leaders of MSG and PIF must jointly put the West Papua issue onto 
the UN agenda as soon as possible.  The UN has a mandate and capacity to engage in 
issues of decolonization and self-determination adequately.  They are reflected in its 
Charter and the General Assembly Resolution 1514 of 14 December 1960 on 
Declaration Regarding the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples.347  Simultaneously, the MSG and PIF must also support the widespread 
request for the UN to review the conduct of Act of Free Choice in 1969 and must allow 
West Papua in due course, to restart its legal role in regional affairs. 
 
Thirdly, MSG must grant permanent membership to West Papuan representatives. 
In accordance with its primary object, MSG member states must give focused attention 
to the self-determination struggle of West Papuans under the initiative of the OPM.  
The OPM is the only legal organization which represents a desire for self-determination 
of all West Papuans and it has coordinated and supported the self-determination struggle 
for more than four decades.  For these reasons, the OPM has been fully charged to take 
political responsibility. 
 
Finally, in relation to the PIF, it must grant observer status to West Papuan 
representatives.  One of the PIF criteria for granting observer status is “a Pacific Island 
territory on a clear path to achieving self-government or independence may be eligible 
for observer status at the Forum, subject to the approval of Forum Leaders.”348  Since 
West Papua ethnically and culturally belongs to Melanesia and the broader Pacific 
community, it perfectly meets the above criteria and is entitled to obtain PIF observer 
status.  By granting PIF observer status, West Papuan representatives are able to 
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dialogue with those of Indonesia at the ‘Post Forum Dialogue’, to attempt and settle 
many issues in the territory.  PIF also must seek support from the Indonesian state for 
its fact finding mission to West Papua to review the human rights condition in the 
territory.  In addition, PIF must persuade the Indonesian state to free all political 
prisoners to show its good faith to the West Papuans, to control the TNI in West Papua 
and withdraw all non-organic troops, and to dialogue with the West Papuan leaders to 
cooperate towards peacefully settling the many problems in West Papua.349  Finally, 
the PIF must encourage the Australian state (as one of the most resourced states in the 
region) not to participate in any training with the TNI which only increases the suffering 
of West Papuans – but rather to support West Papuans in the area of education and 
health programs. 
 
The PIF has a potential to play a same role as the European Union in the Pacific 
region and as well as participating in regional development, it should also focus 
seriously on the human rights condition in the region.  Although Australia and New 
Zealand, two influential states for the PIF and older brothers to the Pacific community 
(which are supposed to lead the way and protect the community) have hesitated in 
antagonizing Indonesia by supporting West Papua, smaller Pacific states have a moral 
obligation to support West Papuans’ self-determination.  They must not forget about 
their ancestors, wantoks right across the Pacific must continuously pay attention to the 
tragedy happening to their wantoks over the artificial border on the map.350  They are 
connected by song and stories and that is why the Pacific community must continuously 
support the self-determination of their own family. 
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3. Relevance of the Theories 
 
By examining the ongoing dispute in West Papua between Amungme and Kamoro, 
Freeport, the Indonesian state and the TNI through this thesis, various theories which 
are examined in chapters 2 and 3, are found to be relevant to the study.  Firstly, in 
relation to Dependency Theory, the U.S., via Freeport has perpetrated a state of 
dependency upon West Papua.  Since its arrival in 1965 the company has influenced 
the politics, economies and society around the mine in West Papua, which is consistent 
with the theory.351  Also, since economic power has been largely concentrated on 
Freeport, the U.S. government refused an appeal by the Amungme and has protected its 
economic interest in Indonesia.352  In addition, since the interests of the Indonesian 
state and the TNI corresponds with that of Freeport, they have also voluntary sustained 
this state of dependency.353  As the theory argues, the TNI has played an intermediate 
role around the mine by using control of state authority to defend the interests of 
Freeport, to the detriment of Amungme and Kamoro.354 
 
Finally, the Freeport operating area does not have a well-integrated and 
economically flexible economy and Amungme and Kamoro have not been able to adjust 
to the economic shifts of the area.  To make the matter worse, the Amungme and 
Kamoro’s economic activity has been disturbed by ethnic discrimination against them 
by Freeport, the Indonesian state, the TNI and the transmigrants.  Therefore, the 
neoclassical model of capitalist economic development brought by Freeport has 
significantly impoverished Amungme and Kamoro. 355   This is consistent with 
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Dependency Theory.356  For these reasons, the two communities have been in a 
situation of underdevelopment in which their mineral resources have been utilized in a 
way that is beneficial to Freeport, the Indonesian state and the TNI but not to them.357  
The Amungme and Kamoro are poor because they were coercively integrated into a 
capitalist economic system only as the owners of the mineral resources.  Also, they 
were given no opportunity of sustained and self-governing economic operations in their 
own lands and were refused the opportunity to sell their minerals in a way that is 
beneficial to them.358  These negative situations of the Amungme and Kamoro are 
largely relevant to the dependency theory.359 
 
With regards to indigenous development and indigenous self-determination, 
Amungme and Kamoro have been dispossessed and marginalized by the global 
capitalist order brought to the area by Freeport, as Harawira argues.360  However, 
state-sponsored developments, including mining, are regarded in Indonesia as national 
interests and they have had priority over any land and resource claims by Amungme and 
Kamoro.361  Due to this, Amungme and Kamoro under the Indonesian governance 
have had no informed consent or been given rights of refusal, nor any right to 
appropriate compensation. 362   Therefore, these legal justifications for the two 
communities’ dispossession by the capitalist oriented development have excluded them 
from the enjoyment of universal human rights such as economic and political 
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sovereignty and self-determination.363  As a consequence, Amungme’s movement has 
sought to ensure their indigenous rights including their cultural, political and economic 
rights by transforming the force of capitalism into a gentler system which can consider 
their livelihood. 364   This is the view expressed by Wilmer, Friedman and 
Chase-Dunn.365 
 
Through their struggle to achieve their self-determination, many West Papuans 
have been suppressed and murdered by the TNI.  Also, the constraint on the West 
Papuan resistance movement within the area, constraint of access to the area by 
international human rights organizations and largely manipulated media have allowed a 
silent genocide in the Freeport operating area, as Harawira argues.366  Yet, through 
their struggle to achieve self-determination, West Papuans have also tried to violently 
weaken the force of Freeport, in self-defence.367  As a result, the company’s false 
generosity is exposed.368  Furthermore, they have been further suppressed by the TNI 
which has protected the company.369  For these reasons, to achieve Amungme and 
Kamoro’s real self-determination, according to Freire, not only must the Amungme and 
Kamoro regain their humanity but they must also restore the humanity of Freeport.370 
 
     Although Freeport has in recent years begun to deal seriously with the social 
problems around the mine, and the Amungme and Kamoro have been invited to be 
partners in the development process, Freeport’s capitalist oriented community 
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development initiative has not been able to accommodate the fundamental cultural 
differences.371  Although Westerners evaluate the quality of life by educational levels, 
life expectancy and infant mortality, Amungme and Kamoro evaluate it by ties to the 
land, cultural strength, performing familiar rituals and kinship relations.372  Therefore, 
the company’s community development initiative has merely encouraged the Amungme 
and Kamoro’s access to an enforced capitalist economic system, as discussed by 
Lutz.373 
 
As a solution to the issues associated with indigenous development and 
indigenous self-determination, Lutz stresses the important role of the public, though her 
argument is not applied to the mining area in West Papua.374  The reason is because 
Indonesian transmigrants, as a public, hold a largely racist view of Amungme and 
Kamoro, regarding them as inferior and it was them who have created the unfair 
situation for the two communities by dispossessing and marginalizing them.375  Also, 
although the adoption of pluralistic politics which Wilmer says is important, the 
adoption of it via SAL in West Papua has failed to create multiethnicity and 
multiculturalism.376  The reason is because the Indonesian state has a lack of capacity 
to implement SAL.  With respect to the global level, Harawira argues the important 
role of global society in acknowledging the ongoing colonization of the indigenous 
people and the right of indigenous self-determination.377  However, major states, 
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including the U.S., UK, New Zealand and Australia have largely ignored the facts and 
have supported the Indonesian state and the TNI since they have gained economic or 
political benefits by supporting Indonesian state and the TNI.378 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
     Since Freeport arrived in West Papua, few Amungme and Kamoro had, until 
recently, witnessed the benefits of the twentieth century which the company’s presence 
guaranteed.  The opportunities for advanced education and jobs, modern technology, 
four-star hotels, airports and the satellite cities had been only beneficial for a few 
privileged West Papuans and the majority of Amungme and Kamoro had struggled with 
cultural destruction and dispossession from their livelihood and land.  With the 
increasing pressures from several parties, especially the NGOs and local West Papuans 
around the mine, Freeport, only in recent years, has gradually recognized the full extent 
of the impact of its operations on West Papuans around the mine and Amungme and 
Kamoro finally started to be invited to be partners in the development processes.  With 
the absence of an accountable government except for the TNI presence, the company 
today admits that it will carry on its responsibility which is in its own best interests for 
development within its concession area to be both acceptable and adequate. 
 
For the Amungme and Kamoro who have lost access to, and control of, much of 
their ancestral lands, and whose culture is threatened and undermined by modernity, 
development is confusing, disorienting, and painful.  However, since modernization 
following Freeport’s presence in West Papua has already made inroads into their 
territory, it is impossible for them to remain as they were.  Hence, though within their 
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cultural framework, they must move forward and should make the best use of the 
benefits which Freeport offers them.  As Elmslie says, although it was rough by 
Western standards, schools which he saw, constructed by Freeport, were much better 
than many of those which he has seen in PNG.379  This indicates that by extracting and 
making the best use of Freeport wealth, West Papua has a very high potential to be one 
of the most developed and advanced areas in the region. 
 
Today, Amungme and Kamoro generally do not renounce development per se and 
what they want is better development.  They argue that development initiatives must 
be led by them rather than for them.  Freeport has also started to realize this and 
realistically says that development works best when West Papuans participate in 
selecting the program and implementing it by themselves rather than when the company 
imposes development on an uninterested or unwilling group.  Yet, even though this is 
the ideal community development model, both benefits and problems remain within this 
approach, as a parochial perspective of development (which certain higher ranked staffs 
within the company still hold) often competes with the wider view, which is often 
absent in locally initiated development.  Also, without establishing acknowledged 
representation and clear and agreed goals, significant progress could not be made in 
reconciling the mine and the aspirations and the rights of Amungme and Kamoro. 
 
There are a number of problems which must be solved if there is to be 
reconciliation and further effective development.  First, the problem of fear, sense of 
betrayal and mistrust which Amungme and Kamoro feel toward Freeport must be solved 
to establish a constructive dialogue and positive cooperation.  Also, it is important to 
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make Freeport accept that community development is a long term task from which 
outcomes are slow - and due to this, continuity in both projects and staff is crucial for 
increasing the company’s understanding and effectiveness in gaining the credence and 
support of Amungme and Kamoro.  Finally, the ongoing human rights violations by the 
TNI, which West Papuans around the mine have suffered for many years, must be 
solved.  In fact, thirty years of damages which Amungme and Kamoro had suffered 
before the company acknowledged that the full extent of the impact of its operation on 
them has sunk into their hearts - and some say it is too late.  However, there are still 
many things which can be done to move the issue forward.  Resolution of above issues 
and consequent establishment of genuine reconciliation between the two parties through 
the MOU Forum and the Pacific community discussed in this thesis are possible 
examples which can move the ongoing issue forward and lead the Amungme and 
Kamoro’s successful development. 
 
Finally although the role of the MOU Forum and Pacific community discussed in 
this thesis are important, even more importantly, the Amungme and Kamoro themselves 
must take responsibility for their plight and take positive actions wherever possible to 
solve the issues surrounding them.  For example, they must generate coherent 
decisions and present them with one voice, accept accountability for the administration 
of funds and their own growth by preventing further corruption, prostitution, drug 
abuses and AIDS.  Unless Amungme and Kamoro themselves undertake fundamental 
changes, they will continue to be marginalized in their own territory.  Generating an 
Amungme and Kamoro elite with advanced qualifications from both local and overseas 
universities, especially PhDs in all the required skills of administration is the only 
solution, so that they can be effectively involved in the governing of their territory and 
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province.  Without advanced education, they will continue to be alienated within 
Indonesian domination and will not have strong political power which will also be 
crucial in preventing further TNI abuse.  Also, without political power, their timber, 
mineral, and fishery resources will continue to be plundered and their indigenous rights 
will continue to be disregarded.  Most of the Dutch-educated elite left after the 
Indonesian invasion.  For these reasons, it is crucial for the Amungme and Kamoro to 
make the best use of any educational opportunity including Freeport educational 
programs to produce more educated Amungme and Kamoro for their own prosperity 
and that of West Papua. 
 
5. Further Directions 
 
This study examined the socio-political and economic impact of mining upon the 
Amungme and Kamoro.  In particular, the study investigated Freeport’s social policies 
which have attempted to address the community development and human rights 
violations by the TNI and explored the further prosperity of Amungme and Kamoro 
regarding these issues.  Yet, the research was limited to the examination of the 
situation up to date of November 2006.  Since the situation continues to evolve, 
advanced research can be done on investigating the future situation regarding the 
Freeport social policy, human rights violations by the TNI and the prospect of achieving 
the successful development of the Amungme and Kamoro.  Especially, Freeport’s One 
Percent Fund policy is prospected to terminate in the end of 2006 and there has been no 
promise from the company regarding the continuation of the policy.  Thus, it would be 
valuable for advanced research investigating the future direction of the company’s 
social policy and explore how Freeport is going to respond in advance to the social 
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problems around its operating area and Amungme and Kamoro’s claims and concerns 
after the termination of the One Percent Fund Policy. 
 
Also, the study was limited to the examination of issues regarding community 
development and human rights violations by the TNI.  However, as discussed in the 
earlier chapters, Indonesian transmigrants have been another important source of issues 
which have negatively impacted upon the Amungme and Kamoro.  As far as West 
Papua remains part of the Indonesian Republic, preventing the continuous inflow of 
transmigrants into the area is also crucial in achieving the further prosperity of the 
Amungme and Kamoro.  Since transmigrants have been brought to the area by the 
Indonesian transmigration policy, it would be valuable for advanced research 
investigating the future direction of the policy and the prospect of preventing 
continuous inflow of the transmigrants into West Papua.  Particularly, the role of 
international organizations in redirecting the policy and preventing the continuous 
inflow of transmigrants into West Papua can be explored since the policy has been 
supported by these organizations. 
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Endnotes  
 
Chapter 2 
 
1.      According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 
information technology is an important element.  This is because information 
technology has provided all kinds of individual economic investors and actors, 
consumers, commerce-valuable new instruments for determining and searching 
for economic opportunities. 380   These include faster and more informed 
investigation of economic movement around the world, easy transfers of 
benefits, and cooperation with far-flung partners.381  Also, the World Bank 
says that an open market economy is another important element because most 
states have reduced obstacles that had restrained the development of domestic 
markets and their connections to the global economy.382  Finally, regarding the 
degree of globalization in recent years, since 1950 for example, the amount of 
global trade has grown by twenty times and only from 1997 to 1999, flows of 
overseas investment became almost doubled, from U.S. $468 billion to U.S. 
$827 billion.383 
 
2.      Louis Althusser, a French philosopher and structuralist thinker argued: 
 
[C]apitalism was a system - a set of ordered economic, political, 
social and legal relationships - reinforced by a range of 
institutions, like the family, church and education system.  The 
part of the system can only be understood in relation to the 
function they fulfill in the system as a whole - thus, institutions 
and their practices have to be understood in terms of their place 
in the overall system of ordered relationships.  The structure of 
the capitalist system determines the nature/purpose of the various 
parts.384 
 
3.      Andre Gunder Frank (1972), one of the earliest dependency theorists says: 
 
…historical research demonstrates that contemporary 
underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past 
and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite 
underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan [states].  
Furthermore, these relations are an essential part of the capitalist 
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system on a world scale as a whole.385 
 
4.      A good example of this state repression (which is sometimes called ‘state 
terrorism’) is the case of El Salvador during the Cold War.  During the Cold 
War, El Salvador was a close ally of the U.S.  Yet, pro-U.S./pro-market and 
anti-communism in the state generated a significantly unfair society with a 
majority of the population living in poverty, caused by a lack of access to 
money and resources. 386   By the 1970s and 1980s, pro-U.S. right-wing 
governments could only retain power through substantial suppression of 
peasant activism, trade union activity and left-wing politics; the military, as it 
had long done, played a crucial role in this suppression.387  Authorities were 
corrupted, elections were manipulated and people were intimidated by fear.  
The state was in fact, the representative of a few elite known as ‘the fourteen 
families’.388 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
1.    According to the commission, even if the populations have not suffered 
colonization or conquest, marginal or isolated communities existing in the state 
are regarded as indigenous people for following reasons: 
 
(a) they are descendants of groups which were in the territory of 
the country at the time when other groups of different cultures or 
ethnic origins arrived there; 
 
(b) precisely because of their isolation from other segments of 
the country’s population they have preserved almost intact the 
customs and traditions of their ancestors which are similar to 
those characterized as indigenous; 
 
(c) they are, even if only formally, placed under a state structure 
which incorporates national, social and cultural characteristics 
alien to theirs.389 
 
2.     Wilmer says that examples of moral and legal justification for indigenous 
alienation are the processes of national integration, assimilation and inclusion 
into the world system.  These entail an economic process that lays claims to 
resources (land and subsurface minerals) occupied or used by indigenous 
people by the modern state on the basis that indigenous peoples are morally 
inadequate to maximally utilize the resources.390 Another example is the 
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indigenous way of life which is often described as inferior and a barrier to the 
economic development of modern societies.391  Finally, there is also a global 
value which legitimates the destruction of the indigenous way of life as 
required for ‘the greater good of the greater whole.’392 
 
3.      According to Lutz, the principles of Fair Trade are  
 
-While anchored in free market economies, the movement 
imposes on fair traders the duty to pay producers at least a living 
wage, to promote democratically run producer cooperatives that 
are invested in their communities, to help producers obtain 
affordable financing and technical support, and to engage in 
environmentally friendly production practices. 
 
-[They] are supposed to encourage the development of products 
based on producers’ cultural traditions, adapted for Western 
markets, as a means of preserving their cultural identity. 
 
-[T]hey are supposed to educate consumers about [F]air 
[T]rade’s benefits for producers.393 
 
4.     Lutz says that the reasons are because Fair Trade within the present free market 
capitalism entails the assumption that ideas, land, materials and equipment are 
property which can be possessed and presumes that workers generate wages so 
that they can purchase the public services and goods they want.394 
 
5.     The draft in addition states several principles of indigenous self-determination 
which it is the right of indigenous people  
 
(A) to freely determine their relationships with states in a spirit 
of coexistence, mutual benefit and full respect.  
 
(B) to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual and 
material relationships with the lands, territories, waters and 
coastal seas and other resources which they have traditionally 
owned or otherwise occupied or used, and to uphold their 
responsibilities to future generations in this regard.  
 
(C) to determine and develop priorities and strategies for 
exercising their right to development.  In particular, indigenous 
peoples have the right to determine and develop all health, 
housing and other economic and social programs affecting them 
and as far as possible, to administer such programs through their 
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own institutions.  
 
(D) to the restitution of the lands, territories and resources which 
they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and 
which have been confiscated, occupied, used or damaged without 
their free and informed consent.  Where this is not possible, 
they have the right to just and fair compensation.  Unless 
otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, 
compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and 
resources equal in quality, size and legal status.  
 
(E) to live in freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples and 
to full guarantees against genocide or any other act of violence. 
[They also] have the right to conservation, restoration and 
protection of the total environment and the productive capacity 
of their lands, territories and resources, as well as to assistance 
for this purpose from States and through international 
cooperation.  Military activities shall not take place in the lands 
and territories of indigenous peoples, unless otherwise freely 
agreed upon by the people concerned. 
 
(F) [to use] indigenous knowledge, culture and traditional 
practices [for] sustainable and equitable development and proper 
management of the environment. 
 
(G) to determine priorities and strategies for the development or 
use of their lands, territories and other resources, including the 
right to require that States obtain their free and informed consent 
prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands, 
territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the 
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or 
other resources, particularly in connection with the development, 
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. 
Pursuant to agreement with the indigenous peoples concerned, 
just and fair compensation shall be provided for any such 
activities and measures taken to mitigate adverse environmental, 
economic, social or spiritual impact.  
 
(H) not [to] be forcibly removed from their lands or territories. 
No relocation shall take place without the free and informed 
consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement 
on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the 
option of return. 
 
(I) to access, without any discrimination, to all medical 
institutions, health services and medical care. 
(J) not to be subjected to ethnocide and cultural genocide, 
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including prevention of and redress for: (a) Any action which has 
the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct 
peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities; (b) Any 
action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their 
lands, territories or resources; (c) Any form of population 
transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining 
any of their rights; (d) Any form of assimilation or integration by 
other cultures or ways of life imposed on them by legislative, 
administrative or other measures. 
 
(K) [to control] over developments affecting them and their lands, 
territories and resources [which] will enable them to maintain 
and strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions, and to 
promote their development in accordance with their aspirations 
and needs.395 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
1.    Haji Misbach, an Islamic Communist, was expelled by the Dutch to West 
Papua in 1924.  Also in 1927, around 1,300 Communists were jailed in West 
Papua after an insurgency in Java.396   
 
2.    The most famous insurgent in the time of Dutch colonization was the Koreri 
Movement which occurred in 1938 and originated from Biak island.  “This 
movement awaited the liberator spirit of Manseren, who had been transformed 
into a human being in the 1860s and would one day return to free the 
Papuans.”397  Several insurgencies had occurred since the 1860s, but in 1939 a 
woman called Angganita Menufandu became widowed while suffering from 
beriberi.398  While recovering in isolation she was visited by Manseren.  She 
preached protest against the Dutch and advised hoisting the Morning Star flag.  
Even though Angganita Menufabdu was arrested by the Dutch, the movement 
was still powerful when the Japanese took over West Papua in 1942. 
 
3. The Japanese had actively operated in West Papua during those days.  Several 
Japanese logging firms had constructed trail timber cuttings, especially in the 
Bird’s Head peninsula area, and as became evident later, these logging firms 
had a significant number of geologists amongst their workers.399 
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4.    The Indonesian claim to West Papua was based on three principal tenets:  
 
(A) A territorial claim which was based on the inclusion of all 
Dutch East Indies territories at the time of Indonesian 
independence.  The West Papuan territory had been nominally 
under the jurisdiction of the Dutch administration in Batavia 
(Jakarta) and its main use was for political internment camps at 
Tanah Merah on the Digul River.  The terrain was considered 
difficult and the indigenous peoples so hostile, that the Dutch felt 
it unnecessary to mount guard on their mainly Javanese prisoners.  
However, Dutch control over the territory for most of the 
colonial period was purely nominal and was connected with the 
(also nominal) claim of the Sultanate of Tidore, in Maluku.  The 
claim was essentially to prevent any other colonial power from 
threatening the Dutch spice trade from Maluku.  Indeed, 
Indonesia’s territorial claim over West Papua follows exactly the 
colonial boundaries determined in the initial division in 1828. 
 
(B) A historical claim which was based on the writings of the 
Javanese poet Prapantja who suggested in 1365 that the 
Java-based Majapahit Empire of the 13th century had some 
contact with New Guinea.  However, from archaeological 
evidence, this empire is known to have occupied only Java, 
Sumatra and Nusa Tenggara.  Similarly, the Sultanate of Tidore 
claimed jurisdiction over West Papua and it was by agreement of 
the puppet regime of the Sultanate that the Netherlands originally 
gained an interest in the area.  Neither the Majapahit Empire 
nor the Sultanate of Tidore has ever been shown to have 
established a settlement or any effective control over even a part 
of the area.  The claim to sovereignty appears to be based upon 
intermittent trading contact, probably for slaves, and certainly for 
bird of paradise plumes which the Sultan of Tidore supplied to 
European market.  The terrain was too difficult and the Papuans 
too hostile for any attempt at control by distant rulers. 
 
(C) Indonesia’s claim was also based on threats, force and 
political maneuvers at the United Nations, and it benefited from 
the connivance of the United States with, to a lesser extent, 
Australia.400 
 
5. For example, in 1946 Dr H.J. Van Mook who was the head of the Netherlands 
administration set up a conference to discuss the future of the area in Malino, 
South Sulawesi.  Participants included West Papuans, Indonesians and Dutch.  
Throughout the conference, Franz Kaisiepo, the West Papuan representative 
clearly stated that West Papuans did not want to be included in an Indonesian 
Republic.  Certain efforts were also made in 1947 and 1948 to reach an 
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agreement between the two parties.  However, in 1949, the U.S. lobbied the 
Dutch to shift position since they recognized that their own economic interests 
were better served by rejecting the Dutch presence in the area.  A strong 
pressure from the U.S. came from the intimidation that if the Dutch were not 
more flexible, they would not receive their post-war Marshall Aid.  Finally, in 
the same year, the United Nations Security Council established the United 
Nations Commission on Indonesia that set up a round table conference.  For 
Indonesia, the claim was predominantly that West Papua should join the 
Republic.  Yet, a minority, influenced by Mohammad Hatta who was the 
Indonesian politician, maintained support for West Papua’s separation from 
Indonesia and for remaining with Melanesia.  He led the Indonesian 
delegation and due to this, his claim carried weight.  Johan Ariks, who was the 
West Papuan representative also claimed against incorporation into the 
Republic.  As a result, the issue of West Papua was left to future negotiation. 
 
6.   The Dutch also promoted the use of Malay across West Papua.  Education in 
elementary schools was in Malay, whereas selected pupils then went on to 
secondary schools in Sarui, Sorong, Manokwari, Hollandia (now Jayapura), 
and Biak, where the medium of tuition was Dutch.401  These elite schools 
were aimed at generating administrators and leaders for the future.  By 1957, 
30 per cent of the state positions in the colony were assigned to West Papuans 
and 50 per cent by 1960.402  Also, the Dutch educated 79 junior forestry 
officials and five West Papuan supervisors between 1955 and 1961.403 
 
7.   The representative assemblies started some time after the revision of Dutch rule 
with the establishment of a representative assembly on Biak Island and later 
similar regional assemblies were founded on the coastal mainland.404  Also, 
examples of political parties were the Indonesian Freedom Committee (Komite 
Indonesia Merdeka) and the Indonesian Irian Independence Party (Partai 
Kemerdekaan Irian Indonesia). 
 
8.  Isolated events widened by 1965 when violence by several hundreds of West 
Papuans against the TNI at Manokwari brought about the first 
counter-insurgency operation Operasi Sadar (Consciousness) by the TNI.405  
Continuous insurgencies in 1966 across the whole of West Papua were led by 
the two-year insurgency of the Arfak people in Manokwari.  Operasi 
Bratayudha (a battle in the Indonesian version of the Hindu Mahabharata) in 
1967 was targeted at 14,000 West Papuans who had taken up weapons against 
the occupying Indonesian authority.406   In 1968 further attacks by West 
Papuans resulted in the bombing of villages by Indonesian helicopters.  To 
prepare for the Act of Free Choice referendum, President Soeharto in 1969 
established a third counter-insurgency operation, Operasis Wibawa (Authority), 
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which was primarily organized to stop another insurgency in the Paniai region 
by the Dani who had been opposing occupation for more than a year.407 
 
9. The New York Agreement Article XVI says that the Act of Free Choice 
referendum would be composed of an enforcement of self-determination rights 
under Indonesian arrangements with UN advice, participation and support.408 
 
Article XVIII of the New York Agreement said that the arrangements were to 
include: 
 
a) consultations, musjawarah, with the nine ‘representative 
councils’ on the procedures and methods for ascertaining the 
freely expressed decision of the people;  
b) the establishment by Indonesian-Netherlands consultation of 
the exact time of the Act of Free Choice to take place before the 
end of 1969; 
c) a clear formulation of whether or not Indonesia was to 
continue in control; 
d) a guarantee of the eligibility of all indigenous inhabitants to 
participate in the Act of Free Choice which was to be carried out 
in accordance with ‘international practice’409  
 
Article XXII says that Indonesia should also ensure the local West Papuans’ 
rights including the freedom of assembly, movement and rights of free speech. 
 
10.  The Report of the Secretary General in relation to the Act of Free Choice in 
West Papua A/7723 states: 
 
<11> I must state at the outset of this report that, when I arrived 
in the territory in August 1968, I was faced with the problems of 
non-compliance with the provisions of article XVI of the 
Agreement.  Though the United Nations experts who were to 
have remained in the territory at the time of the transfer of full 
administrative responsibility to Indonesia had been designated, 
they had never, owing to well-known circumstances, taken up 
their duties… 
 
<26> I assumed my duties as the United Nations Representative 
on 1 April 1968… 
 
<27> Despite my willingness and readiness to travel to the 
territory immediately after my appointment, my departure was 
postponed until 7 August 1968 at the official request of the 
Indonesian Government. 
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<84> The consultative assemblies would not reach a decision 
through voting but through musjawarah which, as explained at 
that meeting, consisted in reaching a ‘decision based on 
discussion, understanding and knowledge of a problem’.   
 
<114> When…some elections took place without the presence of 
the United Nations observers, I went so far as to suggest the 
holding of fresh elections in some more important places in order 
to stress the importance of the eligibility of all adults to 
participate in them. 
 
<144> Many petitions requested our mission to take steps or 
measures clearly beyond our terms of reference, such as the 
withdrawal of Indonesian armed forces, the taking over of the 
administration of the territory by the United Nations, the 
guaranteeing by the United Nations of proper rights and 
freedoms for the population, and so on.  All of them, however, 
advocated the severance of ties with Indonesia and the 
establishment of a Free Papuan State. 
 
<160> The leaders of the insurgents requested the withdrawal of 
Indonesian troops from Paniai with the explanation that the 
people wanted to exercise the right of free choice without 
pressure.  A government plane brought reinforcements of 
sixteen soldiers, and on 30 April shooting started between the 
Indonesian troops and the insurgents aided by the armed police 
deserters. 
 
<163> On 1 May the insurgents hoisted their flag at Enarotali 
and on 3 May the appeal for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops 
was repeated and the United Nations Representative’s assistance 
in the withdrawal requested.  The answer given by the Military 
Commander was that the withdrawal of troops was a matter for 
the Army to decide and that the United Nations Representative 
had nothing to do with it. 
 
<180>. Notwithstanding the fairly negative result achieved up to 
that time, I continued my efforts to have article XXII properly 
implemented.  At a meeting of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
on 24 May, I said that the problem of the full implementation of 
article XII concerning the rights and freedoms had to be dealt 
with because, up to that time, no concrete measures had been 
adopted.  I suggested that the Indonesian Government should 
allow the opposition the opportunity to express its views, since 
that was the moment to adopt courageous and generous 
measures. 
           
  
144
 
           <181> In a conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on     
           30 May, I pressed for concrete measures in regard to this and    
           other outstanding questions.   
 
<182> In a last attempt to have article XXII of the Agreement 
properly implemented, I asked, on 10 June 1969, for an audience 
with the President of the Republic of Indonesia, General Suharto.  
Owing to his heavy schedule of work, the President could not 
receive me before 12 August, ten days after the completion of the 
Act of Free Choice, so that I did not have the opportunity of 
making my appeal regarding the implementation of the basic 
rights and freedom of the population of West Irian to the highest 
office of the Republic. 
 
<249> It can be seen from my report that United Nations 
observers were able to attend the election of 20 per cent of the 
total membership of the consultative assemblies…250.  The 
petitions opposing annexation to Indonesia, the cases of unrest in 
Manokwari, Enarotali and Waghete, the flight of a number of 
people to the part of the island that is administrated by Australia, 
and the existence of political detainees, more than 300 of whom 
were released at my request, show that without doubt certain 
elements of the population of West Irian held firm convictions in 
favor of independence… 
 
<251> I regret to have to express my reservation regarding the 
implementation of article XXII of the Agreement, relating to the 
‘rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement 
and of assembly, of the inhabitants of the area’.  In spite of my 
constant efforts, this important provision was not fully 
implemented and the Administration exercised at all times a tight 
political control over the population.410  
 
11.     According to the Indonesian Department of Health reports, in the Central 
Highlands, with a population of 400,000, there is only one hospital with 70 
beds, and 15 health centers with a doctor in the 13 subdistricts covering an area 
of 53,000 square kilometers in 1995.411 
 
12.     General transmigration (transmigrasi umum) is a state-sponsored 
transmigration.  The Indonesian state supplies transportation to the settlement 
site: house and an agricultural plot, infrastructure and a living allowance aimed 
to assist the transmigrant family normally for the first eighteen months.412  
Also, supported spontaneous transmigration (transmigrasi swakarsa 
berbantuan) is assisted by the Indonesian state in co-operation with investors 
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and businesses related to particular plans.  Finally, self-assisting spontaneous 
transmigration is practiced by the community concerned, individually or by a 
group of people.  Although self-supporting spontaneous transmigrants are 
more independent than supported transmigrants, both types receive a plot that 
has been titled and surveyed by the Indonesian state. 
 
13.     In the 1980s, significant amounts of Asian Development Bank (ADB)/ World 
Bank bilateral financial assistance and loans made it possible to enlarge the 
transmigration program, with the outcome that ten times more people during 
1980-90 were resettled than in the previous seven decades since the 
commencement of state-sponsored transmigration. 413   Yet, huge social, 
economic, and environmental problems led to the international and domestic 
criticism and due to the transmigration’s failure to accomplish its goals, 
external financial support to assist new resettlement plans dried up in the 1990s.  
Simultaneously, external financial support shifted to a new strategy to assist 
‘Second-stage Transmigration’, i.e. to restore the existing resettlement 
projects.414  The financial crisis that attacked Indonesia in mid-1997 and the 
ensuing struggle to re-construct the economy and transform the corrupted 
political structure resulted in major shifts in the economic, political, and 
institutional landscape.  These have in turn, largely impacted on the 
transmigration program since 1997.  Factors such as the outbreak of social 
conflicts at several areas in Indonesia, the new phenomenon of refugees and the 
indirect and direct influences of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)-imposed Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) have featured the post 
1997 transmigration program.415  Finally, today, both the Indonesian state and 
the provincial government relies on industrial shrimp, farming, oil palm, 
pulpwood plantations and natural resources exploitation such as industrial 
timber, mining and logging to create revenue.  The huge scale commercial 
exploitation targeted at export markets is being actively encouraged by 
Indonesia’s external creditors, led by the World Bank and the IMF.  If this 
continues, the need for workforce in West Papua will grow, fueling a new 
migration and most probably transmigration boom. 
 
14.     In fact, these ruthless attitudes and activities by both the Indonesian state and 
the logging companies have also resulted in the conflict between them and 
West Papuans.  One typical example is the conflicts between the Intimpura 
Timber Company and the Moi tribe who have resided in the town of Sorong 
and its surrounding areas.  Same as other West Papuan tribes, the Moi way of 
life has been intimidated by the logging.  The Indonesian state granted a 
logging concession of 339,000 hectares to the Intimpura Timber Company in 
1990, without the consent of native landowners.416  The Moi community has 
opposed the intrusion of the company on their land, and have established 
representations to the company, provincial government, the TNI (in Indonesia, 
the TNI supports national development and was in fact the primal owner of the 
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logging concession) and forestry service.  Yet, the Indonesian state, the TNI 
and the company stay firm in their policy of not acknowledging anything in the 
way of land rights.  Since the Moi community has continued to resist, they 
have been accused of being ‘security disturbers’.417 
15.     Amnesty International, while not allowed to enter the West Papua, has received 
substantial reports of torture and ill treatment of political prisoners.  They are 
said to be given electric shocks, burned with lighted cigarettes, submerged in 
water tanks and beaten.418  Lawyers who have visited some of the prisoners 
report that they do not receive proper medical attention.  Many of them have 
also been shifted to Java without first informing them, their lawyers and 
families.  It is not just the mental effect of such separation which causes 
problems.  In Indonesia detainees often depend on medicine, clothing and 
food brought by visitors to supplement what they are able to obtain via the 
prison system.  Due to this, the separation raises a humanitarian concern, 
especially for those who are in poor health or old. 
16.    Key provisions of SAL include: 
z 70% of oil and gas royalties to be channeled to the territory 
(to be reviewed after a 25 year period) 
z 80% of mining, forestry and fisheries royalties 
z funds from the national General Allocation Fund - as under 
‘normal’ autonomy 
z 2% of the national General Allocation Fund for education 
and heath 
z extra funds (amount not yet determined) for infrastructure 
z the creation of a Papuan People’s Council (MRP) – made up 
of [West Papuans], church and women’s leaders, designated 
to protect the customary (adat) rights of [West] Papuans 
z Use of [West] Papuan flag as a cultural symbol, not as an 
expression of [West] Papuan’s sovereignty as an 
independent state419 
 
17.     According to the Dr. Agus Sumule, a member of Special Autonomy team and a 
senior lecturer at the Papua University in Manokwari, the unsuccessful 
implementation of Special Autonomy is attributed to the following obstacles: 
 
z The deep-rooted distrust of the people of Indonesia that 
Special Autonomy will bring a peaceful workable solution 
for separatism in West Papua.   
z Anti-Special Autonomy groups have a strong feeling that 
Special Autonomy [poses a] serious threat to their economic 
interests in West Papua 
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z The lack of capacity to implement Special Autonomy420 
 
18. A typical example of this is the MRP Decision No. 04/MRP/2006 and the MRP    
Recommendation of February 2006 on the results of its public hearing on the 
establishment of a separated West Irian Jaya province, from which there has 
been no response from the Indonesian state to date.421  The MRP is still 
waiting for a response from the Indonesian state.  The Indonesian Vice 
President Haji Yusuf Kalla says that “the MRP is not a super body or any such 
thing.”422 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
1.   Freeport uses Cairns as a supply base, for machinery, employees, food and as a 
rest and recuperation (R and R) location.  It also largely contributes to the 
economy of Cairns and is actively searching for Australian investment.  In 
fact, it already has the assistance of some superannuation funds in Australia. 
 
2. Whereas investigation remains incomplete, there has been well-documented 
evidence of human rights violations against the West Papuans in Freeport’s 
operating territories.  These include; 
 
z Torture; rape; indiscriminate, summary, and extrajudicial 
killings; disappearances; arbitrary detention; surveillance 
and intimidation; employment discrimination; and severe 
restrictions on freedom of movements; 
z Interference with access to legal representation; 
 
z Violation of subsistence and livelihood rights resulting from 
seizure and destruction of thousands of acres of 
rainforest—including community hunting grounds and forest 
gardens---and contamination of water supplies and fishing 
grounds; 
 
z Violation of cultural rights, including the destruction of a 
mountain and other spiritually significant sites held sacred 
by the Amungme; and  
 
z Forced resettlement of communities and destruction of 
housing, churches, and other shelters.423 
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Some of these abuses, such as those caused by ecological breakdown, are the 
by-products of Freeport’s activities.  Other abuses, such as physical assaults, 
are the result of the indiscriminate, disproportionate and illegal use of force 
against West Papuans by the Indonesian police and the TNI. 
 
3.     The incidents happened due to the demonstration by the Amungme community 
with OPM members who opposed the enlargement of Freeport’s mining 
operation at Tembagapura.  According to eyewitnesses, 15 supposed guerrillas 
and 22 civilians have been murdered by the TNI, supported by security forces 
recruited by Freeport.424  Others were coerced to run into the jungle, arrested, 
tortured or beaten.  Also, the Catholic Church of Jayapura issued its own 
report by conducting interviews with Amungme eyewitnesses and it 
described the incidents of several arbitrary detentions, torture and summary 
excecutions which had happened between 1994 to mid-1995 in Freeport’s 
operating area.425  The report also described the death of three civilians who 
were tortured by the TNI at a Freeport workshop.426  The company strongly 
refused to acknowledge the existence of such workshop and involvement of its 
security forces in any killing.  “We have an excellent relationship with the 
chiefs of the  tribes,” said Thomas J. Egan, the Freeport senior Vice 
President.427  Finally, the report also illustrated that in 1995, West Papuans 
were attacked by the security forces at the Freeport security post, its shipping 
containers and on an operated bus.428  The report, written on eyewitness 
testimonies, provides the most informed and troubling public explanation of the 
human rights violations experienced by Amungme and other West Papuans. 
 
According to the report,  
 
…physical torture consisted of kicking in the belly, chest and 
head with army boots; beating with fists, rattan, [sic] sticks, rifle 
butts and stones; denial of food; kneeling with an iron bar in the 
knee hollows; standing for hours with a heavy weight on the 
head, shoulders, or cradled in the arms; stepping and stamping on 
hands; trying and shackling of thumbs, wrists and legs; sleeping 
on bare floors; stabbing, [sic] taping eyes shut; and forced labor 
in a weakened condition.  The torture caused bleeding head 
wounds, swollen faces and hands, buries, loss of consciousness 
and death because of a broken neck.429                                            
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4.    Amungme and Kamoro’s demands  
z Compensation by Freeport for all lands that have been 
confiscated; 
z Independent environmental and human rights assessments to 
determine the extent of damages; 
z Accountability for military personnel who have perpetrated 
human rights abuses; 
z Explanations by Freeport and the Indonesian government of 
the company's mining plans and activities under its CoW; 
z Community-led development programs; 
z Cessation by the government of the transmigration program 
and of "spontaneous" migration; 
z Responsibility by Freeport for reclamation of land degraded 
by mining activities; 
z Cessation by Freeport of tailings deposition into local river 
systems; 
z Compensation to the communities by Freeport for 
pollution-related suffering; 
z Cessation by the government of military involvement in the 
management of natural resources; 
z Compensation by the government for past losses suffered as 
a result of land seizures and exploitation of Amungme lands;  
z The return by the government and Freeport of traditional 
Amungme lands confiscated without the community's 
permission”; and 
z Amungme permission and consent for all activity on 
Amungme land. This includes sitting on Freeport's Board of 
Directors and participating in shareholder meetings.430 
 
5.  Between 1975 and 2000, the U.S. military industry sold approximately U.S. $ 
1.1 billion valued weapons to the TNI. 431   Subsequent to Indonesia’s 
occupation of East Timor in December 1975, the U.S. military aid more than 
doubled, from U.S. $ 17 million to 40 million, and its sales raised from U.S. $ 
12 million to U.S. $ 65 million.432  Henry Kissinger, who was the former U.S. 
State Secretary, used his connections to lobby on behalf of Freeport in Jakarta 
and Washinton. 
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6.     Amungme state: 
 
For us, the Amungme people, the root cause of the human rights 
violations is Freeport.... 
Considering that the government decided to designate Freeport 
as a `vital project', why was the matter not first discussed with 
the people who are the owners of the natural resources before the 
company began its operations?  Or is it that because the 
company was designated as a vital project, it was deemed 
necessary to sacrifice the interests of the people?  If the 
company is indeed a vital project, making it necessary for the 
government to sacrifice its own people, we regard this as 
economic colonization by capitalists in contravention of our 
national economic system....  The fact that Freeport has been 
allowed to operate here in Irian Jaya and dig up and exploit our 
mineral resources, to destroy the very means of our existence, to 
drive us out of our ancestral lands, to impoverish us and kill us 
on our own territory, is all the result of a policy which has been 
determined at the centre in Jakarta.  It is the central government 
that must take responsibility for reaching a solution to this 
problem.433 
 
7. In September 1996, Indonesian police in West Papua exiled U.S.-based lawyer 
Martin J. Regan on trumped-up charges, forbidding him from seeing the 
Amungme leaders, Tom Beanal and Yosepha Alomang, in Timika.434  Also, in 
May 1998, Ms. Alomang was blocked from traveling to London by the TNI 
where she planned to talk about human rights violations and other issues to 
Freeport management and shareholders at the company’s Annual General 
Meeting.435 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
1.     This difficulty in communication between the two communities and Freeport 
was obvious when on April 1996 Freeport announced that it had reached an 
agreement with the Amungme regarding the company’s new development 
scheme.  To its embarrassment, this announcement was renounced next day by 
the Amungme Traditional Council (LEMASA) and completely rejected by it 
after two months.436  It was obvious that communications between the two had 
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broken down, resulting in Freeport then settling an agreement with the 
Breakaway Amungme yayasan (AMUNGKAL), a rival Amungme group 
established with Freeport’s support. 
 
2.      Dr. Carolyn Cook who works closely with the Amungme describes the 
Amungme way of negotiation and states: 
 
The Amungme begin negotiation speeches with a discourse on 
how God created the heavens and the earth.  They then progress 
through history until finally they come to the point they want to 
make.  Time-oriented administrators often swear they have heard 
the same speech a thousand times, they became bored before the 
Amungme have a chance to make their point.  Some tribal 
leaders have modified their traditional speech patterns in order to 
be heard.  Still, each tribal representative has to have his say 
because persuasive ‘talk’ is a necessary element of becoming a 
‘Big Man’.  A meeting is unfinished until all aspiring Big Men 
have had a chance to speak.  A few of the younger fellows then 
chime in, in an attempt to gain prestige among their peers.  Some 
typical Amungme patterns of behavior during negotiations are 
aggressive jumping toward others, spitting, yelling, and at times 
brandishing bow and allow.437 
 
3.      As Kal Muller noted: 
 
There are no quick answers, and long consultation times are 
needed, yet everyone at Freeport wants quick results to impress 
the outside world.  You have to spend nights in the villages to 
have time to talk to the Kamoro (they are busy during the day 
feeding their families) yet Freeporters have not done this, due to 
the primitive conditions, inertia whatever.438 
 
A former President of Freeport George A. Mealey acknowledged the above 
statement and said:  
 
You have to understand that we were working on the basis of very 
little information about the Amungme/[Kamoro] culture, which 
nobody has ever studied in depth…What motivates them?  What 
is valuable to them?  What do they consider as incentives?  
How do they relate to their peers and the outside world?  We just 
don’t know very many of the answers.439 
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4.  In fact, in belated recognition of these issues, Freeport assisted the West Papuan 
communities to organize the representative assemblies in 1996, at the same 
time paying for legal mediators or counsel to support these groups in 
negotiations.  However, disbelieving Freeport’s favors, LEMASA have 
favored support from the NGOs.  In the end, efforts by the NGOs to address 
the disparity of power have resulted in the break down in negotiation.  It was 
obvious in 1996, when at the request of the Indonesian Forum on the 
Environment (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia-WALHI), Tom Beanal, the 
acknowledged leader of the LEMASA sued in the U.S against Freeport.440  
Emmy Hafild of WALHI, who was advising Beanal, said that the trial was 
established, partly to address the disparity of power between the company and 
indigenous communities, and to bring out more positive negotiation.441  Not 
surprisingly, however, this legal action resulted in a breakdown in negotiation. 
 
5.  At the same time, other development initiatives have funded separately from 
the One Percent Fund up until today.  These include the costs of the 
Community Affairs Department (which between 1996 to the end of 2000 had 
approximately 80 full-time staff and had an annual budget exceeding U.S. $3 
million) and part of the costs of the Freeport Malaria Control and Public Health 
Department (approximately U.S. $4 million annually).442  
 
6.  As Broek states: 
 
Setting up a representative organization is not that easy, as it has 
to respect traditional patterns already in place.  There are even 
traditional cultural constraints which have their impact on the 
organizational structure that can be set up.  As LEMASA, also 
[Kamoro Traditional Council] LEMASKO was meant to be set up 
as a representative body (based on traditional views and structures 
of authority); in that way it sets LEMASA as well as LEMASKO 
apart from all the other pragmatic Foundations.443 
 
He also mentions the distinct features of Kamoro and states: 
 
LEMASKO is still in a very special position.  It is meant to have 
the same mission as LEMASA but traditionally it is virtually 
impossible to fulfill that mission as in the local traditional pattern 
there is no element of ‘the whole tribe being represented by one 
voice’.  Traditionally the Kamoro people are structured in 
‘taparu’ and ‘marga’ (as traditional owners of the land).  Every 
‘taparu’ consists of a number of families, which within the ‘taparu’ 
are ordered in a kind of hierarchy of authority.  All the existing 
‘taparu’s’ as a whole are just equal, and there is no traditional 
structure such as a ‘primus inter pares’.  So, it will be very 
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difficult to create a simple representative body that is really 
recognized by all the parties involved.444 
 
7.     In detail, the main reason why LEMASA renounced the One Percent Fund was 
as Broek states: 
 
As long as the [One Percent Fund] has been interpreted ‘as a kind 
of deal’ with the local population (including the traditional 
landowners of the project area), LEMASA fears that by accepting 
the [Fund] it helps implicitly to create the impression that all the 
problems are solved, that there is ‘a deal’; for LEMASA (or at 
least a number of people-more than 2000 signatures-represented 
by LEMASA), that is not the case.  LEMASA tries to avoid the 
situation that by accepting some ‘presents’ the real problems will 
not be dealt with: the problem of land-rights, the problem of 
environment damage and the problem of human rights violations 
in the past.445 
 
8.  In fact, the company was largely condemned by the NGOs for what they 
understood as an intentional effort to split the generally cohesive Amungme 
community.  However, the company opposed, saying “it would work with any 
group that wanted to help bring development to its people” while arguing that 
causing separations within the Amungme community was not its purpose as it 
was in its own best interests to deal with unified groups.446  The company in 
addition said that it was also in the company’s best interest not to have the 
funds renounced. 
 
9  In this mechanism not only was the village required to learn new skills and 
become forcibly engaged in its own development, but theoretically, wealth was 
accumulated in the community which could be available for future 
sustainable-development projects.  The company expected that this new 
system would address the issues that appeared previously when the 
disbursement of funds was driven by contractors or manipulated by an 
individual in Jayapura.  Simultaneously, it aimed to reject power from the 
larger competing community-based foundations in Timika, which misused the 
funds without considering those remaining in the village.447  In addition, it 
also aimed to reject the tensions over access to funds between the each 
community.  Furthermore, this style of village-based development was 
essentially aimed to minimize the gap between expectation and reality.  The 
village, which was required to accomplish the project itself, would not 
supposedly expect a shopping mall or five-storey building, but rather projects 
that were feasible, relevant and important such as a bridge, a water system or a 
school.448  The focus of this development scheme was to be sustainable 
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development targeted at promoting independence rather than short-term 
projects that would strengthen dependence.  In 1999 LPM-Irja agreed on a 
scheme for 1999-2000 which was implemented by choosing a number of 
village foundations to be responsible for funded projects.  The project 
provided some form of support to all the seventy-one villages situated within 
the operating area, but focused initially on the twenty-nine villages LPM-Irja 
regarded as being most affected by the mining.449 
 
10.  According to the company, activities assisted by LPMAK in 2005 included: 
 
z Two hospitals and five health clinics that treated a total of 
30,000 in-patients and more than 100,000 out-patients during 
2005 alone.  Health care is provided free of charge to 
members of the seven [West] Papuan tribal groups indigenous 
to the area.   
 
z Partnership programs with the local government for the 
prevention and treatment of malaria, tuberculosis and 
HIV/AIDS, as well as the operation of two clinics built by 
LPMAK in the remote Highlands. 
 
z Scholarships for nearly 5,500 students at all levels, including 
350 university graduates, and full funding for 13 student 
dormitories. 
 
z Partnership programs with the local government for teacher 
training, support for students from the seven local [West 
Papuans] in the regional Science Olympiad, and renovations 
to the Banti elementary school. 
 
z More than 1,600 rural income generation activity groups from 
the seven main [West Papuan communities] in the area in 
agriculture, animal husbandry, fishing, trade and services. 
 
z Cultural activities including the Kamoro Festival attended by 
over 4,000 participants and a group of 40 Amungme and 
Kamoro dancers who attended the Bellingen Global Carnival 
in Australia.450 
 
11.  As a part of the successes, Mr Anderson Worabai, a Freeport officer who 
helped administer the plan, stated that 60 percent of the 71 villages which 
received funding used it properly.451  Also according to him, since not all the 
fund is spent straightforwardly in villages, other projects assisted by the 
company fund were also successful.  For example, the fund spent U.S. $6.4 
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million on a 75-bed hospital which opened recently in Timika to provide free 
treatment to seven West Papuan communities.452  The fund has also provided 
scholarships to 5,000 students for university, college and senior high school 
education.453 
 
12.  For example, those who have access to the fund could purchase another wife 
more easily.  Also, the ready money has increased the bride price to U.S. 
$5,000 or U.S. $6,000.454  Finally, it has also made it easier to cheat on a wife.  
In West Papuan culture, such crimes meet with fines, which are now around 
U.S. $100. 455   In relation to HIV/AIDS, some West Papuan men have 
sufficient cash to play around in Timika “a rough frontier town which grew 
with the mine which has an active red-light district.”456  Due to this, the 
number of people with HIV/AIDS is increasing, although Freeport has taken 
several initiatives to prevent it. 
 
13.     According to Freeport, Land Rights Recognition Programs are under way in 
both highlands and lowlands.  
 
z The Kamoro Village Recognition Program. 
 
This program is a compensation for the release of land to the Indonesian state 
by five Kamoro villages in the lowlands, including its use for an electrical 
transmission line corridor, the port, cargo dock facilities and the tailings 
deposition.457  The program primarily focused on physical infrastructure, 
including community facilities and housing, but now focuses on existing needs 
such as preservation of the Kamoro culture, social and village foundation 
development, ongoing education for post-secondary students, nutritional 
instruction, access to health facilities, health education, income generation and 
economic development.458  Included are programs to grow a sago plantation 
and to promote the commercialization of the local fishing industry.  Projects 
in 2005 included supplying continuous training in sewing and nutrition  to 
women in all five villages; providing fishing support packages to more than 
400 households, including cool boxes, nets, outboard motors and fuel; 
constructing a permanent bridge and elevating a road in one village; connecting 
electrical service to three villages; and installing pumps and water wells.459 
 
z The Tiga Desa (Three Village) Development Program. 
 
This program is a similar program for three Amungme villages in the highlands.  
This program supplied extra recognition to the Amungme as inhabiting land 
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closest to the mine, who had been compensated in the 1974 agreement, 
regarding the expanded prospect and ongoing success of mining operations.  
This program focused on infrastructure through 2005 and included building of 
protective levees, roads, bridges, housing, water and hydroelectric development 
and a sewer service.460  As a result, a church, 9 bridges and 94 houses were 
built during 2005.461 
 
14.     The company states that at the end of 2005, the fund held a combined total of       
nearly 43,000 common shares in Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc., 
worth more than U.S. $2.3 million at the share price as of that time.462 
 
15.    Edward Pressman believed that if Freeport was not restricted by Indonesian law, 
it would without reluctance, sit down with the West Papuan representatives and 
work out a large financial arrangement as one would in the West.463  In other 
words, the company would just buy the land or the license for using the land.  
The company believed that this kind of deal would not only satisfy the West 
Papuans’ requests, but would allow the company to get away from the burden 
of community development.  In Pressman’s scenario, the money would be 
deposited into a trust fund which West Papuans would administrate and could 
use to directly fund their own projects. 
 
16.  Today in Timika, which has twelve transmigration dwellings located at its 
perimeter and within the operating area, not every settler is happy with their lot.  
With many failing to find jobs and their excess produce failing to find markets, 
they have stopped working on the settlements and have moved to Timika, 
creating tension between themselves and the West Papuans.464 
 
17.  A typical example is the story of Mr Nurdin who is Kamoro and runs the 
Souvenir Shop in Kamoro.  In 1994, one transmigrant from Sulawesi moved 
to Nurdin’s neighborhood.  He immediately “gathered a store full of 
sought-after Asmat art for sale to the tourists, but most at vastly inflated prices 
compared to the Bali shops.”465  His shop’s focus on the more complex art of 
the more distant Dani and Asmat people indicated how free market capitalism 
really is.466 
 
18.    For example, with a perspective toward long-term development of West 
Papuans in the workforce, Freeport in 2004 established the Nemangkawi 
Mining Institute.  Also the new facilities, that are being built totally by 
apprentices, open in 2006. According to the company, its goal is to supply 
pre-apprentices, apprenticeships and advanced career development 
opportunities for hundreds of West Papuans each year and by the end of 2005, 
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more than 1,000 West Papuans were registered in the institute’s programs.467  
These students have received on and off-the-job training in clerical and 
administration duties, electrical and instrumentation work, equipment 
operations, heavy duty mechanics, welding and numerous other trades.468  
Freeport states that most of them will be employed by the company and its 
related companies and since the opening of the institute, 55 apprentices have 
been employed at Freeport or its related companies.469  In addition, more than 
200 pre-apprentices, all Kamoro and Amungme, have completed the full 
apprentice program.470 
 
Freeport has also provided training to its employees.  Through 2005, 
Freeport’s Quality Management Services Department supplied approximately 6 
million hours training to around 16,000 workers. 471   The workshop 
accommodates about 300 workers per day, supplying development 
opportunities in management and trades fields.472 
 
19.  Dr. Cook states that Freeport is seriously looking for qualified West Papuans to 
promote, it is trying to place West Papuans into top supervisory positions and 
has announced that it will strive to double the number of West Papuans in 
middle management by around 2006.473 
 
20.  By mid-2000 Freeport stated that they had funded the estimation of five 
thousand scholarships for West Papuans with no less than 30 percent being 
provided to Amungme and Kamoro.474  However, it should also be borne in 
mind that sponsorship numbers included things such as dormitories, uniforms 
and other items. 
 
21.  In what could be classified as a common understanding among West Papuans 
facing the power of a multinational, the Amungme believe that the company 
would rather make deals with the elders in the community, who are unworthy, 
undereducated and they believe more easily cheated, than with the more worthy, 
and educated young West Papuans.475 
 
22.    One good example is in the new company town of Kuala Kencana where the 
company was obliged to found two schools: international or American and an 
Indonesian school, the latter because the Indonesian state obliges every 
Indonesian citizen to receive only a state-sponsored education using Bahasa 
Indonesia.476 
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23.    According to the Ondawame, recent major human rights violations include: 
 
z December 7, 2000, Police raided a student camp in Abepura 
and arrested 99 civilians and killed Elkuis Suhunaib (18), 
Jonny Karunggu (18) and Orry Dorongo (17) after torturing 
them. 
 
z In the beginning of 2001, William Onde, Operational 
Command of the OPM of Rusa Military Command in 
Merauke was assassinated by the TNI and indiscriminate 
terror acts were committed in Bonggo, Sarmi.   
 
z In November 10, 2001, Mr. Theys Eluay, Chairman of [PDP] 
was abducted and murdered by the Indonesian Special Forces 
[Komando Pasukan Khusus-KOPASUS]. 
 
z John Rumbiak, Supervisor of the Institute of Human Right 
Studies and Advocacy [Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Hak 
Asasi Manusia-ELSHAM] and his staff members in Jayapura 
were constantly intimidated and threatened with death by 
[the] TNI.  He was forced to leave the territory and sought 
political asylum in the [U.S.] in 2004. 
 
z Benny Wenda, Chairman of Council of KOTEKA Traditional 
Assembly (DEMMAK) was arrested and imprisoned by the 
TNI in Jayapura but he escaped and got political asylum in 
London in 2003.   
 
z In the Central Highland particularly in Puncak Jaya district, 
huge numbers of the troops were also deployed to hunt down 
OPM.  These three regions are highly militarized zones 
today.  The military controls all [West] Papuan’s lives: ports, 
airfields, urban cities and even gardens owned by local people.  
Consequently, freedom of movement of the local people is 
restricted.  Their lives are tightly controlled and local girls 
were raped.   
 
z Yusak Pakage (26) and Filip Karma (45) faced a possible life 
sentence under the Article 106 of the criminal code.  Their 
crime was organizing 43rd Anniversary celebration of 
Morning Star at the university campus in Abepura on 1st 
December 2004.  They are also charged under Article: 154 of 
the Criminal Code, with expressing hostility or hatred towards 
the state, the maximal penalty for which is seven years.   
 
z OPM resistance persistent.  A new weapon contact occurred 
between the TNI and OPM in Timika, eight Indonesian 
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soldiers were killed by the OPM and two guerrillas, Musa 
Tsuggumol and Eanam were killed by the TNI in the Kopi 
river on 13th March 2005. 
 
z Other serial killings occurred in the remote highland village of 
Wunin, Puncak Jaya regency [in March 2005].  From the 
photos that were collected by human rights investigators, it 
shows the aftermath of an attack – with elderly villagers 
murdered and schools and churches burnt to the ground.  
[During November 2004 to May 2005], investigations have 
documented scores of deaths and acts of violence attributed to 
the Indonesian military.  Sources in West Papua say that as a 
result, throughout the entire province, between 15,000 and 
20,000 people have been forced from their homes.  In late 
January [2005], human rights investigators on a secret 
mission to West Papua’s Central Highlands stumbled into a 
scene of misery and death.  More than 6,000 civilians had 
taken refuge in the jungle escaping from Indonesian 
brutalities.  This 11-month-old girl had just died from 
malnutrition and exposure - a victim of West Papua’s hidden 
conflict.  All these events have threatened the lives of many 
West Papuans.477 
 
24.     For example, Yoman stated the case of the Puncak Jaya humanitarian operation.  
He asserted that the U.S. $ 250,000, set aside for development was spent on 
military operations including the murdering of innocent people in the Puncak 
Jaya regency.478 
 
25.    Freeport states: 
 
[T]he support for the Government-provided security in [West] 
Papua includes in-kind assistance and monetary allowances to 
mitigate living costs and the hardship elements of posting in 
[West] Papua, better ensuring positive morale and that personnel 
are properly fed and lodged, and to provide the logistical resources 
necessary to patrol and secure the company’s operating area.  
Oversight of support requests is designed to ensure that only 
appropriate and legitimate requests are granted.  This support for 
the [g]overnment security institutions assigned to the company’s 
area of operations represents a prudent and considered step by our 
company to protect its workforce and property, and to meet the 
expectations imposed by the [g]overnment on companies 
conducting business in remote areas of Indonesia.  This provision 
of support is consistent with the company’s obligations under the 
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[CoW], our philosophy of responsible corporate citizenship, the 
joint U.S. State Department-British Foreign Office Voluntary 
Principles on Human Rights and Security, and is in keeping with 
our commitment to pursue practices to promote human rights.479  
 
26.     The U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld states: 
 
The ability for our militaries to work more closely with each other 
is clear when one thinks of what took place in the (December 
2004) tsunami or what took place with respect to the (May 27) 
earthquake, and the need to know each other and be able to 
communicate well with each other and understand each other 
when there’s a disaster of that type.480 
 
Also, after the September 11 incident in New York, the U.S. believes that 
military cooperation with Indonesia is important in terrorist mopping-up 
operations since Indonesia is the most populous Muslim dominated state and 
has been a “possible safe haven for al-Qaeda and its sympathizers”, a view that 
was strengthened by the terrorist attack on Bali in 2002 and 2005.481 
 
27.     However, in response to the incident, British Foreign Office Minister, Ian 
Pearson said that “the UK no longer seeks guarantees or assurances that UK 
weaponry will not be used to abuse human rights, since such assurances are not 
enforceable i.e. essentially worthless”482 
 
28.     The Embassy further states: 
 
What this means for New Zealand, if the evolution of our 
domestic public opinion parallels the US, Canadian or Australian 
trends, is a requirement to make demarches, that in the current 
Indonesian climate will probably have little impact on Indonesian 
policy while straining our relationship with Indonesia.  Such 
strains are unavoidable in the circumstances but it may be 
possible to contain them somewhat.  Anything we say may be 
better received if we have on record some statement about 
support for Indonesia’s territorial integrity.483 
 
 
                                                  
479 Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. The Elements of Sustainable Development. 2005 Working toward Sustainable 
    Development Report. 2005, p. 29. http://www.fcx.com/envir/wtsd/pdf-wtsd/2005/WTSD-ver4.pdf 
480 Rhem, K T. Americans, Indonesians Forging More Cooperative Military Ties. United States Department of Defense. 2006.  
   http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2006/20060606_5347.html 
481 Lobe, J. US Paves Way for New Indonesia Military ties. Asian Times Online. 2003. 
    http://www.atimes.com/atimes/southeast_asia/EA28Ae02.html 
482 Barber, P. Closer UK Defence Ties Threaten Fight against Military Terror in Indonesia. The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign 
    (TAPOL). 2006. http://tapol.gn.apc.org/press/files/pr060331.htm 
Lewis, M. Letter to Guardian on UK Military Ties with Indonesia. The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign (TAPOL). 2006. 
http://tapol.gn.apc.org/news/files/let060403.htm 
483 Leadbeater, M. Expediency, Hypocrisy, Policy. From Henderson, J and Watson, G. Securing a Peaceful Pacific. Canterbury    
   university press: Canterbury, 2005, p. 496. 
  
161
29.     Phil Goff who was the minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade at that time states: 
 
Indonesia would view outside representations of support for West 
Papua’s independence as an attempt to undermine Indonesia’s 
territorial integrity.  This would give negative consequences for 
relations with Indonesia and would weaken New Zealand’s ability 
to make effective representations to Indonesia in support of a 
peaceful resolution of its differences with West Papua.484     
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
1. First subsequent contractual agreement of MOU in 2000 included  
 
z the establishment of PT Kelabuma Permai, a limited 
company owned by LEMASA employing [West] Papuans to 
carry out dredging and maintenance work on the tailings 
containment levees downstream of the mine; 
 
z an integrated agricultural, aquaculture and livestock project 
in and around the tailings area, sponsored by Freeport with 
shareholdings by LEMASA and LEMASKO; 
 
z the building of an office for LEMASA and a building for 
tribal elders.485 
 
2.      Especially, the Black majority who officially became citizens of particular 
‘homelands’ which were formally sovereign nations but operated along lines 
more similar to the Canadian/Australian Aboriginal Reserves and US Indian 
Reservations.486  As a matter of the fact, most Blacks had never lived in their 
homeland under the apartheid government.  In practice, apartheid disallowed 
non-White South Africans – even if they actually lived in White South Africa – 
“from having a vote or influence, restricting their rights to faraway homelands 
that they may never have visited.”487  Public services including medical care 
and education were sometimes claimed to be equal but separate, but those 
available to non-White people were in general perceived as inferior. 
 
3      During the last years of apartheid governance in South Africa, the state was in a 
regular state of emergency.  Growing civil disorder and township violence 
resulted in the government (via the President P. W. Botha) declaring a state of 
emergency on 20 July 1985 in 36 authoritative areas.488  Areas affected were 
the Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging (PWV) regions, and the Eastern Cape 
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and three months later, the Western Cape was also incorporated.489  During 
this state of emergency around 2,436 people were arrested under the Internal 
Security Act.490  The government could enforce curfews manipulating the 
people’s movements and the President could control by decree without 
referring to parliament or the constitution.  Another state of emergency was 
declared on June 12, 1986, four days before the 10 year cerebration of the 
Soweto uprising to cover the whole state.  The government revised the Public 
Security Act, enlarging its powers to incorporate the right to declare certain 
areas ‘unrest areas’.  This permitted the state to exercise extensive measures 
to fight protests in these areas.  The government Censorship Board kept an 
eye on the publication and press content relevant to all unrest activities.  
Although the government insisted that the media in South Africa was free, the 
independent media in South Africa was prohibited from reporting on the state 
of emergency.  The state spokesperson, the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC) supplied daily propaganda in favor of the state. 
  
4.      Bantustan refers to the twenty territories which served as reserves for the 
indigenous South Africans as part of the ethnic separation policies of apartheid.  
Ten Bantustans were created in South Africa, and ten in neighbouring 
South-West Africa (then under South African control), “for the purpose of 
concentrating, in their territories, members of designated ethnic groups, thus 
making each of those territories ethnically homogenous.”491  With the collapse 
of the apartheid state in South Africa, the Bantustans were disassembled and 
their territories reincorporated into the South African Republic. 
 
5.      In fact, a different process may lead to negative outcomes.  The revelation of 
truth which points to unilateral criticism is not likely to generate reconciliation.  
Discussing truth and reconciliation attempts in other states, 
Gobodo-Madikizela argues: 
 
Their tendency to focus only on perpetrators on one side of a 
political conflict may, however, disrupt whatever fragile unity 
might be forged by two sides previously at war with each other. 
This could then fuel the anger of one side, which may feel that 
the law is biased against it as the 'oppressor' group, when in fact 
this is often a record of human rights crimes committed by the 
oppressed group as well.  The issue is not a simple one, for in 
recognizing that both sides produced victims, one may seem to 
be applying the same moral standards to the actions of the 
oppressor and those of the cycle of hatred and revenge, it is 
important first to acknowledge, as did the TRC, that human 
rights abuses were committed by both sides, and then to find an 
effective way of moving society forward.492 
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6.      The Commission proclaimed: 
 
.... one can say that the information in the hands of the 
Commission made it impossible to claim, for example, thai: the 
practice of torture by the state security forces was not systematic 
and widespread; that only a few 'rotten eggs" or 'bad apples' 
committed gross violations of human rights; that the state was 
not directly and indirectly involved in 'Black-on-Black' violence; 
that the chemical and biological warfare program was only of a 
defensive nature; that slogans by sections of the liberation 
movement did not contribute to killings of "settlers' or farmers; 
and that the accounts of gross human rights violations in the 
African National Congress (ANC) camps were the consequence 
of state disinformation. Thus, disinformation about the past that 
had been accepted as truth by some members of society lost 
much of its credibility.493 
 
7.      In fact, punishment and prosecution of the perpetrators were not conceived as 
an initial vehicle for dealing or engaging with the past (in fact, the TRC 
approach was consistent with the perpetrators “being granted amnesties 
conditional on full disclosure, in effect an exchange of truth for identity”).494 
 
8.      Formerly the main options for reconciliation had been that of (retributive) 
‘Justice’ (i.e. the torturers and killers should be punished and prosecuted, as in 
the Nuremberg Trial), ‘Amnesty’ (i.e. the perpetrators of political abuse should 
be officially indemnified and pardoned to clean the slate), or ‘Amnesia’ (i.e. the 
divisible disputes or violence of the past should be forgotten, if not forgiven, as 
in the case of Spain).495 
 
9.      For example, when this was inquired about, one White South African focus 
group replied with the following comments: 
 
-Yes, all these things when they came out at the TRC, I thought, 
my God, where was I living? Was that in South Africa? 
 
-It's a very good point. 
 
-The Whites, you didn't know any of that was going on. You 
looked on apartheid and you were comfortable because you 
could go to the shops and go where you liked. 
 
-It was a very clever system. 
 
-It was wonderful, but I didn't know these things were happening. 
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I was shocked to learn what was going on. But that was the 
government we were living under. 
 
-I remember having arguments with my father. He was saying, 
'don't believe everything you get told." I'm telling him. 'this is 
happening to my friends" and he kept saying they were 
Communists and ... 
 
-That's it. you see! Because that is what the justification for all 
this was, to us. 
-It was the brainwashing. 
 
Q.  So there are quite a lot of people here, let me understand 
this nicely, you're saying that to some or to a large extent you 
weren't actually aware of the atrocities until you saw ... 
 
-I think we were aware of people being separated, separate toilets, 
buses, you know this.  The superficial things. 
 
-But, in my opinion ... I can remember growing up. hearing 
drums on the farm, having a wonderful time and to me, that was 
some of their choice. 
 
-They were happy living in these ... 
 
-Yes, they were happy. We were ignorant in a sense of knowing 
what actually really went on.496 
 
10.    Whites cannot have helped but be impressed by the graciousness and 
magnanimity of Nelson Mandela, the former Black President of South African 
in the early days of the transition.  “Mandela's continuous pleas for tolerance 
and reconciliation—not to mention his well-publicised donning of a rugby shirt 
(the sport of choice among Whites)—have undoubtedly contributed to more 
benign racial attitudes among Whites.”497 
 
11.     When inquiring about the following questions, one Black South African focus 
group replied with following comments: 
 
Q. (Reads second statement: Those struggling for and against 
apartheid did terrible things to others.) What do you think of 
that? 
 
-It's very true, both sides have blood on their hands. 
 
Even the so-called liberators had very inhumane methods that 
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they used when they wanted to put through a message—in camps 
abroad and within the country. A lot of people were hurt in the 
townships, if you were successful you were accused of selling 
out.  We as Blacks don't empower our people, Whites lift each 
other up. When we Blacks get to the top, we forget our own. 
 
. Q. Anyone else? 
 
-It's true, both sides did bad things. 
 
Q, You only mention the liberation movements, why not the 
White regime? 
 
-That is obvious, with them we don't even need to mention it, 
because we know exactly what happened. 
 
Q, But was it justified for both camps to do what they did? 
 
-Not at all. 
 
But in those days there was no time to think about whether the 
actions were justified or not. 
 
Q. So both sides did wrong? 
 
-Yes. 
 
Two wrongs don't make a right.498   
 
12.     In 1982, the first recorded death from AIDS happened in South Africa.  
Within a decade, the number of recorded AIDS cases had increased to over 
1,000 and by the mid-1990s, it became 10, 000.499  In the late 1980s, the 
South African Chamber Mines started an education campaign to attempt to 
stem the increase in cases.  Yet, without a change in the situations of mine 
workers, a key factor contributing to the plague, success could seldom be 
anticipated.  “Long periods away from home under bleak conditions and a few 
days leave a month were the apartheid-induced realities of the life thousands of 
miners and other laborers worked.”500  Compounding the issue was the fact 
that as of the mid-1990s, many public health authorities in South Africa still 
concentrated more on tuberculosis than HIV.   
 
13.     Also, as a part of the decolonization process, the Dutch colonial authority 
promoted West Papua to participate in regional affairs.  Under the ten-year 
Papuanization project, significant numbers of West Papuan students were sent 
                                                  
498 Ibid, p. 146. 
499 Omnipelagos. History of South Africa in the Apartheid Era. 2006. 
    http://www.omnipelagos.com/entry?n=history_of_South_Africa_in_the_apartheid_era b 
500 Ibid. 
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to Fiji, PNG and Europe to receive education.  Four West Papuan medical 
students were sent to Fiji to receive education to learn at the Suva Medical 
College whereas seven West Papuan medical students, including Prof. Adolf 
Saweri, who is now Dean of the Faculty of Medicine at the University of PNG, 
were sent to PNG.501  Under these exchange programs, geographical, racial 
and political relationships with the neighbouring Pacific Islands states were 
well created. 
 
14.     Vanuatu, PNG, Pacific Civil Society Forum, the Pacific Conference of 
Churches (PCC), and Pacific Concern Resource Centre (PCRC) have played an 
important role in supporting the cause of West Papua.  These can be seen from 
the following events: 
 
Vanuatu  
 
z In September 2000, the Vanuatu Prime Minister included 
three West Papuans in his delegation to the UN Millennium 
Summit in New York.  In his Millennium Address, the 
Prime Minister requested the UN to rectify its mistake in 
1969 that caused much suffering in West Papua.  Two other 
Pacific Nations, Nauru and Tuvalu have also included the 
issue of West Papua in their respective address.   
 
z During Vanuatu’s independence celebrations in July 2000, a 
Memorandum of Understanding was signed in Port Vila 
between the leaders of the two National organizations, the 
OPM and PDP. 
 
z In September 2002, in his address of the [UN General 
Assembly] UNGA, the Foreign Minister of Vanuatu, 
requested the UN place West Papua on the UN 
Decolonization Committee.  On his return from New York 
he announced that the Vanuatu Government had decided to 
allow West Papuans to open their office in Vanuatu.   
 
z In March 26, 2003 the Vanuatu government welcomed the 
setting up of West Papua Representative office in Port Vila.  
The office is run by Dr. Otto Ondawame a West Papuan 
graduate of the Australian National University. 
 
z On the 30th July 2003 and 2004, the people of Vanuatu 
allowed raising the West Papuan National Flag, Morning 
Star during the 23rd and 24th Anniversary of Independence 
Day of Vanuatu in Port Vila. 
 
                                                  
501 Ondawame, O. West Papua: New Prospects for Change. A Briefing Paper No1. Representatives of West Papuan Representative 
    Office: Republic of Vanuatu, 2005, p. 3. 
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z West Papua also enjoyed support from grass roots 
organizations, politicians, the NGOs, traditional council, 
women organization, churches and government of Vanuatu.  
On 25th October 2003 and 5th March 2004, new support 
groups were established on Loganville in Santo, and Port 
Vila respectively.  Major of Luganville, [Paul Hakwa, 
openly advocated an independent West Papua throughout the 
establishment of the support group in Luganville.] 
 
z A successful lobby was conducted by the Government of 
Vanuatu providing new possibility.  In a meeting between 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Vanuatu, the Hon. Serge Vohor, and Secretary General of the 
UN, Dr. Koffy Anan, in September 2003, both leaders agreed 
to launch an Integral Inquiry within the UN that was 
responsible for investigating the conduct in relation to the 
Act. 
 
z Vanuatu Government sponsored the issue of West Papua to 
34th PIF-meeting in Auckland and included West Papua 
representative, Dr Otto Ondawame, in his official delegation 
to the meeting.   
 
z On 21st May 2004, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon. 
Moana C. Kasolil, called a round - table conference between 
the people of West Papua and the Government of Indonesia 
in Port Vila addressing the current problem in West Papua, 
but Jakarta did not give any response.   
 
z Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon. Barak Sope in his 
powerful address at the 59th Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly meeting in New York on 28th September, 
and the Hon. Barak Sope said: “The United Nations must be 
consistent in its decisions for the recognition and respect of 
the fundamental rights to self-determination for the people of 
West Papua.  The truth surrounding the so called Act of 
Free Choice must be exposed to the Melanesian sisters and 
brothers of West Papua, and to the rest of the international 
community; the saddest of all is the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 2504 on West Papua in 1969.  How can the UN 
continue to ignore the cries of over three million people 
demanding justice?  The Hon. Barak Sope underlined the 
importance of respect for and recognition of the rights of 
West Papua in accordance with the UN’s own charters and 
principles.  In his view, the UN must take responsibility to 
restore its own image and bring a lasting peace to West 
Papua.  And urged the UN to undertake the following calls: 
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-the establishment of a Secial Commission of Enquiry to 
review the UN’s conduct in relation to the 1969 Act 
 
- the UN to send a fact-finding missions to examine the 
situation in West Papua 
 
- the re-inscription of West Papua on the List of the UN as 
one of the remaining Non-Self-Governing Territories 
z Head of State of Vanuatu, President Kalkot Mataskelekele, 
raised the issue of West Papua with his counter partner, 
President Bambang Susilo Yudhiyono, during 50th 
Asia-Africa Non-Alliance Movement conference in 
Bandung, May 2005.  In his prayer, the President called the 
Government of Indonesia to settle the conflict peacefully.   
 
z It was a diplomatic success defeating Indonesian cheap 
propaganda.  Such victory can be measured from those 
immediate expressions given by more than one hundred 
delegates who participated in the meeting.502 
 
Papua New Guinea 
 
z Melanesian Solidarity Group has been one of the longest 
support groups for West Papua since its establishment in 
1980s.  They mobilized support not only in PNG but also in 
the Melanesian region.  Public awareness campaign and 
solidarity networks have been major tasks of the group.   
 
z PNG churches and the Catholic Church in particular have 
taken the issues of justice, human rights and refugees as one 
of the priorities in their policies.  Over 3,000 West Papuan 
refugees in Vanimo and East Awin camps were looked after 
by the Catholic Church. 
 
z University of PNG has also advocated more about an 
independent West Papua by calling the Government of PNG 
to take a positive step to end violence in West Papua and 
then find a peaceful solution of the problem.   
 
z PNG West Papua Association is a newly established 
solidarity group, which association has tasks such as public 
awareness campaigns, lobbying government and politics, 
advocacy and networking and strengthening solidarity 
networks.   
 
                                                  
502 Ibid, pp. 18-19. 
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z Civil Society at large and people along the border region 
have played crucial roles in supporting the cause of West 
Papua.  They provide shelter, food, land, protection, 
financial and material support since the movement was 
organized in the border region.   
 
z In March 15, 2005, a new solidarity group was established in 
Port Moresby.  Advocacy works, networking, lobbying and 
public awareness campaigns are primary tasks of this 
group.503 
 
Pacific Civil Society Forum 
 
Pacific Civil Society Forum held on August 15, 2003 in Auckland 
simultaneously as the Pacific Islands Forum held its meeting.  Broad 
representatives of Pacific NGOs co-coordinated by the Coalition for 
International Development participated in the Forum.  The Forum officially 
declared the following demands: 
 
z Grant observer status to West Papuan representatives 
 
z Call on the Secretary-General of the UN to review the 
conduct of the ‘Act of Free Choice’ 
 
z Call on the UN to re-list West Papua onto the List of 
Non-Self Governing Territories.504 
 
The Pacific Conference of Churches (PCC) 
 
After years of disregarding the self-determination issue of West Papua, the 
World Council of Churches (WCC) decided at the 8th meeting in Harare, 
Zimbabwe to dispatch an ecumenical delegation to West Papua in 1999.  
Since then, the member churches of WCC have also expressed concerns over 
the West Papua issue.  The WCC/PCC Pacific Workshop on Peoples Struggle 
for Land and Identity in September 2000 declared: 
 
z The Churches in the Pacific and the PCC be requested to 
continue to support the struggle of Peoples of West Papua 
and to lobby their respective governments for support for 
their self-determination for listing on the UN Decolonization 
list.   
 
z That the churches in the Pacific and PCC request WCC to 
liaise with the UN Commission Human Rights to appoint a 
Special Rapporteur to investigate human rights abuses in 
                                                  
503 Ibid, p. 23. 
504 Ibid, p. 22. 
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[West] Papua including the mass killing of almost 1 million.   
 
z That PCC be requested to take the Program of West Papua as 
a priority in its program of activities.505   
 
Pacific Concern Resource Centre (PCRC) 
 
PCRC realizes the continuing important role played by the Papua New Guinea 
Council of Churches with its associated members, particularly the Catholic 
Church in the issue of border crossers and their sustenance in PNG.   
 
z In April 2000, PCRC declared West Papua a priority 
campaign issue for the Decolonization Desk.   
 
z In response to a push initiated by a group of [states] 
including Indonesia and Australia to abolish the Special 
Committee on Decolonization, PCRC petitioned the UN 
Pacific Regional Seminar in 2000 not to abolish the UN 
Special Committee on Decolonization because of unfinished 
decolonization processes in the Caribbean and Pacific 
region.   
 
z In 2004, Rex Rumakiek, West Papuan leader was employed 
as Assistant Director for decolonization of the centre.506 
 
15.    Since 2003, these organizations established many social and political 
manifestations.  Major events include: 
 
z In July 30, 2003, the representative of West Papua in 
Vanuatu participated in the 23rd Anniversary of Vanuatu 
Independence Day and raised West Papua flag and exhibited 
Papuan situation in Freshwater IV, Port Vila. 
 
z In 24th October 2003, new Vanuatu Association for Free 
West Papua was launched in Luganville where Dr. Otto 
Ondawame and Lord Major of Luganville, Paul Hakwe, 
opened the launch.   
 
z In 5th June 2004, a new support group was established in 
Port Vila and this was launched by Ms. Hilda Lini, the 
former MP and Minister for Health during Lini Government 
in the post independence.   
 
z In July 30, 2004, once again the representative office was 
invited to participate in the 24th Independent anniversary and 
                                                  
505 Ibid, p. 22-23. 
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raised the West Papuan flag.   
 
z On 6th November 2004, the Melanesian Trust invited the 
West Papuan representatives to attend the conference on 
sustainable development and environmental protection in 
Melanesia.  The conference took resolution on West Papua 
and Kanaky and called for an independent West Papua and 
Kanaky.   
 
z On 1st December 2004, more than 300 hundred Chiefs from 
all islands of Vanuatu attended 43rd West Papuan National 
Flag Day in Port Vila.  In the opening speech, the Hon. 
Barak Sope reconfirmed the longstanding commitment of 
the people and Government of Vanuatu to continue to 
support the struggle for Independence in West Papua. 
 
z In 19th May 2005, Port Vila based Vanuatu Free West Papua 
association organized a peaceful demonstration against the 
visit of Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, Imran Cotan and 
his cultural group.  In the event, the group pulled down the 
Indonesian flag and covered his car with Morning Star, the 
West Papuan National Flag. 
 
z June 2005, new memorandum of understanding and 
cooperation was reached between Vanuatu Chief Council 
and Prime Minister, the Right Hon. Ham Lini in custom 
ceremony and made their commitments to continue 
supporting West Papua. 
 
z In 25th June 2005, West Papuan Cup in relation to 25th Silver 
Jubilee of Vanuatu Independence Day was launched by Dr. 
Otto Ondawame, the main sponsor, in Luganville, Santo.  
Football trophies and 150,000 Vatu were offered to 
Chairman of the Independent Celebration, MP Jack Eric.  
Chiefs from North of Vanuatu called the Government of 
Vanuatu to grant a Permanent member of MSG to West 
Papua.  Lord major of Luganville, Brown Hill called the 
Government of Vanuatu to put West Papua on the agenda of 
MSG and grant a Permanent member of the Group that will 
have direct effects for Melanesian Games, Pacific Arts 
Festival and Pacific Games in the future. 
 
z Council of Chiefs of Maiwo, Luganville, Epi, Pentecost, 
Efate, and Olry called the Government of Vanuatu to grant a 
Permanent member of the MSG and insisted any idea to 
inclusion of Indonesia into the MSG-meetings.507 
                                                  
507 Ibid, p. 20-21. 
  
172
 
16.     The MSG as a political body has successfully observed and settled down ethnic 
and political conflicts in its member states.  The participation of MSG 
peacekeeping force in ethnic conflicts in Solomon Islands and Fiji are two 
obvious examples.  Also the Kanaky issue was strongly assisted by member 
states of the MSG. 
 
 
Chapter 8 
 
1. There have also been several other cases.  For example, the 1974 agreement 
mentioned in chapter 5 also included respect for the existence of Amungme and 
acknowledgement of their land rights.508  However, Freeport had disregarded 
implementing these aspects specified in the agreement.  This resulted in the 
open resentment of Amungme.  Four years later in 1978, the Amungme in 
collaboration with OPM assaulted the Freeport installation, “including 
pipelines that transferred ore from mining areas to the ships.”509  This was 
often their way of showing their resentment over inequality, and the lack of 
respect for their initial human rights, including the right to self-determination.  
Also, in the most recent attack in September 3, 2006, the OPM assaulted 
Freeport and it led to the death of three Freeport staff in the Amole Task 
Unit/Mobile Brigade. 510  This has resulted in RioTinto/Freeport with the 
cooperation of the TNI/Police engaging in strategic action by placing thousands 
of troops in the Mile 68 and Kwanki Lama areas.511  A OPM member says 
that the one of the reasons for this assault was the company’s exploitation of 
West Papua’s wealth and this indicates that there are a certain number of West 
Papuans who still distrust the company and who do not perceive the company’s 
community development initiatives to be on their behalf. 
 
2. The General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 declares              
that: 
 
z The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination 
and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human 
rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is 
an impediment to the promotion of world peace and 
co-operation. 
 
z All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.   
 
z Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational 
                                                  
508 See Chapter 5, p. 67 of this thesis. 
509 UT Watch. The Impacts of Freeport’s Mining Activities on the Amungme and Kamoro People in West Papua. 2005. 
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preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying 
independence.   
 
z All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed 
against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable 
them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete 
independence and the integrity of their national territory 
shall be respected. 
 
z Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and 
Non-Self-Governing territories or all other territories which 
have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to 
the peoples of those territories without any conditions or 
reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will 
and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or color, 
in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and 
freedom. 
 
z Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the 
national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is 
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations.  
 
z All states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provision 
of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on 
the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs 
of all states, and respect for the sovereign rights of all 
peoples and their territorial integrity.512 
 
3. Peaceful dialogue is one of the possible alternatives to conflict resolution.  To 
successfully settle the conflict via peaceful dialogue, it is important for the 
involved parties to understand the meaning and practice of peaceful d   ialogue 
and then engage in the peace process.  It needs a common understanding and trust.  
However, one lasting issue in West Papua regarding peaceful dialogue is that 
Indonesia and West Papua have different views on the meaning of it due to the 
different important conflicts of interests between them.  For Indonesia, any way of 
conducting peaceful dialogue indicates a suicidal, commitment of itself leading to 
destabilizing the Indonesian unity and sovereignty.  On the other hand, for West 
Papuans, peaceful dialogue is one of the best ways for not only establishing a 
common trust and understanding between the two parties but also to create a strong 
basis for future peaceful dialogues.  For these reasons, the different views of 
peaceful dialogue between the two parties have, until today, prevented the 
much-needed dialogue. 
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